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GERMANY 
HER- OWN 
m JUDGE 




BY H. J. SUTER-LERCH 




*? i *? 



GERMANY HER OWN JUDGE 



GERMANY 

HER OWN JUDGE 

REPLY OF 
A COSMOPOLITAN SWISS 
TO GERMAN PROPAGANDA 

BY 
H. J. SUTER-LERCH 

Translated from the German 




BOSTON AND NEW YORK 

HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY 
1918 



^^r^^ 



^'^t 



Printed in the United States of America 



PREFACE 

TO THE SECOND GERMAN EDITION 

The present second edition can appear at a con- 
siderably reduced price, since it has undergone no 
vital alteration and the type of the earlier edition 
is therefore mostly available. 

It is important for the majority of the Swiss liv- 
ing abroad that the opinion which they hold in over- 
whelming proportion on the subject of the respon- 
sibility for the world war should become known in 
a form accessible if possible to all classes at home. 
Even to-day a section of the German-Swiss press 
is treating the question of responsibility, which is so 
preeminently important in any peace negotiations, 
far too superficially; to this section it appears ad- 
vantageous, for financial and professional reasons, 
to serve the German side. This unjust, and there- 
fore damaging, procedure is awakening in foreign 
countries an intelligible disgust with ever3^hing 
that is German-Swiss, and from this not only the 
Swiss abroad, but also the Motherland may suffer. A 
strict control of the press on the part of the public 
is therefore desirable. The present cheaper edition 
is intended to play its part in making the control 
stricter. 

In order to meet the accusation of prejudice, the 
second edition excludes every documentary proof 
which is not acknowledged as accurate by both 



vi Preface 

sides, and therefore by the accused parties. Natur- 
ally all unsubstantiated attempts at exoneration to 
be found in war propaganda must be disregarded, 
for it is the duty of all impartial historical students 
to use only authentic material. 

We emphatically defend our point of view about 
the responsibility for the war, because the comfort- 
able but inaccurate subterfuge according to which 
''all the States willed the war'* favours the rise of 
an universal anarchistic Babel after the war. And 
that is a result which would in the end benefit no 
class of society, but would harm the whole of hu- 
manity. 

The Author 



ABBREVIATIONS 

N.Z.Z. = Neue Ziircher Zeitung 
B.N. = Easier Nachrichten 



CONTENTS 

Introduction ix 

I. The "Belgian State Papers" .... 3 

II. German and English International Policy . 9 

III. The Russian and the Prussian "Dangers" . 24 

IV. Origin and Nature of the Entente Policy . 35 
V. Breakdown of the Entente Policy ... 48 

VI. Policy in the Balkans 65 

VII. How Austria annexed Bosnia .... 79 

VIII. Serbia before the Outbreak of War . . 93 

IX. The Outbreak of War: Part I — The 

Austro-Serbian Dispute 100 

X. The Outbreak of War: Part II — The Russo- 

German Dispute 120 



INTRODUCTION 

To Neutrals: 
"Logic, not race sympathy!" 

Herr Avenarius, the German, disapproves of 
reserve! Still, following the hint of Spitteler, I 
intended to keep silent till the end of the war and 
only to publish my notes after the conclusion of 
peace. I had a feeling that a neutral who has no 
intention of taking an active part in a struggle 
must remain dumb till the war is ended, from sim- 
ple tact — from tact towards his neighbours as well 
as from respect for his own Government ! But the 
loud tone and the aberrations of writers in the Ger- 
man camp ("Stimmen im Sturm,'* etc.) force me 
to immediate speech. 

So let Herr Avenarius listen! 

First of all, to avoid mistakes, let me introduce 
myself to the reader. 

I am a German -Swiss, or, more accurately, a cos- 
mopolitan who has seen too much to back any race 
or people without reason. My earliest youth was 
spent in Russia. ^'A pro-Russian in disguise, I sup- 
pose/' Not at all. Although we Germans (from 
Germany and Switzerland) met with a hospitality 
in Russia which deserves our fullest gratitude, we 
mostly kept the strongest attachment to our West- 
ern homes. And this was nowhere more apparent 



X Introduction 

than in my own family, as we had a Swiss tutor for 
our early education instead of going to a Russian 
school. Our social intercourse at that time was con- 
fined to a small circle of German and Swiss resi- 
dents. Then I went to school at Zurich. And nearly 
ten years' stay in Zurich made me completely Swiss. 
It was not till my return to Russia for some years' 
stay that I came in closer contact with the Russian 
character. Although I came to value much in it 
highly, I felt more at home in German surround- 
ings in consequence of my education. I have very 
often taken Germany's part against Germans born 
and educated in Russia! My inadequate knowledge 
of the Russian language and my strong feeling for 
the West alienated my sympathies from Russia in 
no small degree. So I chose Germany for my perma- 
nent home as it was thoroughly sympathetic to me in 
many respects^ not least politically. The new Ger- 
man ''Kultur'' indeed, which I met in Berlin, did 
not wholly fulfill my expectations; for the old com- 
fort, charming simplicity, and honesty were more 
and more being ousted by ostentation, cold shoddy 
glitter, and the last thing in materialism.^ Yet I 
still continued to defend Germany as often and as 
well as I could. 

I used to say that elsewhere too the growth of the 
moral cancer was to be noticed, that the Empire, 
and especially the Southern States, should not be 

^ Cf. inter alia Sudermann's poem "Was wir waren" {Berliner 
Tageblatt, August, 1914); also the opinions of Th. Oehler, director 
of German Missions (B.N. 21 supplement); and the Crown Prince 
{Deutschland in Waff en) , etc. 



Introduction xi 

measured by the standard of Berlin ; I would praise 
German order in contrast to the Apache licence of 
Paris, to the unrest in the French vineyards, and 
so forth. I lived nearly ten years in Germany with 
the firm intention of remaining there; at most I 
should have exchanged the capital for Munich and 
the Starnbergersee, as those districts are more con- 
genial to a German-Swiss. What bound me to Ger- 
many was the conservative spirit, which establishes 
order for the present and brings security for the fu- 
ture by its system of entails and family trusts — 
and these are growing more and more common even 
among the middle classes. This feeling of security 
is weaker in democracies from the fear of vague and 
extravagant desires on the part of an often im- 
provident proletariat. I noted, too, that the general 
tone of the people grows more refined under a mon- 
archy — which agreeably impresses a foreigner. 

The war broke out. The German method of 
opening the war, the violation of Belgian neutral- 
ity, and even more the white robes which German 
propaganda assumed, disgusted me utterly. My 
unusual position made me too impartial to believe 
the legend of foreign attack (cf. chs. ix and x). I 
left Germany, which I had held so high in my es- 
timation, in disgust, in spite of friendly relations 
and many other pleasant recollections.^ 

I went to my own country. The impression which 

* I read lately, in a correspondence from the United States, a 
passage which pictured the experiences I had had myself (B.N. 
445): "Those classes which before the war had the greatest feeling 
for German culture mostly declare themselves against Germany." 



xii Introduction 

I got there was a depressing one. It was as if the 
German war wave had advanced the frontier of the 
Empire from the Rhine to the St. Gothard. I will 
not attempt to hold up a true mirror to Switzerland, 
for her to see the picture which she then presented 
to a newly returned Swiss of cosmopolitan sym- 
pathies like myself. I will only call to remembrance 
that an exaggerated, almost blind, belief in ''Ger- 
man truth" reigned among the German-Swiss, and 
among the Latins an overloud declaration for right 
and freedom. Even though (as I believe) the war 
had been staged and opened by certain Prussian 
circles in order finally to establish German predomi- 
nance, noisy partisanship by small States would 
have been useless to the group of Powers attacked 
and actually dangerous for the small States them- 
selves. For the issue of the war appeared likely 
at the beginning to be preeminently in favour of the 
attacking side. As the neutrals had failed to inter- 
vene on the lines of the Anglo-American pacifism 
when Austria sent her ultimatum to Serbia, any 
later pronouncement was futile. 

Many Swiss fall to-day into the opposite error; 
they hold that true neutrality precludes all free 
judgment. That is obviously wrong; it is pre- 
cisely the neutral who can deliver an impartial 
verdict — a verdict based solely on logic and free 
from all race sympathy. The longer the war lasts, 
the less can we suspend judgment. There are, indeed, 
many who hold the opinion that the division of 
our people into two camps to some extent insures 
our neutrality. That would be a sign of intellectual 



Introduction xiii 

poverty; our neutrality should spring from a rea- 
sonable will and not from internal division. This di- 
vision is no help to our political unity! The only 
real neutral is the man who can deliver an impartial 
judgment in spite of his national sympathies, and 
who — even though this judgment must recognize 
right to be disconcertingly stronger on the one side 
— shows his weapons equally to both groups and 
behaves as tactfully to one side as to the other. 



GERMANY HER OWN JUDGE 



GERMANY HER OWN JUDGE 

CHAPTER I 
THE "BELGIAN STATE PAPERS" 

The world war was originally represented on the 
German side as a purely defensive war. German 
propaganda, however, gradually shifted its ground 
from "a hostile attack" to a war '' forced upon us." 
And now it is attempting to justify this preventive 
war, for which purpose it relies extensively on the 
so-called "Belgian State Papers." As these docu- 
ments will also play a prominent part in my ar- 
gument, I think it relevant to begin with a short 
commentary on them. 

The "Belgian State Papers" are a collection of 
letters from Belgian diplomatists, which the Ger- 
man Foreign Office selected for publication from 
among the correspondence discovered in Brussels. 
The object, as Herr von Bethmann says, is "to 
show the world that even neutral statesmen in 
Berlin, Paris, and London saw preeminent danger 
in the policy of the Entente." The documents prove, 
indeed, that up to the German declaration of war 
the Belgians were no friends of the policy of the 
Entente, which confirms Herr von Bethmann's 
earlier confession that "a wrong had been done to 
Belgium by Germany." But they further prove to 
us, as I will show in detail in the fifth chapter, that 



4 Germany Her Own Judge 

Edward the Seventh's preventive policy, which met 
with a very varied reception in neutral countries, 
was shipwrecked on the obstructively democratic 
mentality of the English people; and that there- 
fore there is no excuse whatever for the German 
preventive war. Hence the publication of the " Bel- 
gian State Papers '* is the greatest blunder of the 
whole German propaganda. 

Doubtless the reader is favourably impressed by 
the German side at first, owing to the very care- 
ful selection of the letters and also to the fact that 
certain passages, which favour Germany, are em- 
phasized by heavy type. But the more closely he 
examines the documents, the more he is convinced 
that the publication of the ''State Papers" com- 
pletely misses its mark. In the first place, students 
of the most recent European history will find gaps, 
incriminating Germany, in the selection and se- 
quence of the letters. Secondly, it will make an 
unfavourable impression on any impartial neutral 
that the collection includes such a disproportionate 
number of letters from the Belgian representative 
in Berlin, Baron Greindl, whose sympathies were 
Pan-German. These are in sharp contrast with the 
utterances of the other representatives (which are 
naturally not in heavy type). Baron Greindl, who 
chose as his favourite paper the Pan-German Kreuz- 
zeitungy who untiringly forwarded to his Government 
with approval the weekly reports of the well-known 
Pan-German Professor Schiemann, produces an ab- 
solutely repellent effect by his exaggerated German 
racial sympathy. He writes, for instance: — 



The Belgian State Papers 5 

Behind the agreements, concluded or contemplated, there 
is always in evidence the hatred of Germany, which is kept 
alive in Paris by the perpetual memory of the humiliation 
of 1870, in London by jealousy of the development of Ger- 
many's trade, industry, and navy, and in St. Petersburg by 
nothing but prejudice and the boundless Slav pride which 
feels injured by the contrast between German civilization 
and Muscovite barbarism. (No. 26.) 

What unworthy language for a diplomat! The 
words might come straight from the lips of the 
Pan-German professor Schiemann. A true neutral 
thirsts for documentary proof and nothing else; 
provocative outbursts rouse his disgust! But Herr 
von Greindl feeds us up with unproved assertions, 
and these are emphasized in the German collection 
by heavy type, although they contradict state- 
ments of his Belgian colleagues. As an instance 
I may cite his remarks on the French idea of re- 
vanche: — 

When has the peace of Europe been threatened, except 
by the French idea of revanche 7 (No. 39.) 

A real and lasting rapprochement between Berlin and 
Paris would presuppose the elimination of the idea of re- 
vanche; but there is no Frenchman, even among the most 
sensible and peace-loving, who does not cherish the hope of 
revanche in his heart of hearts. (No. 36.) 

So writes Herr von Greindl from Berlin. But the 
contrary views of the Ambassador in Paris, Herr 
A. Leghait, — the man on the spot, — are not in 
heavy type : — 

If France after long years of slumbering peace is thinking 
of sharpening her sword again, we must not assuijie that 
file is urged to do so by lust of conquest; (No. 11.) "' 

Her readiness for defence is under consideration and 



6 Germany Her Own Judge 

c6'!niparisons are being made with the powerful organiza- 
tion of her Eastern neighbour (Germany). (No. 1 1.) 

It is certain that French poHcy is conducted with the 
idea of peace. (No. 51.) 

Herr von Greindl makes great play, too, — un- 
fortunately also without documentary proof, — 
with the ostensible objects of the policy of the 
Entente: — 

I do not question Sir Edward Grey*s sincerity; but it is 
nevertheless true that, with or without written or verbal 
commitments, every one in England or France regards the 
Entente Cordiale as a defensive and offensive alliance 
against Germany. This corresponds exactly to the charac- 
ter which the late King of England wanted to give it. The 
Entente Cordiale was not founded on the positive basis of 
defence of common interests, but on the negative basis of 
hatred of the German Empire! (No. 85.) 

Yet this is answered in modest ordinary type by 
the remarks of his Belgian colleagues from London 
and Paris : — 

France, who sincerely desires the preservation of peace 
and the improvement of her relations with Germany, will 
have to make great diplomatic efforts to prove in Berlin 
that the Entente Cordiale need not alarm Germany and 
was not concluded to prevent German expansion. (Leghait, 
Paris, No. 24.) 

Certain Jingo organs of the London press declare that 
Great Britain will have to support the French Cabinet, if 
the Imperial German Government shows signs of exercis- 
ing pressure. It hardly appears as if this would be in con- 
formity with the attitude of so peace-loving a Government 
as that of Mr. Asquith. (Lalaing, London, the Morocco 
Question, No. 69.) 

Grey's position is not free from difficulties; on the one 
hand he would naturally like to conserve his relations with 
Germany, which have improved recently, while on the other 



The Belgian State Papers 7 

hand he would not like to give the impression of not siff>- 
porting France. {Ibid,, No. 74.) 

Thus an attentive reader finds a large number of 
the crudest contradictions in the '^ Belgian State 
Papers," as might be expected in the publication 
of personal opinions ^ even from the pens of active 
diplomats. Only such statements, therefore, have 
a historical value, which describe events, or which 
are, at any rate, to some extent supported by proofs. 

On the whole, on the strength of many of these 
'* State Papers,*' the reader gets the firm conviction 
that the Belgians, even in London and Paris, had 
little sympathy with the policy of the Entente. This 
is intelligible. The former grouping of the Powers, 
which separated France and Germany into two 
camps, renewed the danger of invasion for Belgium 
with each European conflict. Therefore the Bel- 
gians favoured a rapprochement between France 
and Germany, which would have removed all dan- 
ger for Belgium. The growing preponderance of 
Germany was regarded with calm resignation as 
inevitable : — 

In a few years a balance of power between France and 
her neighbour (Germany) will be no longer possible. Ger- 
many need only have patience, need only continuously in- 
crease her economic and financial strength in peace, need 
only await the effect of her superior birth-rate, in order to 
dominate all Central Europe without contradiction and 
without a struggle. (Beyens, No. 118.) 

Every attempt of the Franco-Russian alliance 
to preserve the European balance of power — 
whether by increasing their own armies or by the 



8 Germany Her Own Judge 

accession of the British Fleet (the Entente policy) 
— was, as is intelligible, condemned by Belgium, 
as she imagined that her painful position between 
the hammer and the anvil was thereby protracted. 
The possibility of seeing their country entangled 
in a foreign war naturally disturbed the Belgians 
more than the fear of a German hegemony. 

Hence the heavy- type extracts in the "State 
Papers. '* 

But France, Russia, and England had other 
views about the balance of power in Europe and 
about the preservation of the status quo ante on the 
Continent and on the sea. 



CHAPTER II 

GERMAN AND ENGLISH INTERNATIONAL 
POLICY 

I. The Origins of German Colonial Policy 
The origin of the hankering after colonial power 
dates from the concluding years of Emperor William 
the First's reign. The desire of the commercial cir- 
cles of Bremen and Hamburg for colonies of their 
own found a willing ear in the son of the Crown 
Prince, the present Emperor. Troubles with na- 
tives and difficulties raised by foreign nations af- 
forded this desire certain justification. At that time, 
however, it encountered opposition from the bulk 
of the German people, as far-seeing circles feared 
future complications and dangers. Indeed, there 
was a great danger that appetite might grow with 
success and that the next generation might blossom 
out from colonial desires to desire for world-power. 
To satisfy such wishes, Germany would inevitably 
have to cross the path of other States. For in con- 
sequence of the late awakening of her colonial policy 
(England began in 1602, Germany in 1883), the 
youthful Germany found the world more or less 
divided up, with the exception of a few districts 
(containing points of vital strategic importance) 
under Moslem rule. And on two of these points 
England had already laid her hand, namely, Gi- 
braltar and the Suez Canal (the purchase of the 



10 Germany Her Own Judge 

shares took place in 1875), in order to secure her 
direct sea route to India. 

2. Naval Rivalry 

The Emperor William II realized that a larger 
fleet was requisite for the entry of Germany into 
the ranks of the World Powers. Unfortunately he 
went too far in his efforts in this direction, for he 
aimed at outstripping the English fleet. With this 
object Germany refused every programme of pro- 
portionate armaments which England proposed. 
(Proportion of 10 to 16; also, the so-called ^' Naval 
Holiday.*' Cf. German pacifist literature.) 

But as soon as any fleet is greater than the Brit- 
ish one, the danger of encirclement would exist 
permanently and in its sharpest form for the island 
empire, whose fleet is the equivalent of the land 
army of a Continental State. While it is exceed- 
ingly difficult effectively to encircle a Continental 
State on account of its many neighbours, England 
is at the mercy of any State with a more powerful 
fleet. So the State which aims at outstripping the 
English fleet is pursuing against England nothing 
else than a policy of encirclement, and from the 
modern German point of view would give England 
the moral right to set the world ablaze. 

3. The Balance of Power in Europe 
The consequence of this special position of Eng- 
land is that she cannot permit the marked pre- 
dominance of any country on the Continent. The 
more powerful a Continental Power is, the more 



German and English International Policy' 1 1 

greedily does it look at England's possessions in the 
world; but little England cannot by herself deal 
with too strong a Continental Power. ^ It must 
therefore be England's aim to maintain the balance 
of power in Europe as equal as possible, but to 
retain so free a hand in her Continental alliances 
that she can offer her friendship to either group of 
Powers according to circumstances. ^ 

In any case England must actively associate her- 
self with the weaker side as soon as an ambitious 
group becomes aggressive. 

This "police supervision" of Europe by England 
is especially beneficial to the small Continental 
States. For it is obvious that a predominant large 
State only considers the interests of a small State, 
if the latter finds a backing in the balance of power 
which provides the best possible guarantee for the 
status quo ante. 

On the other hand, an attempt by England to 
abuse her position as a World Power as regards the 
Continent in times of peace would bring upon her 
an Anglophobe coalition, which might easily be her 
destruction. 

^ How necessary it is for England to support the weaker mili- 
tary group on the Continent was neatly put in a popular form by 
a German acquaintance of mine. We were discussing at the be- 
ginning of the war the probable enormous French and Russian war 
indemnities (one hundred milliard marks), and the Berliner said: 
"We will build a fleet with the money, and then England had bet- 
ter arm herself!" 

2 Cf. Sir Edward Grey's words at the time of the German-Eng- 
lish rapprochement : "Old friends do not exclude new friendships." 



12 Germany Her Own Judge 

^ 4. The Hegemony of the World 

England, the greatest European sea Power, 
would only become a danger to the world if she 
were to unite with the strongest Continental Power. 
There is no possible doubt now that Germany, the 
mightiest State on land, had been working for this, 
for Herr von Bethmann opposed the English prin- 
ciple of a balance of power ^' which kept Europe 
nervous'' in order, as he confesses in his speech of 
the 2d of December, 1 9 14, to force England into a 
British-German agreement. 

He hoped to achieve this object by the military 
predominance of Germany : — 

. . . England was comparatively the least entangled. An 
attempt at an understanding could most easily be made 
with her, which would have absolutely guaranteed the 
peace of the world ... I never hoped to break down this 
old English principle [of the balance of power] by persua- 
sion. But I thought it possible that the growing power of 
Germany and the increasing risk of war might force Eng- 
land to realize that this ancient principle was untenable 
and impracticable and that a peaceful compact with Ger- 
many was preferable.^ 

The Chancellor's paper, the Norddeutsche All- 
gemeine Zeitung, commented on this (B.N. 172): — 

Supposing a firm and loyal understanding were to be 
established between Germany and England, the danger of 
a European war would be removed so far as human fore- 
sight can reach. France would not dare to provoke a war, 
and other European dangers of war would be nipped in the 

1 The later speeches of the German Chancellor also clearly re- 
vealed this effort to achieve predominant power on the part of 
German policy. 



German and English International Policy 13 

bud by the weight of an Anglo-German agreement. As is 
well known, England did not assent to these proposals. 

It is obvious that this over-powerful Anglo-Ger- 
man hegemony would have meant danger for all 
other States. When, therefore, these intentions on 
Germany's part were revealed for the first time by 
England in this war, the Chancellor hastened to 
calm the fears of the most powerful neutral, Amer- 
ica, by the following statement to one of her press 
representatives : — 

... I reminded the English Ambassador of my long-con- 
tinued efforts to bring about an understanding between 
England and Germany, efforts which, as I suggested to him, 
would have made a general European war impossible and 
fully guaranteed the peace of Europe. Such an understand- 
ing would have formed the basis on which we should have 
approached the United States as a third partner. But Eng- 
land did not accept these views, and by entering the war 
destroyed for ever the hope of their fulfilment. 

England certainly did not refuse Germany's en- 
ticing offer from sheer love of justice. The far- 
seeing Briton saw clearly that even the greatest 
naval Power would be bound to sink into vassalage 
to her all-powerful Continental friend, as soon as 
the latter had achieved assured predominance on 
the Continent. 

The Chancellor failed to enforce this definite 
agreement with England; on the contrary, his pol- 
icy of ''the growing power of Germany and the 
increasing risk of war" spurred on the fatal compe- 
tition of armaments in Europe. 



14 Germany Her Own Judge 

5. Chancellor J Crown Prince ^ and People 
We should be wronging Herr von Bethmann if 
we ascribed to him alone and to his epoch the origin 
of the German lust for predominance and the re- 
sponsibility for it. Prince Biilow, who claims for 
himself the honour of being the founder of German 
world-policy, proclaimed in a sitting of the Herren- 
haus as early as 1904: *'The King at the head of 
Prussia, Prussia at the head of Germany, Germany 
at the head of the world ! " ^ 

Herr von Bethmann *s actions are, indeed, worse 
than such words as those. It is true that the Anglo- 
Russian proposals as to the extension of inter- 
national law, arbitration, and the limitation of 
armaments came to nothing owing to Germany's 
opposition even in Herr von Billow's time (as can 
be shown from German pacifist literature) ; still, the 
universal competition in armament did not reach 
fever heat till Herr von Bethmann's regime. It was 
Herr von Bethmann who tried to secure German 
predominance for generations to come by means of 
a world catastrophe. The starting of the world con- 
flagration and the fiction of a foreign attack (for 

^ This phrase of Billow's forms a significant background for 
German policy from 1904 to 1907, which was trying to checkmate 
the English fleet by means of an overwhelming Continental coali- 
tion. (Burzev's Revelations.) 

It is comprehensible that such words influenced the present 
Crown Prince — at that time twenty-two years old. A well-known 
Swiss paper comments very justly: ^^ At home this had a very good 
reception, but abroad, e.g., by attentive listeners such as Edward 
VII, it might well be maintained that Germany, the mischief- 
maker, was aiming at the domination of the world." 



German and English International Policy 15 

proofs, see chs. ix and x) are such momentous ac- 
tions that they can only be explained by the pre- 
supposition of a vast increase of power after the 
war, great enough to crush the idea of revenge. 

While the last two Chancellors show us the clear 
determination to place Germany *'at the head of 
the world,'* there is a third character who also gives 
us an insight into German aims — the Crown Prince 
William! He is, of course, not yet a responsible 
director, but is all the more dangerous as a propa- 
gandist. How does he write in his famous book 
'^ Germany in Arms '7 Among other gems we read : 

The German Empire above all other nations of our old 
earth has the sacred duty of keeping its army and fleet at 
the highest point of readiness. It is only so, supported by 
our good sword, that we can attain to the place in the sun 
which is our right, but which is not willingly conceded to us. 

The much-read Pan-German propagandist Dr. 
Paul Liman comments justly on this in his well- 
known book "The Crown Prince": — 

We find here the realization that a people must not rest 
content with the goods which the past created for it, unless 
it means to surrender itself, that Germany, too, is entitled 
to claim the right of free movement, but that she will at- 
tain to the place which is her due only by making sure of 
her power to take it by force. 

The comment is absolutely to the point: the 
Crown Prince's words are, indeed, fundamentally 
aggressive; it is not a question of protecting exist- 
ing possessions, but of acquiring new possessions. 
"The thirst for increased power and greatness in 
certain circles in Germany before the outbreak of 



i6 Germany Her Own Judge 

war and the envy of England's world possessions 
are depicted for us in an interesting way by Liman 
among other authors : ^ — 

And when the Crown Prince saw the fatal effects of per- 
petual famine in India, when he noted the fierce hatred which 
lay so near the surface, did he not get the impression that 
even the edifice of English power, in spite of its apparent 
stability, might yet one day collapse? . . . 

For the Crown Prince knows that we stand at a turning- 
point of history. We all have the feeling that the dawn 
of a new world is beginning to appear, and that the content 
of the history of the coming decades, in which the Crown 
Prince will be our leader, must be different from the past. 
A universal monarchy like that of the early Middle Ages 
will certainly never arise again, and if, nevertheless, we 
were to talk nowadays of a world-domination in the nar- 
rower sense, we should have to point to England, whose 
flag rules the seas, whose colonies form a mightier empire 
than the Caesars ever united beneath theii* sway. . . . 

The German people is thirsting for a new period of action, 
for the possibility of winning new rights over new terri- 
tories. It is not "saturated," as the Philistines say, quoting 
a phrase of Bismarck's which was coined for the moment, 
for a limited European purpose. Germany does not want 
a policy of peace, but of power. The traditions of the heroic 
age are not so utterly extinct, the ancient pride is not so 
utterly dead, that we should be content to retire to the 
dower house. . . . 

We need more egoism and more determination such as 
springs from a sure self-consciousness. The lotus flower 
does not float on the dark pond in our country, nor will the 

^ From the overwhelming mass of material I pick out Liman's 
work, because a personal friend of his drew my attention, whilst I 
was still living in Berlin, to his successful book. This book, which 
has, I may add, a semi-official character, because it defends the 
Crown Prince himself and his militarist-imperialist tendencies, 
appeared in a large edition some months b^ore the outbreak of 
war, and is therefore served up "piping hot." 



German and English International Policy 1 7 

miracle of Frau Nora ever appear there, if we do not break 
open the door for it with our own hand. Can the future 
possibly make good the neglect of the last twenty-five years? 
Shall we be told again: The world has been given away; the 
vintage, the markets, the sporting-rights are no longer mine 
to give? ... 

That is how Liman incited the Germans, and 
the Crown Prince encouraged them and a crowd of 
other authors fanned the flame in books, pamphlets, 
lectures, etc. 

And success crowned their efforts. Any one who 
watched popular feeling in Germany carefully, be- 
came aware of a remarkable change towards im- 
perialism in educated circles, especially since the 
Morocco crisis. It was not for nothing that Ger- 
man lust for power burst out directly after the out- 
break of war with a suddenness and an inevitabil- 
ity that amazed the outside world and shocked many 
a pro-German neutral. Examples: The editor of 
the semi-official Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger wrote on 
the day of the outbreak of war: — 

We are fighting to-day the final struggle to consolidate 
for ever our position in the world, which we have never 
abused; and when the German sword is sheathed again, all 
our hopes and wishes will have been accomplished. We 
shall stand out as the strongest nation in the world. 

And again on the same day: — 

We shall be victorious, we shall become the strongest 
nation on earth. 

We may state emphatically that neither the 
Temps y The Times, nor the Novoe Vremya would 
presume to employ language hke that of the semi- 



i8 Germany Her Own Judge 

official Lokal'Anzeiger. Nor, on the outbreak of war, 
did learned men go off the rails in any Entente coun- 
try as often as in Germany. Examples : ■ — 

. . . And if it appears necessary for us to extend our bor- 
ders in order that the greater body of the people may gain 
space to develop, we will take as much territory as seems 
necessary to us. We will plant our foot where it seems stra- 
tegically important to do so, in order to preserve our in- 
violable strength: if therefore it helps our position in the 
world, we will establish naval bases at Dover, Malta, and 
Suez. (Professor Werner Sombart, Berlin, B.N. 407.) 

Every nation has its day in history. But the day of the 
German nation shall be the harvest of the whole world. 
(Professor v. Wilamowitz-MoUendorff, Berlin, B.N. 431.) 

Such words should not be used by the nation 
which stage-managed and began the war (cf. chs. 
IX and x), for they brand the so-called preventive 
war from the outset as essentially a war of conquest 
— especially when the proofs of the necessity of 
a preventive war cannot be produced (cf . chs. in 
and iv), and when, after the first successes of their 
arms, the people are told of their '^world-mxission'* 
not only by professors, but both semi-officially and 
officially. 

This tide of imperialism which flooded Germany 
so carried away our Swiss poet Jakob Schaffner, 
who lived in Berlin, that he urges even Switzerland 
to adopt his confession of faith, *' Health lies in 
growth alone." (B.N. 442.) 

Nevertheless, at the beginning of the war, the 
great mass of the German people did not approve of 
the lust for increased power and greatness. Liman, 
for instance, tells us — naturally in a reproachful 



German and English International Policy 19 

tone — that some fiery speeches of the Crown Prince 
had a bad reception among part of the people : — 

People not only declared scoffingly that stress of feeling 
even shook the speaker's mastery over his words and made 
him forget the most elementary grammatical rules, but 
that an outburst of lust for war was clearly visible. And 
with a glance at the past they added that the father, of 
course, could give his son useful lessons as to the difficulty 
of wiping out the impressions made by such speeches in 
Europe. So extremely warlike a German Emperor would be 
regarded as a danger in all Europe and would provoke a 
coalition of all States against the German Empire. For an 
almost absolute master of the formidable German armies, who 
professed such warlike views, must necessarily appear as a 
personal threat to peace to all States, even to his allies, etc. 

We see in these words of Liman that there were 
some far-sighted people even among the Germans 
who, in view of the late entry of Germany into the 
field of world-policy, would rather have seen small 
but secure progress than the hazardous advance of 
a '* whole-hog" policy. 

6. Political Anarchy 

Pan-German circles are offended because neutrals 
regard the vast territorial possessions of the Entente 
Powers as natural, while they look with mistrust 
at the German desire for expansion. They forget 
that Germany's colonial policy began far too late 
to enable her to compete on equal terms with her 
rivals. For all expansion — whether by economic 
and political predominance or by annexation — 
is immoral, when it absolutely disregards existing 
foreign interests. 

It is obvious that Russia cannot allow the pre- 



20 Germany Her Own Judge 

dominance of any other European Great Power in 
the Dardanelles (the outlet for South Russian ex- 
ports), and that France and England would be 
bound, for strategic reasons, to oppose any foreign 
invader of the domain of Gibraltar. But the policy 
of Germany and Austria makes it clear that these 
Powers, especially since 1913, have been aiming at 
predominance in the Dardanelles and the Balkans. 
(Cf. ch. VI.) 

The campaign of slander in the press (the Post^ 
the Grenzbotenj Kheinisch-Westfdlische) proves in 
the same way that Herr von Kiderlen-Wachter 
was intending to establish for Germany a political 
position in Morocco by the side of France and 
Spain before he decided, in view of the superiority 
of the English fleet, to put up with compensations 
in the French Congo. Clearly the alteration of the 
status quo ante in the neighbourhood of Gibraltar 
did not originally appear to him as a threat to the 
European Powers already in possession. 

Further, the Pan-Germans were more and more 
openly casting covetous glances at the Portuguese 
and Belgian colonies. The Norddeutsche Allgemeine 
Zeitung, for example, had to admit that, in order 
to improve Franco-German relations, Herr von 
Jagow proposed to M. Cambon a special agreement 
as to the Belgian Congo, especially on the question 
of its railways, and stated that ''the administra- 
tion of such large colonies as the Congo was beyond 
the financial strength of Belgium."^ 

^ The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung represented Herr von 
Jagow's remark as his "personal opinion." Without doubting the 



German and English International Policy 21 

This policy of push — whether it aims at direct 
interference in neighbouring economic spheres or at 
predominance with disregard of existing foreign 
strategic and economic interests — becomes in any 
case * Apolitical anarchy" as soon as it tries to reach 
its end by force of arms. The effort to restore 
''balance of power and justice" by force is as 
Utopian in political as in social life. For a ''just dis- 
tribution" of territory among nations is as im- 
possible as a just distribution of capital among 
individuals. We can only very vaguely estimate 
beforehand the development of colonies, and there- 
fore their value as markets, and the wealth of the 
un worked treasures of the land. But it would run 
counter to all morality to adjust the equilibrium 
by periodical European massacres. 

In proportion to population Switzerland is one of 
the richest countries, although she has not a single 
colony. And her Latin citizens do not feel the slight- 
est desire to be disloyal to their country in order 
to attach themselves to France, which is so rich 
in territory. The argument that Germany as a 
Great Power may put forward claims other than 
those of little Switzerland is illogical : it is economic 
pressure, not the size of the country, that is the de- 
ciding factor! In the former respect we Swiss were 
not in a more favourable position than our German 

truth of this, we must remark that Germany's recent Foreign Sec- 
retaries have approached very near to Pan-German ideas in their 
"personal opinions." It is also interesting to mention in passing 
that the German Foreign Minister and the High Command held 
very different views of Belgium's financial strength, as is shown by. 
the tremendous war levies on the country. 



22 Germany Her Own Judge 

neighbours. Still, so long as our neighbours do not 
refuse to allow us to employ our capital and our 
workmen abroad, we are not justified in attacking 
them for gain. 

Was this policy of expansion at all costs really 
needed by the German Empire? The German peo- 
ple of to-day, in its present mood, answers this 
question in the affirmative : — 

It is impossible and also immoral to refuse a great na- 
tion, with an annual increase of nearly 900,000 souls, the 
space in the world outside its borders which it needs for 
its citizens and its superfluous energy. With all due recog- 
nition of the ability of the English, a people of forty-six 
millions has no moral right to appropriate in perpetuity 
two thirds of the earth and only to give other nations what 
it likes, while barring the world to a rising energetic people 
of seventy millions and strangling them. ("Address" from 
South Germany, B.N. 112.) 

But this view is absolutely inconsistent with the 
official speech made by Herr von Miihlberg, as 
representative of the Chancellor, in 1907, in order 
to allay English uneasiness at German arma- 
ments: — 

Sceptics might perhaps reply that the German Army 
and Navy were dangerous instruments, which might be 
employed one day to find room for the ever-increasing 
population. But Germany has no need of new territory. 
Although her population increases annually by from 800,- 
000 to 900,000 souls, emigration has become insignificant; 
there is a general scarcity of workers in agriculture and in- 
dustry. (''Belgian State Papers," No. 31.) 

As a matter of fact, before the war Germany had 
made poor use of her quite considerable colonial 
possessions. Interest in colonization had to be 



German and English International Policy 23 

fostered in the German people by organized prop- 
aganda. In the main, and broadly speaking, the 
chief concern of German industry was to secure 
good markets among her civilized neighbours. Her 
colonial policy, on the other hand, only benefited 
a relatively small part of the population, whether 
by increasing the number of military and civil 
appointments or by securing certain commercial 
concessions from which a safe return could be de- 
rived. 

So German propaganda contains amusing para- 
doxes: when it is a question of justifying new terri- 
torial acquisitions, there are complaints of "unfair 
pressure" and "strangling'*; when, on the other 
hand, proof is needed of England's jealousy, stress 
is laid on German prosperity. Now the cry is "over- 
population," now the Russian neighbour is re- 
proached for preventing the immigration of cheap 
labour from Poland! The impartial neutral has 
every right to put the question whether it would 
not have been a more profitable policy — for Ger- 
many especially — to come to an understanding 
such as the Czar had proposed as early as 1898. 

Regard for the general interest is the essential 
condition of a peaceful life: the State which tries 
to place itself "at the head" of its neighbours 
makes enemies. 



CHAPTER III 

THE RUSSIAN AND THE PRUSSIAN 
** DANGERS" 

Neutrals used often to read of the ** Russian 
danger'* in German propaganda. Serious students 
used to set the Germans up as the saviours of Eu- 
rope and surprise people who knew Russia with 
a strange new bogey. 

I . The Development of Russia 

It was pointed out that Russia, with her vast 
territory, must in the course of her development 
gradually become the most powerful State in Eu- 
rope. Many a Russian patriot may certainly have 
hoped that a very long period of peace would de- 
velop Russia to such an extent that she might one 
day, as Count Witte said, play the first violin in 
the concert of the world without striking a blow. 
But between the first utterance of this pious wish 
and its fulfilment there lies so vast a space full of 
obstacles that preventive measures on the part 
of Europe seem unnecessary. Let us consider the 
many obstacles to development: — 

1. Internal crises which may weaken or even 
shatter the greatest States; the seeds of revolution 
had never quite died out in Russia since 1905. 

2. Stagnation due to satiety (China). 

3. Democratization of the nations, which aims 



The Russian and the Prussian Dangers 25 

less at growth of power than at the peaceful settle- 
ment of European conflicts (Liberalism has been 
growing fast in Russia since the Japanese War).^ 

It is to be remembered that coalitions of threat- 
ened neighbours can always be formed effectively 
against the danger of a peacefully growing Power. 
England (which would feel itself threatened in India 
by a too powerful Russia), Japan, Germany, Aus- 
tria, Sweden, the Balkan States, Italy, and Turkey 
— it is to the interest of all of them that there should 
be an adequate counterpoise to an overpowerful 
Russia, and they would all be ready to form a coali- 
tion at the necessary moment. 

It is certainly contrary to all morality for a great 
and powerful State, from fear that its neighbour 
may develop too far during a long period of 
peace, to knock that neighbour on the head on 
the naive pretext: *^If I do not destroy him to- 
day, he might perhaps destroy me to-morrow!" 
The logical consequence of such a doctrine in the 
present war would be the immediate intervention 
of the whole world against Germany, for the Chan- 
cellor makes no secret of the fact that he wanted 
to disturb the European balance of power in order 
to secure his *' lasting peace.'* It would mean an 
endless series of wars based on mere hypotheses! 

2. Russian Greed 
*'They want Galicia . . . Constantinople ... !*' 
German propaganda has talked a great deal 
about the liberation of the Baltic provinces al- 
^ Written before the revolution. 



26 Germany Her Own Judge 

though their original inhabitants, the Letts and 
Esthonians, are outspokenly anti-German.^ Ger- 
many would like to relieve the later German im- 
migrants, who are naturally greatly inferior in 
numbers, from Russian rule. And a good part of 
these, too, are no longer friendly to Germany. Still, 
no one will believe that Germany would have set 
the world ablaze, unless greater aims than the ac- 
quisition of these districts had floated before her 
eyes. Galicia stands in a similar relation to Russia. 

It may wound the pride of many Russian patriots 
that a section of their Slav brothers are under Ger- 
man rule; especially as 'Ve Germans carry our 
swords in our mouths,*' as Herr von Bethmann 
himself admitted: for every Russian knows that 
the Slavs under German rule are mostly unwilling 
to take the field against Russia. And yet no one 
who knows Russia could honestly maintain that 
she would have declared war on account of Galicia. 

It was the same with Constantinople. Up till 
the war Russian diplomacy was accustomed to 
the thought that the, hope which certain Russians 
entertained of the possession of Constantinople 
would always be shattered by the veto of almost 
all Europe, especially by that of England. (Cf. 
ch. VI.) If circumstances have altered since 1915, 
the concessions of England and Italy were forced 
from them by necessity (Russian lack of munitions 
and the fear of a separate peace). Enver Pasha, 
whose over-confidence was derived from the Pan- 
German and military salons in Berlin, which he 
* Even the Emperor recently spoke of the "liberation" of Riga! 



The Russian and the Prussian Dangers 27 

frequented, could not have done Russia greater 
service than he did by his war-policy. For the 
closing of the Dardanelles showed Western Eu- 
rope that the defensive forces of Russia could not 
be employed to the full without securing the Straits. 
But where does Russia's greed come in, if the new 
conditions were brought about only by Germany's 
making war and by the intervention of Turkey? 

• 3. Russian and Prussian Militarism 

There is probably more misconception on this 
subject than on any other: while German propa- 
ganda paints an exaggerated picture of Russian 
militarism to excuse its own, neutrals, even Eng- 
lishmen, often regard the militarism of all States 
alike as tarred with the same brush. But any one 
who knows both Russia and Prussia well will be 
amazed at such doctrines; for Russian militarism 
is to Prussian as the moon is to the sun. Naturally 
Russia endeavoured, as far as possible, to advance 
her military power to the requisite point both in 
quantity and quality; moreover, she was urged to 
do so by France. But what to the Prussian, owing 
to his education and political institutions, is a joy 
and pride is to the Russian a necessary evil. 

The German Chancellor hoped that *'the grow- 
ing risk of war" would force England into coali- 
tion with Germany, in order, as he said, to pre- 
serve peace; but even German officers admitted 
that the rivalry in armaments, if it continued at 
the pace set by Germany, must lead to war, as 
neither Germany nor other countries could bear 



28 Germany Her Own Judge 

the huge burdens permanently. Such utterances 
were not isolated. One can only explain the open- 
ness with which the Chancellor admitted that Ger- 
many led the way in the race of armaments, on the 
assumption that he was here faced with a solid 
fact, which could not permanently be concealed 
and must sooner or later be justified. 

A statement of the military expert of the Berliner 
Tageblatt which was published in No. 386 on the 
day war began seems to me to throw an interest- 
ing light on German militarism : — 

It is quite natural that the numbers which the Russian 
High Command can put into the field should cause a cer- 
tain anxiety in Germany. This anxiety is fostered by all 
sorts of press notices, which were published continually in 
the past in the interests of armament. The military strength 
of Russia available against the Triple Alliance was enor- 
mously exaggerated, while the obstacles which stand in the 
way of the full use of it were not mentioned. 

Similarly, the Deutsche Militdr-Wochenblatt wrote 
shortly before the outbreak of war: — 

We may here remark parenthetically that the statement 
which has recently appeared in the [German] press about 
the raising of five new Russian army corps is untrue. These 
army corps do not exist. 

All these attempts to mislead public opinion for 
the purpose of spurring on armament are quite in 
keeping with Prussian militarism and its longing 
for a fresh decision and with the Chancellor's 
''peace policy.'' The Pan-German press (Kreuz- 
zeitung, Deutsche Tageszeitung, etc.) venomously 
represented every precautionary measure of neigh- 
bouring States as a challenge, while Germany's 



The Russian and the Prussian Dangers 29 

preparations were described as necessary for self- 
defence, in spite of the fact that they led the way. 
And yet it was the Pan-German party which was 
most conspicuous even before the war for its lust 
of predominance and conquest. 

Less spitefully, but all the more effectively ow- 
ing to its wide circulation, the Jewish press egged 
its readers on. The same paper, which at the 
outbreak of war published the reassuring article 
by its military expert quoted above, had recom- 
mended a preventive war five months earlier "in 
view of Russia being superior in power and armed 
to the teeth," "in order not to leave to the enemy 
the choice of the most favourable moment for the 
death-blow." 

As a matter of fact, at the time of the outbreak 
of war Russia was about to reduce the start which 
Germany had won in material armaments. Both 
camps were fully aware of the technical superiority 
of the Central Powers over the Franco-Russian 
alliance in the summer of 1914.^ The official organ 
of the military party in Vienna, the Militdrische 
Rundschau, wrote a few days before the Austrian 
ultimatum to Serbia: — 

The moment is still favourable for us. If we do not de- 
cide on war, the war which we shall have to wage in two 

^ Only our military "expert," Colonel Egli, thinks himself en- 
titled to assert a balance of material power at the outbreak of war. 
Colonel Egli, who is wholly ignorant of Russian circumstances, ad- 
mittedly draws his knowledge only from German and Austrian 
military attaches. But in Berlin and Vienna Russia was at one 
moment a giant armed to the teeth, and at the next a dwarf with 
empty pockets — just as the picture happened to suit. 



30 Germany Her Own Judge 

or three years at latest will be begun under far less fav- 
ourable circumstances. At present the initiative is in our 
hands: Russia is not armed; the moral factors and right 
are on our side as well as might. 

We shall deal with the questions whether the 
Central Powers ^* would have to fight in two or 
three years," and whether ^'the moral factors and 
right" were on their side in 1914, in detail in the 
following chapters; here we merely wish to estab- 
lish that, at the time war broke out, the Central 
Powers knew that the technical superiority lay 
with them. 

The theory of the inadequacy of Russian prep- 
arations is not invalidated by contrary assertions 
on the part of Sukhomlinov in the winter of 1913-- 
14. At that time there awoke in Russia, for rea- 
sons which we will explain later, an increased fear 
of the Eastern poHcy of Germany. The Minister 
of War had to describe the situation as more rosy 
than it was, if he was not to fall from his post. He 
was all the more entitled to do so, as Russia was 
making feverish efforts to recover the ground lost 
by the German start. 

Germany's fear that in a few years Russia would 
have caused the balance of power to tend in the 
direction of the Franco-Russian alliance was an 
unintelligible mistake, or merely a pretext for es- 
tablishing Germany's own predominance. One 
does not need an expert knowledge of the Russian 
and Prussian situation to realize that in two or 
three years the Central Powers would still have 
been relatively stronger in striking power than 



The Russian and the Prussian Dangers 31 

their adversaries. We must not forget that at the 
outbreak of war Germany was armed and pre- 
pared to the smallest detail, although only one third 
of the milliard-mark tax had been collected and 
two thirds was still outstanding. The remaining 
666 millions would have found their way to the 
munition works. 

We must also not forget that an extensive, 
thinly populated country needs vast wealth, if it 
is to keep its striking force up to a high level. 
While Germany can in peace time easily get a return 
from her loans for roads and railways, owing to the 
great volume of her internal traffic, the huge devel- 
opment of her industry and her dense population, 
Russia is compelled to cover her corresponding out- 
lay through her military department. It is absurd, 
therefore, to compare the figures for German and 
Russian military expenditure, especially as the ex- 
change value of a given sum of gold is very different 
in the two countries. This is the case, for instance, 
in the making of roads, as in Russia the land is 
most unfavourable and the material has often to 
be brought from a considerable distance. The Pan- 
Germans have no right to compare the Franco- 
Russian loan of several milliard francs with the 
German milliard tax: the former was distributed 
over very many years and helped to pay for ur- 
gently necessary but costly economic development ; 
the latter, on the contrary, was nothing but a war 
tax in peace-time. 

Russia would presumably have brought her ar- 
tillery, flying corps, etc., up to the German stand- 



32 Germany Her Own Judge 

ard by 191 7-1 8; but her lines of communication 
(railways and rolling stock) would have remained 
a weak spot in her war preparations. Comparatively 
poor returns necessitate cheaply built railways, and 
these render quick transit impossible. Moreover, 
Russia's use of her relatively meagre supply of roll- 
ing stock is further hampered by special delays be- 
tween loadings in consequence of the great distances. 
Owing to these disadvantages, Russia cannot move 
and concentrate her troops so easily as Germany. 
. Russia would have been able to make good these 
disadvantages by having a considerable superiority 
in number of troops, in order to keep reserves in 
readiness at all points of her territory against hos- 
tile attack in case of war. What the Russian army 
lacked in mobility, it must make up in numbers. 
But as Germany would not endure this numerical 
superiority in spite of Russia's obvious disadvan- 
tages, and as she anticipated any increase of the 
army, — to the length even of spreading false reports 
of the strength of her opponent in order to keep the 
risk of war alive on her side, — the Russian Govern- 
ment cannot be blamed for ill-preparedness. In- 
dustrial Germany was in a better position to carry 
on her shoulders her excessive armament through- 
out the years of peace ; on the Russian side the cul- 
tivation of unopened territories demanded huge 
expenditure, the fruits of which seemed richer than 
mere armaments. 

Although the Lokal-Anzeiger wrote, ''The war 
has been wantonly evoked by France and Russia, 
trusting to their superior power"; and although 



The Russian and the Prussian Dangers 33 

Herr Bassermann cried later in the Reichstag, "We 
look in admiration at the achievements of our army 
in face of Russian superiority in strength": — yet 
at the outbreak of the war no fear of this superior- 
ity could be perceived in Berlin in either military 
or civil circles. On the contrary, it was pointed out 
that Russia had not shown herself efficient either 
in the last Turkish War or in the Japanese War. No 
regard was paid to the fact that the latter war was 
fought at the end of a single railway line of many 
thousands of miles, with few sidings. And no one 
took into account that since 1905 Russia had made 
great progress in European culture in all directions.^ 
It is certain that Russia has vast natural re- 
serves, especially in men. But economically she is 
too little developed to concentrate these forces in 
time of peace or to bear the necessary expense by 
increasing her debt. The suggestion of a Russian 
danger, therefore, was mere talk. 

4. The German Danger 

German propaganda tried so frequently to win 
over neutrals by the suggestion of a Slav danger, 
that it is permissible for us to ask: Is there no dan- 
ger from you Germans, if even the Slavs, who have 
always been represented to us by foreigners living 

^ It was not till later that some recognition of the quality of the 
Russian troops was to be heard in Germany. A Swiss, for instance, 
reported in his "War Impressions in Munich" (B.N., S.Bl. 46): 
"I have heard on trustworthy authority that military circles are 
astonished at the military prowess of the Russians and positively 
alarmed at the progress Russia has made in organization, drill, 
tactics, and strategy since the Manchurian War." 



34 Germany Her Own Judge 

in the East as especially kindly and peace-loving, 
are a danger? Was not your militarism notorious 
before there was any question of a Triple Entente 
to balance your Triple Alliance? Did not Bismarck 
long ago admit that he caused the Franco-Prussian 
War by altering a despatch? Are not you likewise 
the stage-managers and originators of the present 
world war? (Cf. chs. ix and x.) Did not Bismarck, 
a German, assert that the policy of princes was ob- 
viously imperialist? Did he not say? — 

The main object of these lords of the earth is to extend 
their dominions and widen their frontiers. I am of opinion 
that we shall live to see a time when the kingdom of Prus- 
sia will increase considerably. (R. von Thadden-Trieglaff, 
Deutsche Revue, B.N. 125.) 

Such efforts are justified when they do not meet 
with opposition, i.e., do not lead to fratricide war 
between Christian peoples. Yet Bismarck tells us 
that even in recent times the German people was 
actually prepared to attack its own flesh and blood 
for no intelligible reason : — 

Whatever may be the origin of this cohesion of the mem- 
bers in each small State, its result is that the individual 
German readily obeys the command of a dynasty to harry 
his German neighbours and kinsfolk with fire and sword 
and to slaughter them with his own hands, as a result of 
quarrels unintelligible to himself. (Bismarck, **Gedanken 
und Erinnerungen.") 

Do not these words remind us of the credulity 
with which the German people accepted the fiction 
of a foreign attack in 19 14? 

Is there not danger there? 



CHAPTER IV 

ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE ENTENTE 
POLICY 

I. Triple Alliance and Dual Alliance 
A WAR party in Prussia wanted to hinder the un- 
expectedly quick recovery of France by a fresh 
campaign in 1875, and at the same time to under- 
take further conquests in Eastern France. The 
necessary propaganda was begun in the Press. But 
the Emperor William I and the Prussian Govern- 
ment opposed a new Franco- Prussian War, and Bis- 
marck had to call a halt.^ 

So the dreaded Prussian war party gave occasion 
to a fleeting and temporary rapprochement between 
the two fundamentally different nations France and 
Russia as early as 1875. 

The alliance between Germany and Austria came 
into being in 1879. It was a purely defensive alli- 
ance and a precaution against Russian attacks. For 
the Slavs felt themselves outraged by the Congress 
of Berlin, which Bismarck had summoned shortly 
before at Austria's instigation. Austria had secured 
control of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the Congress, 
although she had refused to give her help in the 

* This episcxie, by the way, is generally passed over in silence 
in German history books; but it is historical and is recognized by 
avowedly pro-German neutrals. It is idle to discuss whether most 
credit should be given to the personal influence of the Emperor or 
to Russian intervention. (B.N. 88.) 



36 Germany Her Own Judge 

previous Turkish War when asked for it. (For 
proofs, see ch. vii.) 

The two defensive alliances, Germany and Italy 
and Austria and Italy, followed at the beginning of 
the eighties as a protection against France — burn- 
ing to avenge her defeat and to restore a Clerical 
State. Thus arose the Triple Alliance as a natural con- 
sequence of the annexations of Lorraine and Bosnia. 

Bismarck soothed Russia's uneasiness at this 
new coalition by the so-called *^ reinsurance treaty*' 
of Skjernevize in 1884. This, however, was not 
renewed after Bismarck's retirement. The defini- 
tive Franco-Russian rapprochement was the logical 
consequence — the Entente Cordiale in 1891, the 
Franco- Russian Alliance in 1894. Thus the balance 
of power in Europe was more or less restored with- 
out England's intervention. 

2. Unequal Development 

This position of affairs, which was so favourable 
for the peace of Europe, was based unfortunately 
on preliminary conditions which were unfavour- 
able to its permanence: the growth in strength of 
the two groups was unequal. 

Germany, owing to the rise of her industries, 
increased out of all proportion in population and 
financial strength. Her emigration decreased strik- 
ingly. At the same time she made every effort to 
exploit these advantages to the full from a military 
point of view. 

France, on the other hand, was not increasing in 
population. The inevitable consequence was, that 



Origin and Nature of the Entente Policy 37 

it fell chiefly to Russia to act as counterpoise to 
the German increase in strength. But there money 
was the difficulty. Not that Russia is a poor coun- 
try; quite the contrary. But undeveloped districts 
soak up money as a sponge soaks up water. All ex- 
penditure for drainage, railways, roads, etc., cer- 
tainly is a good investment, only the enormous 
extent of Russia demands correspondingly great 
investments, while the inadequate population and 
the relatively backward state of Russian industries 
make quick returns impossible. Russia was in the 
position of a great merchant whose capital is deeply 
involved. (Foreign loans do not alter the situation, 
inasmuch as they are not free gifts.) But where 
there is urgent necessity for remunerative outlay, 
no State willingly wastes its money on armies — 
above all, when it has no intention of using them tO 
force a decision. 

In view of these unfavourable conditions in the 
Dual Alliance — on one side in money, on the other 
side in men — the preservation of the balance of 
power seemed impossible in the long run, unless 
Germany had been willing to agree to a scheme of 
proportionate armaments. These are the motives, 
apart from his universally recognized personal love 
of peace, which induced the Czar to make his fa- 
mous peace proposals in 1898 (court of arbitration 
and disarmament). 

3. Origin of German World-Policy 

England had no need to be uneasy at the men- 
ace to the balance of power so long as Bismarck was 



38 Germany Her Own Judge 

at the helm. This statesman took no interest in 
colonization, and seemed really ''sated*' since the 
creation of the Triple Alliance (for the protection 
of Alsace and Bosnia). Circumstances altered, how- 
ever, under Prince Billow — ''the founder of Ger- 
man world-policy." The year of Bismarck's death 
— 1898 — may be taken as the turning-point. 

In that notable year 1898 — Billow had been 
Foreign Minister since 1897 — three events took 
place which attracted attention in England : — 

1 . The Emperor undertook his journey to Syria. 

2. Germany officially discouraged Russia's pro- 
posals of disarmament (August, 1898). 

3. Germany founded her Navy League (April, 
1898). 

No doubt, the Emperor's journey to Syria was 
merely a symptom of the rapprochement between 
Germany and Turkey. The Turkish army had 
already been reorganized on a German pattern by 
the mission of Von der Goltz Pasha in 1884, im- 
mediately after the creation of the Triple Alliance. 
The Emperor, however, made the famous speech in 
Damascus in which he assured the Mohammedan 
world of his lasting friendship — an assurance which 
was bound to cause misgiving in all States which 
possessed Mohammedan subjects (England, France, 
and Russia). 

The second point I regard as even more signifi- 
cant. The unfavourable attitude which official 
Germany adopted towards the Czar's efforts dis- 
^pointed peace-loving circles even in Germany. 
The negative result of the Peace Conference which 



Origin and Nature of the Entente Policy 39 

was summoned for the following year was only to 
be expected. A good Austrian patriot, Dr. A. H. 
Fried, the German pacifist leader, writes on the 
subject: — 

German complaints about the Delcass6s and the Lans- 
downes are unjustifiable. She herself created the situation 
from which she suffers. She put into the hands of her ene- 
mies the moral weapon of distrust in 1899 at The Hague: 
she thereby missed her great opportunity of gaining credit 
for being a Power which wanted to insure peace by mod- 
ern methods. 

This fact is extremely important, since the at- 
titude of the German Government caused "King 
Edward's policy, '* which in its turn served the Ger- 
man war party as a pretext for starting the present 
world war (a "preventive" war). 

The third event, namely, the foundation of the 
Navy League, was the most dangerous of all for the 
peace of the world. Here they worked at high pres- 
sure. In a relatively short time the League had 
already a round million members, one third indi- 
vidual and two thirds corporate members. That is 
to say, the influence of the League's propaganda 
(lectures and pamphlets) extended over many mil- 
lions of people — indeed, almost over the whole of 
Germany. It was naturally not suggested that, for 
instance, for Germany to get a footing in Morocco 
meant a dangerous alteration of the status quo for 
France and England, that German predominance 
in Constantinople was bound to bring Russia on 
to the scene, because of South Russian trade. Of 
course the nation was not warned to exercise moder- 



40 Germany Her Own Judge 

ation (as it should have been, in view of Germany's 
late awakening to colonization) , whilst it was shown 
how deeply it had worked its way by its industry 
into foreign economic spheres, from which it could 
not now be driven. On the contrary, a new bogey 
— the danger of foreign aggression — was created in 
the interests of armament, and peaceful efforts of 
other nations were often concealed or distorted. 
Instead of being grateful for the friendly reception 
which was given everywhere to us Germans, our 
Government produced fear and hatred of Germany 
by encouraging over-armament, self-confidence, 
and greed. -^ 

Quickly and surely the nation was educated up, 
if not to the desire for an aggressive war (that was 
not necessary, as a war can always be ''forced on" 
a nation), at any rate to imperialism, and so thor- 
oughly that the tide of instructions even flowed 
beyond the frontiers of the Empire.^ 



^ I base the word " greed " on a witness cited on the German side. 
In 1913 the Post published an article which spoke of the volun- 
tary or compulsory cession of the Belgian colonies to Germany as 
a quite natural event and of England's possible consent to this 
transaction. Baron Beyens, the Belgian Ambassador in Berlin, 
wrote to his Government on this subject {Belgian State Papers, 
No. 106): ''However great the greed of German colonial circles and 
the Pan-Germans may be, it is not to be assumed that England will 
be prepared to create for herself in the heart of Africa a rival whose 
expansive force and economic strength would threaten the English 
colonies." 

2 Cf. Swiss remarks at the beginning of the war: "Why did not 
the Entente give Germany her due share in Morocco?" "This 
comes of trying to hinder German development in the Balkans." 
A naturalized Swiss (Austrian): "Why should England have every- 
thing in India? " 



Origin and Nature of the Entente Policy 41 

So the ground was prepared for the coming world 
war, which was to raise Germany from her position 
as a Great Power to the first place in the world. ^ 
So, too, the moment had come when the ancient 
Mediterranean Powers had to see to the partition 
of North African territories, before a new partner, 
as ambitious as he was strong, joined the company. 
Must France and England endure a foreign in- 
truder in the neighbourhood of Gibraltar? Is Italy 
to be blamed for annexing the piece of Africa which 
lies opposite to her, and is therefore strategically 
important, before the power of Germany laid its 
hand on the free territory? Everybody could see 
that Germany's desire for expansion was growing 
after 1898 with increasing force, till in 191 1 Herr 
von Bethmann declared openly: ''Germany's ex- 
pansion is a fact with which other nations must 
reckon. Nothing can stop it." ^ 

4. Origin of the Entente 

Such was the natural cause of the Franco-Italian 
treaty as to Morocco and Libya in the year 1902. 
It has not been proved that England was the Power 



^ Cf. the propaganda before the battle of the Marne, in which 
reference was made to the map of the Hohenstaufen period, etc. 

^ Belgian State Papers, No. 85. 

"Preventive acquisition" is defended by the friends of Germany 
where it is a question of measures taken by the Central Powers. 
Professor Hiinerwadel, in his pamphlet "The Historical Antece- 
dents of the European War" (published by Orell Fussli), tries to 
defend the annexation of Bosnia by arguing that "the junction 
of Bosnia with Serbia would make the Austrian position in Istria 
and Dalmatia almost untenable." 



42 Germany Her Own Judge 

behind the agreement, nor was this necessarily the 
fact.^ . \\ 

The famous treaty of the 8th of April between 
England and France about Morocco and Egypt 
was not concluded till two years later, and in 
October of the same year there followed the Franco- 
Spanish agreement on the Morocco question. On 
the recommendation of Count Biilow — Chancellor 
since 1900 — the Emperor replied to these agree- 
ments concluded without German assent by his 
journey to Tangier. This decisive policy won, in- 
deed, for the Chancellor his title of Prince, but it 
increased the uneasiness of the Mediterranean 
Powers, which had existed since 1898, and drew 
them still closer together. Above all, the Morocco 
question was the logical and direct cause of the 
rapprochement between France and England, and 
that again led to a certain rapprochement between 
England and Russia (the ancient defensive ally of 
France). Russia at that time (1904) was still in 
the background, and only came to the front at the 
time of the Balkan crisis.^ 

^ On the contrary, one of the best known Pan-German publicists, 
Professor Schiemann, names as the authors M. Camille Barr^reand 
M. Delcasse, "whom we herewith designate as the first organizer 
of the world war." Of course, that does not prevent King Edward 
being the scapegoat and France the unhappy lamb of sacrifice — ac- 
cording to the version usually put before the patient German people. 

2 The revelations of Burzev (Superintendent of the Department 
of Russian Archives, 19 17), which have been published since the 
first edition of the present work, confirm our assertion. They prove 
that from 1904 to 1907 the German Emperor made stubborn efforts 
to persuade the Russian Government to a Continental alliance 
against England and that the Czar took a favourable view of this 
proposal. (B.N. 448.) 



Origin and Nature of the Entente Policy 43 

5. Defensive Character of the Entente 
Pro-German publicists are fond of writing of the 
*' spearhead" of the new grouping of Powers against 
Germany. It is absolutely untrue; the object of the 
Mediterranean Powers — France, Italy, England, 
and Spain — in their treaties was to preserve the 
status quo in the Mediterranean; they had no ag- 
gressive intentions against Germany. Mr. A. Leg- 
hait, the Belgian Ambassador in Paris, had to admit 
that the position of affairs showed a clearly defen- 
sive character, although he felt a certain personal 
uncertainty, quite unfounded, as we shall show, 
about England's intentions: — 

Paris, June, 1907. — The friendly relations and the un- 
derstandings which have existed for the last two years 
between France, England, and Spain have recently been 
strengthened in a way which clearly characterizes the 
grouping of the Powers and their efforts to secure them- 
selves against other eventualities by peaceful agreements. 
("Belgian State Papers," No. 33.) 

Mr. Leghait leaves out Russia, as it was only 
through France that she was concerned in the new 
grouping, which was very loose and created for the 
defence of each country's separate interests. 

6. Menace to Russia 

The Entente, as is proved by the treaties, had its 
origin in common interests in the Mediterranean; 
these interests were the bond which held it together. 
They removed two danger points from European 
politics in 191 1 (Morocco and Libya) and yet spared 



44 Germany Her Own Judge 

us a European war. The more, however, the door 
to the southwest was closed to the German Empire, 
the more openly did German Imperialists turn to 
the Southern Orient. (For details, see ch. VI.) While 
the menace to Gilbraltar from the rising power of 
Germany had brought England and France to- 
gether, the fear of German predominance in Tur- 
key (the Dardanelles and the Suez Canal) brought 
Russia and England together to a more limited 
extent. 

Many readers who have considered the matter 
from one side only will probably maintain that this 
fear was unfounded. That may appear true if the 
German side only is considered, but not -from the 
standpoint of threatened Russia. She might regard 
the mission of Von der Goltz Pasha in 1884 and the 
German reorganization of the Turkish army as an 
attempt at encirclement. She was by no means 
bound to believe in the defensive character of the 
mission, for in any case Germany had at that time 
a superiority in strength: the Triple Alliance had 
just been established, the Franco-Russian Alliance 
had not yet been concluded, and there was then 
no trace of friendship with England. Russian un- 
easiness in the eighties was not merely a conse- 
quence of the Congress of Berlin (the forcible an- 
nexation of Bosnia) ; it was rather the result of her 
distrust of the establishment of the Triple Alliance 
in the west and the encirclement in the south. This 
threat to her seemed all the more unjustifiable, as 
Russia had not shown herself at all a military lion 
in the Turkish War. The position of affairs created 



Origin and Nature of the Entente Policy 45 

by Bismarck forced essentially reactionary Russia 
to a formal rapprochement with democratic France 
— which was naturally bound to put certain re- 
actionary circles in Russia in an ill-humour with 
Prussia (Kotkoff, Moskow Wjedomosty, etc.). The 
distrust was fostered afresh in 1898 ; for the founda- 
tion of the Defence and Navy Leagues and the 
refusal of proportional reduction of armaments 
increased the danger for Russia in the west, while 
the Kaiser's Eastern journey and his Damascus 
speech seemed to confirm the attempt at encircle- 
ment in the south. Obviously no true neutral would 
approve of a Franco- Russian preventive war on the 
ground of this Russian uneasiness; on the other 
hand, every impartial judge must realize that Ger- 
man policy from 1878 onwards was driving Russia 
into the arms of England. There was no need of 
Billow's irresponsible words (see p. 14) or Beth- 
mann's outspokenness to make Russia appre- 
hensive; there was no need of the Morocco crisis 
either, when Germany's growing desire for expan- 
sion showed itself so unmistakably. The mistrust 
was intelligible from 1878^ onwards, fully justified 
ever since Bismarck's death in 1898,^ and bound 

1 Cf. the Congress of Berlin; the formation of the Triple Alli- 
ance; the mission of Von der Goltz Pasha; the refusal to renew 
the treaty of Skjernevize. These events gave rise to the Franco- 
Russian Alliance. 

2 Cf. the Kaiser's speech at Damascus; the foundation of the 
Defence and Navy Leagues; the rise of Tirpitz; rejection of pro- 
posals for restriction of armaments and for a court of arbitration, 
etc. Under the influence of these events, various far-seeing states- 
men formed the desire to develop the Franco-Russian Alliance into 
a Triple Alliance. 



46 Germany Her Own Judge 

to increase in intensity with the annexation of 
Bosnia in 1908. This upset the compromise ef- 
fected at the Berlin Congress — a compromise suf- 
ficiently painful to Slav feelings already — and 
also meant an effective step forward in German and 
Austrian Eastern policy. 

No one who follows European politics impartially 
will be surprised that some circles in Russia were 
glad after 1904 to see the rapprochement between 
England and France on the basis of the Mediterra- 
nean agreements, and that they kept pleading for a 
direct approach to England, especially after the 
annexation of Bosnia : — 

1. On the one hand, it seemed necessary that 
the menace to the balance of power in Europe 
caused by the rapid rise and the full exploitation of 
German power should be met by the equivalent 
counterpoise of the English fleet. 

2. On the other hand, the development of Ger- 
man Imperialism implied that Germany would 
sooner or later secure for herself economic and con- 
sequently also political predominance in Turkey 
— which would be equivalent to a menace to 
Russia in the Dardanelles. (See ch. vi.) 

7. Natural Logic 
The fresh grouping of the European States which 
now resulted arose of its own accord: on the one 
side were Latins, Britons, and Slavs, rich in terri- 
tory because they were situated on the periphery, 
but lacking the corresponding military spirit; ready 
to protect their advantage in colonization, by estab- 



Origin and Nature of the Entente Policy 47 

lishing strategic points (such as Libya and Morocco) 
so as to maintain the old relations of the Powers as 
far as possible, and also by defensive agreements ; ani- 
mated by a growing pacifism which tried to check 
armaments as much as possible, and which aimed 
at avoiding bloodshed in Christian Europe. . . . 

On the other side was Germany (with some 
foreign and generally discontented dependants) 
hemmed in, energetic, highly industrialized, rich, 
thickly populated, yet anxious for the immigration 
of cheap labour; militarized through and through, 
from Alpha Moltke to Omega Haseler, able to de- 
liver a blow at any moment because of her abnormal 
supply of railway material; self-confident, disap- 
pointed with her diplomatic successes and her terri- 
torial possessions. Whether the King of England 
intervened or not, the Delcasses, Lansdownes, and 
Isvolskys were bound to appear on the scene. 



CHAPTER V 
BREAKDOWN OF THE ENTENTE POLICY 

As formerly Bismarck had hung a Damocles sword 
over Russia's head by the creation of the Triple 
Alliance and the militarization of Turkey, so now 
Germany was alarmed at the question of the 
Triple Entente. But whereas the Iron Chancellor 
was able to attain his end owing to the rise of Ger- 
man prestige since 1866 and 1870, the Governments 
of the Entente Powers, as we shall show immedi- 
ately, were very soon obliged to call a halt owing 
to the democratic and pacifist mentality of the 
English people. 

I. Hostile Tendencies 

The Entente policy had enemies in every coun- 
try, partly owing to the danger just mentioned, 
namely, the fear of exciting uneasiness in a power- 
ful Germany, partly because of the extreme racial 
differences in the various Entente States. 

There were Russians who could not conceive 
why their conservative country should run any 
risks for democratic countries like France and 
England. Surely it would be more sensible to let 
Germany fill her hands in Morocco and so divert 
her from the Dardanelles ! The champions of this 
theory disregarded the fact that the appetite of a 
healthy stomach cannot be determined in advance; 



Breakdown of the Entente Policy 49 

they forgot, too, that a settlement of the Morocco 
crisis which satisfied Germany would have filled 
the maw of that one Empire alone and only for a 
time (by altering the maritime status quo)j but 
would not have satisfied the Austrian Empire, too. 
The Balkan danger would not be got rid of by sat- 
isfying German claims in Morocco. Later, indeed, 
when the Balkan danger became acute in 19 13, 
even Russia begged most eagerly for England's 
help (see ch. vi). 

Then there were Frenchmen who, with their 
democratic and pacifist ideas, could not realize 
why a new sea power should not be allowed to es- 
tablish itself near Gibraltar ; why a neighbour should 
not be given a finger provided the hand was with- 
held. And others again would willingly have adopted 
a benevolent attitude to the Eastern policy of the 
German Imperialists, so long as Germany would 
guarantee the maintenance of the status quo in 
the west (Caillaux and an alliance with Germany). 
The Entente idea had its enemies in France. Mr. 
Leghait, the Belgian Ambassador in Paris, testi- 
fies on the 24th October, 1905, that "a return to 
the universally condemned policy of Delcasse is 
impossible." (''Belgian State Papers," No. 11.) 
Later, on the 4th February, 1907 (''Belgian State 
Papers," No. 21), the Ambassador reports: "We 
may conclude from a number of indications that 
French public opinion doubts the advantage of 
the Entente Cordiale, and is beginning to wish to 
free France from British interference." The new 
position aroused the wrath of the German mailed 



50 Germany Her Own Judge 

fist, while England only offered in compensation 
her mighty fleet, which could not protect Paris 
from destruction! French diplomacy, indeed, had 
achieved an advantageous settlement of the Mo- 
rocco crisis with England^s help, but still the idea of 
a new Triple Alliance remained unpopular in many 
circles. 

Then there were the neutral States. First of all 
I will take Switzerland. When I was at school in 
Zurich, the balance of power in Europe was taught 
us as the only salvation for small countries. It is 
only reasonable to think that an over-powerful 
great State can swallow one mouthful after another, 
and will have consideration for a small State only 
if it is afraid of the veto of the other great Powers. 
Gradually this theory was discredited: German 
nationalism, which had been rising so high since 
1898, coloured our way of thinking, too. It pro- 
duced a certain feeling of brotherhood with Ger- 
many and obscured our judgment of the character 
and intentions of the Entente Powers. Antipathy 
to their policy of alliance was strengthened by a 
general dislike for England, which began with the 
Boer War.i 

Next, let me cite Belgium. Here the case was 
different. I must repeat that Belgium lies on the 
direct road from the heart of France to the heart of 



* In this we failed to consider that the idea of intervention in 
favour of the Boers, which France and Russia urged, came to noth- 
ing owing to the opposition of the German Government; we learnt 
also too late that the German Emperor had sent England a plan 
of campaign against the Boers. 



Breakdown of the Entente Policy 5 1 

Germany. The machiavellian theories of German 
war literature, occasional individual speeches, as 
well as the network of strategic railways which Ger- 
many thrust forward towards Belgium, meant un- 
easiness for that country as soon as relations be- 
tween Germany and France became strained. Hence 
it is obvious that Belgian patriots were bound to 
favour a policy which aimed at a Franco-German 
Alliance — i.e., the policy of Caillaux. Even the 
Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894 could not expect 
a friendly reception in Belgium, because it added 
chances of disagreement between Russia and Ger- 
many to those between France and Germany. 
Every step which might serve to strengthen this 
alliance — the proposed accession of England, the 
three-year military service in France, etc. — in- 
creased Belgian uneasiness. The Belgians knew the 
growing strength of Germany in wealth and popu- 
lation ; they knew, too, the impulse of their German 
neighbours to expansion, of which the Chancellor 
had said that ** nothing could stop it." If the En- 
tente policy ended in an alliance, all the conse- 
quent local conflicts would become European con- 
flicts, and so would all have involved the Belgian 
buffer State in danger. I repeat: this was the reason 
why Germany could publish a number of Belgian 
diplomatists* letters proving that the Belgians, in 
contrast to the German assertion about Belgium's 
violation of her neutrality, had been decided op- 
ponents of the policy of alliance favoured by cer- 
tain diplomats of the Entente. That is how I in- 
terpret, among other statements in the "Belgian 



52 Germany Her Own Judge 

State Papers/' the words of the Belgian Ambassa- 
dor in Paris, Baron Guillaume (''Belgian State 
Papers," No. no): — 

If I were a Frenchman, I quite think that my sympa- 
thies would be with the grouping of the Powers advocated 
by Briand, which would represent a step forward from the 
present conditions; but I am a Belgian and therefore com- 
pelled to look at the play of events from a different point of 
view. It seems certain to me that it would be more to our 
interest if the policy of M. Caillaux and the Radicals and 
Radical Socialists were successful. 

The attitude adopted by other neutral States 
towards the Entente policy is unknown to me ; but 
I may assume with certainty that "King Edward'* 
must have had opponents everywhere. 

2. Retreat 

Even Englishmen took the field, not insignifi- 
cant in numbers or importance — Lord Courtney 
of Penrith, Lord Newton, Lord Weardale, Lord 
Rosebery, and many other men of distinction. 
Moreover, there was a great body of opponents 
among the people. We learn from the pen of the 
Belgian Ambassador in London, Count Lalaing, 
"it is interesting to note how unpopular Sir Ed- 
ward Grey has become with the extreme left wing 
of his party."' (February, 1912; "Belgian State 
Papers," No. 89.) The Ambassador refers in the 
same letter to the opposition of the Daily News: — 

To-day, the paper takes a speech of Lord Rosebery in 
Glasgow as a text for further attacks on Sir Edward Grey. 
In his speech Lord Rosebery criticizes British foreign poHcy 
with its compHcated system of Ententes, involving heavy 



Breakdown of the Entente Policy 53 

responsibilities. The paper deplores the result of the For- 
eign Minister's policy, which opposes the Triple Entente 
to the Triple Alliance, hinders German development, and 
in the previous summer brought the country to the very 
brink of war in the Morocco crisis.^ 

On the other hand, the British pacifists tried to 
reassure the people as to the German desire for 
expansion, which; last, owing to Germany's late 
awakening, would necessarily involve a menace to 
certain vital points. On the German side, too, there 
were attempts to lull the English to sleep. As an 
instance I may again refer to the speech which 
Herr von Muhlberg made to English journalists as 
a representative of the Chancellor (''The Belgian 
State Papers," No. 31): — 

Sceptics might perhaps reply that the German Army and 
Navy were dangerous instruments which might be em- 
ployed one day to find room for the ever-increasing popu- 
lation. But Germany has no need of new territory. Al- 
though her population increases annually by from 800,000 
to 900,000 souls, emigration has become insignificant; there 
is a general scarcity of workers in agriculture and industry. 

The English people were glad to hear such 
speeches; they found widespread echo, although 
they were in contradiction with other no less val- 
uable disclosures. They were well calculated to 
strengthen the current of public feeling in England 
against a policy of the strong hand, especially as 
the people became convinced by a crisis, which was 

^ I may here repeat my opinion that the foundation of defensive 
alliances on a great scale is only possible when the founder can base 
his action on superior fighting power, as was the case with Bismarck 
and Moltke. 



54 Germany Her Own Judge 

successfully surmounted, that under certain cir- 
cumstances a strict preventive policy may actually 
increase the danger of war. For though the Mo- 
rocco crisis had finally established the European 
status quo ante at Gibraltar, Europe had come very 
close to war. The English people did not want to 
take upon itself the responsibility for a so-called 
'* forced war** on the part of Germany; it was 
utterly tired of the false suspicions to which Eng- 
land is so often exposed on the Continent. And so, 
as Herr von Bethmann confesses, *' popular opinion 
forced the English Government towards a rapproche- 
ment with Germany/* Thus the idea of far-seeing 
statesmen of a new Triple Alliance became an ideal 
dream, and even the shadow of it, the Triple Ententey 
threatened to vanish. The vitality of the Triple En- 
tente grew visibly less, and fell to zero in June, 
1914. England protected hqr second cause for 
anxiety, the Suez Canal, not by Franco- Russian 
backing, but by direct arrangement with Germany 
in respect of Western Asia and Africa. 

Russian calls for help after the milliard war tax, 
after the rapprochement between certain Bulgarian 
circles and Austria during the Balkan War, and 
after the mission of Liman von Sanders, remained 
unanswered by England, except in so far as the 
Anglo-German arrangement may be regarded as a 
negative answer. 

In spite of the one-sided selection made by the 
German Foreign Office, an attentive reader can find 
in the "Belgian State Papers** sufficient evidence 
to make him realize that the bogey of an encircling 



Breakdown of the Entente Policy 55 

policy was steadily losing ground in Germany ftora 
191 1 onwards. The following examples may be 
noted: — 

The very pro-German Belgian representative 
in Berlin, Baron Greindl, writes as follows in 
March, 191 1, in reference to a speech of Sir Ed- 
ward Grey which can be described as the first move 
towards an Anglo-German rapprochement: — 

The disappointment of the Temps proves that public 
opinion in Paris reads considerably more into the speech 
than in Berlin. Judging from the expressions in the French 
paper, one might suppose that French public opinion 
now regards the Triple Entente as nothing but an empty 
formula without meaning. ("Belgian State Papers," 
No. 65.) 

Count Lalaing, the Belgian Ambassador in 
London, writes in January, 1912 (''Belgian State 
Papers,'* No. 87): — 

These events will be exploited by those English publicists 
who doubt the value of the Entente Cordiale. Their num- 
ber is now greater than it was. Articles appeared to this 
effect in the last numbers of the Fortnightly and of the Con- 
temporary Review. They will provide new material for the 
small group of writers who are trying to prove that it would 
be advantageous for England to maintain more friendly 
relations with Berlin without breaking with France. 

A month later the same writer says ("Belgian 
State Papers," No. 88) : — 

It is clear that England's purpose is a peaceful one. It 
is to diminish at any price the tension which exists between 
the two countries [England and Germany]. This is the 
Cabinet's present policy, and the War Minister is the most 
friendly to Germany of them all. 



56 Germany Her Own Judge 

In the next letter the Ambassador notes how un- 
popular Sir Edward Grey had become in his own 
party, and refers to press articles to that effect. 

3. Collapse 

Then the complete disruption of the Entente, 
which had been so triumphant at the time of the 
Morocco crisis, became more apparent. 

Baron Beyens, Belgian Ambassador in Berlin 
(formerly in Bukarest), wrote on the 26th May, 

1913 ("Belgian State Papers," No. 106): — 

Undoubtedly one can say without fear of error that the 
visit of the English King and Queen to Berlin appears in 
the eyes of Europe as confirmation and ratification of the 
rapprochement which was quite certainly achieved between 
Germany and England during the Balkan War, when the 
two States worked together to preserve peace. ^ 

The same Ambassador wrote on the 24th April, 

1914 (''Belgian State Papers," No. 113): — 

Isvolsky will be able to convince himself in England that 
public opinion has no inclination to see England give up 
her freedom of action through a formal treaty which wou^d 
link her fate to that of France and Russia. It is strange to 
have to state that it is the English Radical party which is 
most strongly opposed to alliance with France. Its intran- 
sigent tendencies and its programme of social reform ought 
on the contrary to bring it nearer to the French Radicals, 
who are pursuing the same political course on the other side 
of the Channel. Its sympathies, however, lie principally 
with the Germans in spite of their conservative, even re- 
actionary, Government. 

^ This cooperation kept the peace at the time, but at the expense 
of the Slavs, and especially of Serbia. (Cf. ch. vi.) 



Breakdown of the Entente Policy 57 

And finally we find a significant remark by Baron 
Guillaume, the Ambassador in Paris, of the 8th 
May, 1914 (''Belgian State Papers,*' No. 115): — 

King George's toast was clearly less hearty than that of 
M. Poincar6. What is the nature of the engagements which 
bind the two nations? Have they concluded a miUtary con- 
vention? I do not know, but I do not forget that thought- 
ful and serious minds are doubtful whether France would 
find assistance in England at the outbreak of a European 
conflagration. There are even people who do not believe 
in serious support by England at sea. 

Could Baron Guillaume have sent his Govern- 
ment better preparation for the Anglo-German 
Treaty which was concluded a month later in 
June, 1 9 14? Did not the events at the outbreak of 
war show that the military convention had never 
in fact existed, since M. Poincare was seriously 
anxious about English support after Germany had 
declared war? Thus, things were going very badly 
with the Triple Entente in the summer of 19 14, as 
the German collection of ''Belgian State Papers" 
proves; the conclusion of this chapter will show 
whose was the master hand which forged the new 
alliance in spite of these difficulties, and how this 
was accomplished. 

4. A Silent Witness 
First of all I will draw the reader's attention to 
the fact that besides the above positive documen- 
tary evidence of the Anglo-German rapprochement, 
the ''Belgian State Papers" also contain a silent 
witness. In order to create the impression of com- 
pleteness the letters were published in full; yet 



58 Germany Her Own Judge 

in places there are great gaps in the sequence. 
Naturally the letters of the Ambassador in London 
would give us the best insight into the actual state 
of the Entente policy, since its centre of gravity lay 
in the relation of England to the Dual Alliance. 
But in proportion as the collapse of the Entente 
policy becomes more obvious from the correspond- 
ence from Paris and Berlin, the London letters be- 
come fewer in the collection. 

In 1912 there are ten letters, five from London. 
In 19 13 there are thirteen letters, three from Lon- 
don. In 1914 there are ten letters, one from Lon- 
don. In fact, the ''State Papers'* leave out of ac- 
count in increasing degree the position taken by 
England towards the encircling policy, and con- 
fine themselves after the Balkan crisis alrnost ex- 
clusively to France. In France, as in Russia, the 
milliard war tax and the mission of Liman von 
Sanders called forth self-sacrificing counter-meas- 
ures and called forth, therefore, an increased tend- 
ency to an alliance with England. Whilst, there- 
fore, the idea of a new Triple Alliance seems to have 
had more supporters in England than in the Dual 
Alliance before the solution of the Morocco crisis 
and during Edward the Seventh's reign, the propor- 
tion was definitely the other way during the last 
years before the war. England was putting on the 
brake with all her strength. 

5. Further Proofs 
The ''Belgian State Papers" are abundantly 
sufficient to show impartial neutrals that the politi- 



Breakdown of the Entente Policy 59 

cal situation before the outbreak of war was in no 
way menacing to the German Empire, and that 
therefore the present war is not a preventive war 
on Germany's part. 

But any one who is accustomed to read docu- 
ments carefully will find in the German propaganda 
further evidence that the ostensible apprehensions 
of the German Government as to the menace of the 
Entente policy could not and did not exist. The 
following is from the Chancellor's paper, the Nord- 
deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (B.N., 6th August, 
1915): — 

When negotiations were being conducted in the spring 
of 1 9 14 between Germany and England about an African 
colonial agreement, the Ambassador Cambon inquired of 
Jagow whether French interests would be prejudiced by it. 
Jagow replied that if there was any question of French 
interests, Germany would obtain the assent of France. In 
consequence of repeated suggestions by Cambon for a spe- 
cial Franco-German agreement with a view to improving the 
general relations between the two countries, Jagow pro- 
ceeded to point out ... 

This passage in the German propaganda shows 
us that the French Ambassador in the spring of 
1 9 14 thought it possible that French interests might 
be prejudiced in consequence of Anglo-German 
negotiations. From that the German Government 
must have known that the Anglo-French friendship 
was very shaky and in no way threatening, a fact 
which had certainly been noted by most diploma- 
tists, and especially by the German representatives 
in London, Paris, and Petrograd. 

The so-called ''Revelations of Count Pourtal^s," 



6o Germany Her Own Judge 

the German Ambassador in Petrograd, show that 
the German ambassadorial reports sometimes dis- 
agreed with German propaganda and also with the 
words of the Chancellor. 

I will deal with these extraordinary reports in 
detail in a later work. Their publication in the 
middle of the war was obviously designed to smooth 
the way for a separate peace with Russia. Here 
I would only state shortly that these reports of the 
German Ambassador represent the political sit- 
uation at the time of the annexation of Bosnia in 
1909 as if Russia had assented cheerfully to the 
Austrian annexation of Bosnia, whilst England 
had "even then" pressed for war. M. Isvolsky, 
who is known in German propaganda as the "in- 
ternational incendiary," suddenly appears as an 
innocent lamb. And Russian Court circles show 
themselves to be indisputably pro-German and 
anti-English. For example: — 

The words of the English Ambassador about Serbian 
claims were described as "provocative" by the Russians 
and their diplomats. After a dinner at the German Em- 
bassy Nicholson expressed himself in such terms that a 
member of the Czar's entourage remarked that Nicholson 
seemed almost to regret a peaceful solution of the crisis, etc. 

In the same way the reports assert that Russia 
made up her mind to a peaceful solution of the all- 
important question of the year 1909 — the annexa- 
tion of Bosnia — "without coming to an understand- 
ing beforehand with France and England." These 
assertions would be all very fine, if they were not 
unfortunately in contradiction with the earlier 



Breakdown of the Entente Policy 6i 

words of Herr von Bethmann. For the Chancellor 
had expressed himself as follows, with regard to the 
same period, in his speech of the 26. December, 
1 9 14: ''When I was summoned to this position 
five years ago, the Triple Entente stood firmly 
cemented over against the Triple Alliance." 

Which of these two contradictory pieces of Ger- 
man evidence is a neutral to believe? Any con- 
scientious student of the history of those years 
knows that neither of them is absolutely accurate. 
The Entente was not firmly cemented in 1909, and 
Russia did not cheerfully consent to the annexa- 
tion of Bosnia. The truth is that the danger from 
the Entente policy was set up as a bogey in the eyes 
of the German people and neutrals when it was a 
case of excusing Germany's declaration of war; 
it disappeared as soon as victory, and with it 
predominance in Europe, seemed attainable by a 
separate peace with one of the enemy Powers. 

6. German Mistakes 

In spite of all, the new Triple Alliance stands 
firmly cemented to-day beyond the wildest dreams 
of its most zealous supporters. How did this 
miracle occur? 

We know that on the 15th June, 1914, England 
concluded a treaty with Germany for the protection 
of her interests in Western Asia and Africa (especi- 
ally the Suez Canal). By this act England withdrew 
from her position as an interested party in events 
in the Balkans, assuming that she could build se- 
curely on this treaty with Germany. Six weeks later 



62 Germany Her Own Judge 

Germany and Austria opened the world war. Ger- 
many broke a treaty of the greatest importance to 
England by violating the neutrality of the Anglo- 
German buffer State of Belgium. Naturally, after 
this breach of a treaty, England could not reckon 
any longer on Germany keeping the agreement of 
the 15th June, 19 14, and had to return while there 
was yet time to the old and well-tried principle of 
the European balance of power. This was the only 
way to secure Germany's respect for this "scrap of 
paper'' and to guarantee England that Germany 
would not destroy the status quo in Southern Turkey 
when occasion arose. 

And again, when the German Government tried 
to make sure of England's neutrality before the out- 
break of war, Herr von Bethmann asked the Eng- 
lish Ambassador to call on him and guaranteed the 
integrity of France provided England remained 
neutral. When the Ambassador asked whether this 
integrity applied also to the French colonies, the 
Chancellor replied that he could not give such an 
assurance. Thus Herr von Bethmann opened up 
again the old Morocco conflict; he touched Eng- 
land's most sensitive spot and forced her to active 
participation in the war. Certainly England might 
perhaps have intervened even without these oc- 
currences — for the preservation of the balance of 
power is a matter of life and death for her; still Ger- 
many's procedure spared the Government in Lon- 
don an unpleasant and very doubtful struggle with 
the all-powerful English Parliament. It remains too 
very questionable whether this purely theoretical 



Breakdown of the Entente Policy 63 

political argument (England's interest in the balance 
of power) would have been sufficiently powerful to 
win Parliament over to active intervention in. time. 
So the circle was closed round Germany. Ger- 
many, who now is labouring to justify her world 
war by the bogey of an "encirclement policy,'' her- 
self forged the circle from beginning to end; Herr 
von Billow did the preliminary work in 1898, 1899, 
1905, and 1908, and Herr von Bethmann completed 
the circle in 19 14. Any serious and impartial student 
of recent history must inevitably come to this con- 
clusion. 

7. Final Result 

The world war, which Germany began in 1914 and 
which is designated in official German propaganda as 
a defensive war, is, in spite of the assertions of Ger- 
man Intellectuals, not a preventive war, because at the 
moment of its outbreak there were no forces threaten- 
ing Germany, Although Germany's neighbours would 
have had precisely the same right to extend the old Dual 
Alliance which Bismarck had to create the Triple Al- 
liance, yet this perfectly justifiable extension did not in 
fact exist in any binding form which might menace 
Germany: nor would it have assumed a menacing form, 
owing to England's opposition. 

This fact is not affected by the contention that, 
in consequence of the common Anglo-French inter- 
est in the maintenance of the status quo at sea, a 
rapprochement between France and England had 
naturally taken place at the time of the Morocco 
crisis, and that this rapprochement was established 



64 Germany Her Own Judge 

for the future in an absolutely unbinding form, 
which was far from reaching the force of the Bis- 
marckian alliances. Equally irrelevant is the fact 
that the far-seeing King Edward was himself prob- 
ably in favour of a policy of alliance. It is demon- 
strable that Germany began the world war at a 
time when she thought she could reckon with great 
certainty on England^s neutrality. It was only 
Germany's greed for the French colonies, and her 
hopes of drawing military advantage from the vio- 
lation of Belgian neutrality, that drove England to 
action. 



CHAPTER VI 
POLICY IN THE BALKANS 

I. ''Berlin to Bagdad'' 

After the defeat of the Russians in the Carpa- 
thians in 19 1 5 and the consequent open adhesion 
of Bulgaria to the Central Powers, the ''Berlin 
to Bagdad Coalition" became the intellectual stock 
in trade of all German publicists. Yet the Ger- 
man-Austrian idea of an economic and political 
union with Turkey across the Balkans was far 
older than the world war. The well-known pro- 
German historian Dr. Bachtold, Professor at the 
University of Bile, made the following admission 
in a defence of Germany which appeared at the 
beginning of the war: — 

The rise of Germany to the position of a World Power 
in the nineties produced the most disturbing impression in 
England, apart from her naval policy, owing to her attitude 
to Mohammedan countries in general and to Turkey in 
particular. This attitude was announced to the world by 
the Emperor's journey to the East. Turkey, and especially 
Asiatic Turkey, was eyed by Germany not as an object 
of political occupation, but as the great sphere of future 
activity for economic and civilizing colonization. It is a 
question of consolidating and regenerating the Turkish 
State and territory from a military, administrative, eco- 
nomic, and financial point of view, and essentially with Ger- 
man means. The details of these political aims and the 
method of carrying them out vary with different German 
politicians. (B.N.) 



66 Germany Her Own Judge 

Bachtold then specifies special large features, e.g., 
the railway problem (the Bagdad and the Ana- 
tolian railways) and the colonization of Mesopo- 
tamia, and continues : — 

These aims are closely connected geographically and 
politically. The establishment of a zone stretching from 
the North Sea to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean 
has formed more and more clearly an essential object of 
political and economic activity for Germany and Austria. 
The aim is the union of the Central European Empires with 
Turkey across friendly Balkan States ^ to form a vast sphere 
in which the two halves would supplement each other eco- 
nomically, and would perhaps he economically united, have 
through lines of communication {from Berlin to Bagdad) ^ 
and constitute a political confederation from the Elbe to the 
Euphrates. 

Those are the words of the champion of Ger- 
many's policy about her aims before the war — 
published at a time when the pro-Russian party of 
Genadiev in Bulgaria was still making the accom- 
plishment of German ideas doubtful, when Bulgaria 
was still neutral. And he had to use such language, 
for his statements were confirmed even before the 
war by articles in the German press and in books. 
For example, Liman wrote in his sensational book 
''The Crown Prince" in the winter of 1913-1914, 
referring to the changes arising from the Balkan 
wars: ''Southeastern Europe, too [the Balkans], 
to which our eyes turn to-day in perpetual hope, 
is gaining a new form," etc. 

Confirmation of the German and Austrian tend- 
ency towards the Near East — before the out- 
break of war — is important, although the latest 



Policy in the Balkans 67 

propaganda of the Central Powers is silent on the 
subject; for this tendency determined the under- 
lying note of all international Balkan politics from 
1898 onwards. 

2. South Russia — the Mediterranean 

The closing of the Dardanelles by Turkey awoke 
to new life in Russia the old longing for the pos- 
session of the Straits. The Russians realized, by 
the disadvantages they now suffered, how right 
those old politicians were who had laid stress 
on the strategic value of the Dardanelles in war- 
time. Their warnings had always come to nothing 
in face of the firm and decided veto of almost all 
Europe and so had finally been neglected as in- 
citements to aggression. Confirmation of this is 
that in the whole of the vast German propaganda 
we do not find one single proof brought forward 
that the ''ardent longing'* of Russia for the pos- 
session of the Dardanelles had found especial ex- 
pression in the last decades — up till the German 
mission of Liman von Sanders. 

The statement of the Pan-Germans and their 
partisans that "Russia had willed the war for 
the sake of Constantinople" is simply ridiculous, 
since the Czar was a zealous supporter of the 
Hague Arbitration Tribunal. Similarly Russia did 
her utmost in the present war to insure the neu- 
trality of Turkey, and that she would hardly have 
done, if her object had been the occupation of 
Constantinople. The reference, too, to imperial- 
istic expressions of the Russian Minister, Miliu- 



68 Germany Her Own Judge 

koff, is beside the point, as the Minister expressly 
characterizes the fulfilment of Peter the Great's 
legacy as the consequence of the German desire 
for expansion — and that, so far as we know, only 
after the outbreak of war. 

Certainly, the German Eastern policy which be- 
gan in the nineties was not calculated to weaken 
the Russian ''longing" for Byzantium. The politi- 
cal and economic predominance of Germany in 
Turkey was bound eventually to lead to Turkish 
political dependency. Russia was therefore com- 
pelled so to direct her policy that she should have 
her hand near Constantinople at the critical mo- 
ment. The Agreement of Miirzsteg in 1903 stands 
out as a change in Russian policy by which 
Russia ''stepped athwart the path." Outwardly, 
no doubt, it only regulated necessary reforms in 
Macedonia. But in its secret essence it was a rec- 
ognition by Russia of the necessity, in the event 
of the collapse of Turkey, of coming to an under- 
standing with Austria as to the "sick man*s" 
inheritance. Every ground of quarrel with Aus- 
tria was to be removed beforehand for all even- 
tualities. Why should Russia in particular, which 
in contradistinction to Germany had natural in- 
terests in the Dardanelles, come empty-handed out 
of these preventive agreements? 

For the cradle of Russian religion, St. Sophia, is 
in Constantinople; it is as precious to the Russians 
as St. Peter's to Catholics. Further, the main 
export route from South Russia goes through Con- 
stantinople. If we consider that a vast network 



Policy in the Balkans 69 

of railways, all the harbours of the Black Sea, and 
the Russian mercantile marine can be more or less 
locked up at any time with the key of the Straits, 
and that therefore many hundreds of million rou- 
bles and the material prosperity of millions of 
people are at the mercy of foreigners, the old long- 
ings of the Russians appear intelligible. A power- 
ful possessor of the Straits is in a position to cut 
one of the most important nerves in the Russian 
body.^ Hence, even the younger generation of 
Russian politicians, who up to the beginning of the 
war used to regard the occupation of Constanti- 
nople as beyond their reach, still had to keep a 
keen watch on any shifting of power at the Dar- 
danelles. They had to see to it that the Straits 
should be, if not in their own hands, at least in 
the hands of as weak a foreign Power as possible. 
The greatest danger for them lay in the German 
and Austrian Eastern policy, which would make the 
trade of South Russia dependent on the powerful 
Berlin-Bagdad Coalition. And so the Russians were 
deeply interested in events in the Balkans and had 
to try to the very best of their ability to prevent 
any alteration in the status quo in favour of the Cen- 
tral Powers, such as the crushing of Serbia in 1914. 

3. England 

England, too, saw with concern the growth of Ger- 
man influence in Turkey. She felt herself threat- 

^ When, for example, the Dardanelles were closed in the Italian- 
Turkish War in 191 1, a great part of the Russian grain harvest was 
spoiled owing to the high freights. 



70 Germany Her Own Judge 

ened in her interests on the Persian Gulf and the 
Suez Canal by the policy of a Central European 
coalition. Whilst, however, the intersection of 
German and Russian interests at one and the 
same point (Constantinople) rendered the politi- 
cal situation between these two countries critical, 
German aspirations at first turned more to the 
Northern, and English aspirations to the South- 
ern Turkish territories. And so Germany and 
England arrived at an understanding about their 
respective spheres of influence in Africa and Asia 
Minor six weeks before the outbreak of war. 

4. The Balkan League 

In 191 2 the Balkan States united into a league 
and thrust the frontiers of Turkey in Europe back 
towards Constantinople. The propaganda of the 
Central Powers hinted at the Entente policy being 
behind this league. The Agence Ottomane said: — 

England paved the way for the union of the Balkan 
States through the brothers Buxton and others, and after 
the end'of the war used every effort to secure the cession of 
all the territory of Turkey in Europe to the Balkan States 

I Professor Bach told wrote: — 

There is no doubt that the Entente, and especially Russia, 
was behind the Balkan League. 

It is not impossible that previously, in the time 
of Edward VII, the English Government had 
thought of making the Suez Canal secure by 
strengthening the Balkans. Still, the reported 
agitation of the brothers Buxton is, so far as we 



Policy in the Balkans yi 

know, not proved. On the contrary, in view of 
the subsequent attitude of the EngHsh Govern- 
ment, it appears doubtful whether England insti- 
gated the foundation of the league. 

Russia, however, which had an even more vital 
interest than England in establishing a bulwark 
against the German and Austrian Eastern policy, 
might well have supported the league. For a league 
of the Balkan States would have been bound to 
nip any idea of a Berlin-Bagdad coalition in the 
bud. And even though Russia had induced Serbia 
to recognize the annexation of Bosnia in 1909, it 
must have felt the necessity of bolting the door 
against further invasion of Slav territory by Ger- 
many. Austria certainly declared herself "sat- 
urated'* after the annexation of Bosnia; but Pan- 
German propaganda constantly maintained that 
such statements are "confined to the moment*' 
(e.g., Liman).^ 

Russian instigation was, however, unnecessary. 
For Germany's desire for expansion, which showed 
itself with growing self-confidence during and after 
the Morocco crisis ; the close union of Germany and 
Austria, which forced through the annexation of 
Bosnia; and finally the sword-rattling of the Ger- 
man war party, constituted an open menace 
to the Balkan States.^ 

^ In contrast to Bismarck^s statements about saturation, Beth- 
mann-HoUweg expressed himself quite definitely in 191 1: "Ger- 
many's expansion is a fact with which other nations must reckon. 
Nothing can stop it." 

2 As to the "sword-rattling," cf. Professor Hans Delbriick: "If 
we had started a preventive war, whether in 1908, or 191 1, or at 



^2 Germany Her Own Judge 

The idea of economic expansion as well as pre- 
ventive strategic insurance pointed to the "only 
sally port still open/* the road to Bagdad. Is it 
surprising that the small Balkan States tried to 
protect themselves by a league? 

5. Unfounded Apprehensions 

There were good reasons for establishing the 
league, and yet it collapsed — not without Aus- 
trian intervention, as the pro-German Dr. Bach- 
told admits. Bachtold tries to justify Austria's 
proceedings by stating that ''after the severance 
of the Balkan States from Turkey had been suc- 
cessfully achieved, these States were logically 
bound to turn against Austria." Austria's own 
propaganda goes even further: "Russia tried to 

any date, for our Hotspurs have demanded it for who knows how 
long . . ." {Voss. Zeitung, August, 1914; aX&oDas Grossere Deutsch- 
land,'" 19th September, 19 14.) Striking proof of the existence of a 
German war party is afforded among many other books by the 
work of the Swiss jurist Professor Nippold, Der deutsche Chauvin- 
ismus, published at Leipsic in 19 13. Compare also the Emperor's 
views, about which the Pan-Germanistic Baron Greindl wrote as 
early as 1905; "I learn from a good source that His Majesty re- 
cently expressed views in a private conversation in the strongest 
contrast to the peaceful ideas which have hitherto been ascribed 
to him." {Belgian State Papers, No. 9.) 

That war did not come in 1905 after the Emperor's journey to 
Tangier is due to four causes: (i) the German people did not yet 
show sufficiently pronounced imperialist views; (2) the slow return 
of the Russian armies after the Japanese War and the weakening 
of Russia by the revolution made it impossible for the German war 
party to popularize a war by the fiction of foreign attack; (3) Ger- 
many had achieved a complete diplomatic success at the ensuing 
Algeciras Conference without military action; (4) the Emperor 
William was endeavouring at that time to persuade the Russian 
Government into a Continental alliance against England. 



Policy in the Balkans 73 

incite all the Balkan States against us; she had 
hoped to be able to embroil all the Southeast- 
ern States, including Roumania, with Austria*'; and 
so on. 

No proofs of these assertions are produced any- 
where. The German White Book, too, sets out 
the following argument, without any attempt to 
prove Russia's aggressive intentions : — 

The Russian idea was that Serbia should cede to Bul- 
garia those parts of Macedonia which it had received dur- 
ing the last Balkan war, in exchange for Bosnia and Herze- 
govina, which were to be taken from Austria. To oblige 
Bulgaria to fall in with this plan, it was to be isolated; 
Roumania was to be attached to Russia with the aid of 
French propaganda; Serbia was to be promised Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, etc. 

Possibly this idea was to be found among Rus- 
sian statesmen in 1913 as a defensive policy. 
There was no lack of menacing signs for Russia, 
as we shall see in the next section. On the other 
hand, the Serbian and Roumanian territories in 
Austria were, from the Russian point of view, a 
good pledge for the restoration of the dead Balkan 
League, in the event of the Central Powers trying 
to put their Eastern policy through by force. We 
look in vain in pro- German propaganda for proof 
that Russia had any intention of abusing this 
*'good pledge" by aggressive action. On the con- 
trary, an official Austrian memorandum of the 
29th July, 19 14, expresses astonishment at the 
Russian protest against the brutal Austrian ulti- 
matum to Serbia and refers to the good relations 
with Russia up till then. (B.N. 61.) That the 



74 Germany Her Own Judge 

memorandum proceeds to accuse Russia of sub- 
versive propaganda in Serbia, merely on the 
ground of this protest, is an indirect but indisput- 
able admission that there was no real evidence. 

The German argument that ''by the rapproche- 
ment between the Balkan States and the Entente 
King Edward's circle would be closed up and the 
aggressive spirit of the Entente Powers increased 
owing to Germany's isolation" is wrong, inas- 
much as the isolating force lay not in the Balkans, 
but in the English fleet. Now the Balkan League 
did not come into visible action till October, 1912, 
when the collapse of the Entente policy in Eng- 
land might long have been noted (cf. p. 55; 
Grey's speech of March, 191 1). Hence, at the 
time when the Balkan League was formed, the 
Dual Alliance was so doubtful about the English 
fleet — the main instrument of isolation — that 
it was quite justified in seeking new shoulders to 
help bear the ever-increasing burden of armaments. 

6. The Austro-German '^Coalition'' Policy comes 
to a Head 

The year 1913 brought undreamed-of successes 
to the German and Austrian Eastern policy. Aus- 
tria succeeded temporarily in erecting two friendly 
strongholds behind Serbia's back — Bulgaria and 
Albania. Further, German-Turkish relations be- 
came more friendly and more firmly established 
than ever before, owing to the mission of Liman 
von Sanders. Finally the German milliard war 
tax put the Central Powers in a position to achieve 



Policy in the Balkans 75 

their ardently desired aims by force at the first 
suitable opportunity. 

Albania: At the instigation of the Central Pow- 
ers an autonomous Albania with a German ruling 
house was established. To this end Serbia and 
Greece had to surrender newly conquered terri- 
tory. Austrian expectations, indeed, were not en- 
tirely fulfilled in Albania, as the Prince soon had 
to abdicate. 

Bulgaria: The Central Powers were more for- 
tunate in Bulgaria. It is well known that Russia 
championed the national unity of this State when 
she founded it in 1878. But Austria at that time 
regarded the creation of a Greater Bulgaria as 
dangerous, and the territory of the new State was 
therefore considerably reduced. 

It is most striking that in 19 13 it was Austria 
who supported Bulgarian aspirations for national 
unity, while Russia, who was appointed arbitra- 
tor, declared herself at the Peace Congress of Buka- 
rest in favour of a balance of power in the Balkans. 
She found the application of the principle of na- 
tionality in the case of Bulgaria unjust, so long 
as the same principle could not be applied to Rou- 
mania and Serbia. As there are seven million Serbs 
under Austrian sway, the arbitrator held it to be 
just to apportion one million Bulgarians to Serbia. 
Similarly Russia was of the opinion that, in the 
case of coalitions, the booty need not correspond 
precisely to the military successes of the individual 
members; and that Bulgaria, by putting forward 
exaggerated claims (presumably at Austrian in- 



76 Germany Her Own Judge 

stigation), was herself partly responsible for the 
diminution of the booty, e.g., for the fact that 
Turkey had regained Adrianople.^ So disagree- 
ments arose between Bulgaria and Russia, which 
Austria knew how to put to clever use in order to 
create a friend for herself in the centre of the Bal- 
kans, as an adjunct to Turkey. Hence the visits 
of the Austrian successor to the throne to Bulgarian 
Headquarters and of King Ferdinand to Vienna in 

1913. 

Turkey: While Von der Goltz*s mission had served 
only instructional purposes, the mission of Liman 
von Sanders in the autumn of 19 13 was intended to 
secure the highest Turkish military posts for Ger- 
man officers. The extraordinary character of this 
step, which in itself suggests a state of war, was 
bound to disturb Russia profoundly. Consequently 
there appeared in Petrograd an increased tendency 
towards a rapprochement with England, and Rus- 
sia took precautionary measures, as if she had a 
presentiment of the coming war. In the winter of 
19 1 3-14 she strengthened the Polish fortresses, 
moved some of her military depots for the ** active*' 
army towards the west, etc. 

She was the more justified in these steps, as the 
German milliard war tax, voted in the summer of 
1 913, put the Central Powers into a position of ex- 
traordinary readiness for war, whereas Russia was 
at a disadvantage owing to her very slow mobiliza- 

^ It ought also to be mentioned that Serbia, contrary to the 
original agreement, had to supply Bulgaria during the war with 
reinforcements 50,000 strong to win Adrianople. 



Policy in the Balkans 77 

tion. Every peace-lover would describe this enor- 
mous loan as over-hasty, unnecessary, and danger- 
ous, although it appeared to be motived by the birth 
of the Balkan League.^ 

7. Russia's Cry of Alarm 
The alteration of the political situation in the 
Balkans in 1913, as we have said, most naturally 
gave rise in Russia to anxiety, which found clear 
expression in the press. The semi-official Novoe 
Vremya wrote : — 

Is it desirable for Russia that our traditional friend Ger- 
many, who stands on our western frontier armed to the 
teeth, should extend that frontier to the Black Sea by trans- 
forming her diplomatic influence on the Bosporus into real 
power over the Straits? What does the **Sanger-Brucke** 
mean? How does France regard this new change in Con- 
stantinople? And why does England keep silence now that 
the fate of the whole Turkish Empire is at stake, while in 
1878 she watched over the Turkish capital so jealously? 

' It was over-hasty, because at the moment when it was voted 
the Balkan League broke up; almost simultaneously Russia showed 
her readiness to meet the Powers over the Albanian question and 
the rift appeared between her and her protegee Bulgaria. 

It was unnecessary, since the aggressive character of the Bal- 
kan League was extremely improbable and in no way proved. 
Germany was far in advance of the opposing group in point of 
armament, for, though only one third of the loan had been paid 
shortly before war began, German equipment proved itself per- 
fectly complete and far superior to that of her opponents. The loan 
had no object, unless it was to help on a speedy decision, because 
the opposing group could, in their turn, make a corresponding in- 
crease in their equipment. 

It was dangerous, because it was bound to be provocative, owing 
to its unprecedented size, and because it strengthened nationalist 
feeling all over Europe and inflamed the hatred of the opposing 
Powers. 



78 Germany Her Own Judge 

Germany proves indirectly by her publication 
of the ''Belgian State Papers" that this Russian 
cry of alarm was not unfounded. It is extraordi- 
narily suspicious that the German Foreign Office 
should publish parts of the Belgian correspondence 
from Berlin, London, and Paris to justify the world 
war, and should entirely omit the letters from Vi- 
enna and Petrograd which could have given us an 
insight into events in the Balkans. This omission 
is the more striking, since a clear understanding of 
the Balkan political situation is of the utmost im- 
portance, if we wish to determine the guilt for the 
war, and since, on the other hand, the letters from 
Petrograd would have the same value as those from 
Paris in helping us to form a judgment about the 
Entente policy. Was the neutral Belgian judgment 
about events in the Balkans inconvenient for 
Germany? 



CHAPTER VII 
HOW AUSTRIA ANNEXED BOSNIA 

I. Turkish Oppression 
Serbian struggles for national unity go very far 
back. Long before Bosnia and Herzegovina were 
handed over to Austrian administration in 1878, 
there existed in Buda-Pesth a Serbian national 
society of which Brockhaus gives the following 
details : — 

Omladina (the Serbian for "youth'* or "the rising gen- 
eration") is a Serbian society founded by Serbian students 
in Buda-Pesth, in order to inaugurate a cultural, literary, 
and political movement for the unity of the Serbian people. 
The society, which holds congresses annually at various 
places, was reorganized in 1866 at the Assembly in Neusatz; 
it included members in the principality of Serbia and was 
supported by Prince Michael himself. He soon resigned his 
membership, however, as the society was pursuing imprac- 
ticable ideals without regard to the actual circumstances 
and needs of the time and eventually supported the oppo- 
sition in Serbia. The Omladina stood at the head of Ser- 
bian opposition to Dualism in Hungary and was conse- 
quently dissolved by the Hungarian Government in 1871. 

The weak side of the Omladina was its pursuit 
of "impracticable ideals without regard to the 
actual circumstances and needs of the time.'* If we 
consider these ideals from the national standpoint, 
however, they were no less essentially justifiable 
than Bismarck's efforts for the union of the German 
people or the present Bulgarian aims. If Bismarck 



8o Germany Her Own Judge 

was justified in reconquering certain German dis- 
tricts which had been taken by Louis XIV, and 
incidentally in seizing 373 purely French parishes, 
the old Serbian effort to recover Serbian national 
territory cannot be condemned. But the Serbian 
Prince had to repudiate the Omladina, for the forces 
at his disposal were too small to accomplish the 
wishes of his Hotspurs. Nevertheless, Turkey, by 
her barbarous measures, took care that the flame 
of national feeling among the Serbs should be per- 
petually fanned ; and in 1875-76 Turkish misgovern- 
ment provoked them to attempt the liberation of 
districts which had originally formed part of gen- 
unine Serbian territory. A revolt against Turkish 
domination broke out in these districts, of which 
we find the following account in Becker's "Welt- 
geschichte '' 1 (vol. 12, p. 195): — 

The inhabitants of Herzegovina and of some districts of 
Bosnia took up arms on the 6th July, 1875, in desperation 
at the extortions, robbery, and massacre of Christians which 
went unpunished by the Government. They received secret 
support from their neighbouring kindred in Serbia and 
Montenegro. The Turks failed to crush the revolt in these 
mountainous districts. 

In the next year Bulgaria, which at that time 
belonged to Turkey, also revolted. Becker (vol. 
12, p. 195) describes the course of events as fol- 
lows : — 

Bulgaria, which revolted on the 1st May, 1876, was laid 
waste by the cannibal Bashibazouks and Circassians to the 

1 This is a popular work, written from a point of view very 
friendly to Prussia, which I read with avidity in my school-days. 
{Note by the Author.) 



How Austria annexed Bosnia 8i 

accompaniment of the most horrible atrocities to men, 
women, and children. About fifteen thousand people, mostly 
women and children, were murdered. The massacres at 
Batak on the 12th May, at Klissura and other places are 
some of the most dreadful in history. Hundreds of Bul- 
garian girls were exposed for sale in the streets of Philip- 
popolis and other towns, young women were carried off to 
the Turkish harems, wealthy merchants, priests, and teach- 
ers were arrested in great numbers and immediately mur- 
dered or thrown into prison. And the Government in Con- 
stantinople rewarded the leaders of these robbers and 
murderers with decorations and high official positions. 

Two months later Serbia and Montenegro de- 
clared war on Turkey, whilst the Great Christian 
Powers would not risk a single drop of blood. The 
only support came from Russian volunteers : — 

While the revolt was still going on in Bosnia and Herze- 
govina, Serbia and Montenegro declared war on the Porte 
on the 2<1 July, 1876. These two States could no longer 
avoid open support of the rebels ; they demanded the union 
of Bosnia with Serbia and of Herzegovina with Monte- 
negro, and took the field in the hope of rousing by their 
military action all the Christian provinces and the king- 
dom of Greece to fight against the Turkish domination. 
(Becker, vol. 12, p. 195.) 

2. The RussO'Turkish War 
The Serbians found no support on any side, and 
were defeated. In vain the Russian Government 
endeavoured to turn the eyes of Europe to the ap- 
palling situation of the Southern Slavs. There was, 
indeed, a party in England under Gladstone which 
initiated violent propaganda by meetings and pam- 
phlets in favour of the Southern Slavs. But Dis- 
raeli's Cabinet feared a too great weakening of 



82 Germany Her Own Judge 

Turkeys as a result of "more effective measures," 
and clung to England^s old policy of protecting the 
Ottoman Empire as much as possible. England had 
secured her direct sea route to India a year before 
by the purchase of the Suez Canal shares; in this 
new order of things she felt herself more threatened 
by an intervention of the Powers than if nothing 
was done. Germany, too, could not be moved to 
active interference. Bismarck thought the Balkan 
question "not worth the bones of a single Pomer- 
anian Grenadier." Even Austria refused the Rus- 
sian proposal of common action : — 

In vain the Emperor Alexander proposed to make his 
pacific efforts effective by the common occupation ot the 
Balkans by Austria and Russia and a simultaneous naval 
demonstration by England before Constantinople; neither 
Andrassy in Austria nor Lord Beaconsfield in England 
would go beyond diplomatic intervention. But could the 
Czar calmly watch Serbia being crushed, Bosnia and Herze- 
govina being turned into a shambles, and the Bulgarian 
Christians being massacred? Was he to turn a deaf ear to 
the cry of misery which reached him from the Danube, to 
the appeal for help which Milan, in his terror and despair, 
addressed to him?^ (Dr. Georg Weber, " Weltgeschichte," 
vol. 15, part 2, p. 1251.) 

Russia intervened and won for Serbia a com- 
paratively favourable peace. Meanwhile the Monte- 
negrin mountaineers, who had gained some suc- 
cesses over the Turks, continued to struggle, and 
Turkey persevered in her evasive policy as far as 
carrying out the promised reforms was concerned. 

^ Cf. e.g., Weber, p. 1265, for an account of the farce of the 
"constitution " granted at Constantinople. 



How A ustria annexed Bosnia 83 

Russia then determined to act alone, after assuring 
herself of the neutrality of the other Great Powers. 
Even Austria was prepared to remain neutral in 
accordance with the Agreement of Reichsstadt 
(1877), but she reserved the right of occupying 
Bosnia and Herzegovina under certain circum- 
stances.^ 

In the Russo-Turkish war which followed in 
1877-78 the Roumanians gave the Slavs notable as- 
sistance later on. But it was only after very heavy 
and costly fighting and by calling up considerable 
reinforcements that the Russians succeeded in con- 
quering the Turks. When Russia at last stood before 
the gates of Constantinople, England thought the 
expedition had accomplished its purpose, and inter- 
vened. As she exposed herself to a certain risk by 
this intervention, she received the island of Cyprus 
from Turkey by a special agreement — not at the 
Berlin Congress. ^ There followed the peace of San 
Stefano with the following conditions: — 

Turkey recognized the complete independence of Rou- 
mania, Serbia, and Montenegro, agreed to the establish- 
ment of an autonomous though tributary principality of 
Bulgaria to comprise five million inhabitants and to ex- 
tend from the Danube to the ^Egean Sea, and resigned the 
Armenian fortresses of Ardahan, Kars, and Bajazid, and 
the port of Batum. Roumania was to restore the part of 
Bessarabia which had been ceded to her by Russia in 1856 

^ Even now Austrian and Russian historians differ as to the in- 
terpretation of the ** back-door treaty " in question; but it is cer- 
tain that there was no unconditional promise on Russia's part to 
hand over Bosnia to Austria. 

2 Cf. Weber's Weltgeschichte, vol. 15, part 2, p. 1268. 



84 Germany Her Own Judge 

and in return was to receive the Lower Dobrudja. (Becker, 
vol. 12, p. 202.) 

Further: — 

Serbia was to be increased by Old Serbia with Nish and 
Sjenica, while Roumania was to receive an indemnity from 
Turkey for the costs of the war. Crete, Thessaly, Epirus, 
Bosnia, and Herzegovina were to receive the necessary 
administrative reforms through a European Commission, 
and the carrying out of these reforms was to be permanently 
supervised by the Powers. (Brockhaus, "San Stefano.") ^ 

Our present interest is first of all in Serbia's gains, 
which, as we have shown, were no small ones, in 
spite of the premature conclusion of peace in con- 
sequence of England's intervention: in addition to 
the notable territorial gain of historic districts, the 
victors enforced guarantees for the protection of 
the Bosnian population against Turkish encroach- 
ments by means of the permanent supervision by 
the Powers. 

Bosnia and Herzegovina were to receive a reformed 
autonomous administration under guarantee of the Powers. 
(Weber, vol. 15, part 2, p. 1264.) 

The settlement of San Stefano, however, called 
forth protests from England and Austria. 

While the Russo-Turkish negotiations, which 
led to the Treaty of San Stefano, were still going 

^ Most German histories, especially the popular ones, unfairly 
reduce the Serbian gains under the Treaty of San Stefano by sim- 
ply omitting important acquisitions in their account of the "pre- 
liminaries" — for instance, Nish and Old Serbia and the settle- 
ment of the Bosnian question — and by representing these latter 
as a gift of the Berlin Congress. I add this in order to explain why 
I supplemented Becker's account by the above extract from Brock- 
haus. 



How Austria annexed Bosnia 85 

on, England raised an armaments loan in order to 
exercise pressure in Turkey's favour on the course 
of the settlement. But ''as neither Russia nor Eng- 
land showed a great desire to resort to warlike action 
against each other" (Weber), Count Schuvaloff suc- 
ceeded in coming to terms with Disraeli. England 
recognized Russian territorial expansion at the cost 
of Turkey. Turkey, being too weak financially to 
meet the whole costs of the unexpectedly long war, 
was allowed by the Treaty of San Stefano to cover 
part of the debt by cession of territory in Asia 
Minor. Russia, on the other hand, had to con- 
sent to a territorial reduction of Greater Bulgaria 
in favour of her enemy. Thus Anglo-Russian an- 
tagonism was allayed by the separate Agreement 
of London in May, 1878, about a fortnight before 
the beginning of the Berlin Congress. 

Russia was less fortunate with Austria. Out- 
wardly, indeed. Count Andrassy declared the Bul- 
garian question, which only involved the defence 
of Austrian interests, to be the essential point in 
his protest : — 

Austria, whose trade was principally towards the East, 
saw her interests endangered if Russia, by creating a vassal 
State in Greater Bulgaria, made herself master of the Bal- 
kan peninsula and extended her ports to the /Egean Sea. 
(Becker, vol. 12, p. 202.) 

3. Quarrel about Bosnia 

Unfortunately, even before the outbreak of 
Russo-Turkish hostilities, Andrassy had been se- 
cretly cherishing aggressive plans which were bound 



86 Germany Her Own Judge 

to arouse the indignation of all Slavs : he wanted to get 
Slav districts conquered for him hy Slav blood. Hence, 
his rejection of the Emperor Alexander's proposal 
of common action. Serbia, Montenegro, and Russia 
were to defeat Turkey without outside help, and he 
proposed afterwards calmly to appropriate Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, for whose sake the War of Liber- 
ation began. He meant to ''liberate'' territories 
already liberated ! 

Andrassy refused to let his policy be affected either by 
the pro-Turkish demonstrations of the Magyars or by the 
sympathy expressed for Russia in Prague, Agram, and other 
Slav towns. He made all preparations to secure Austria's 
interests if a Russo-Turkish War should break out, to keep 
open his communications by the Danube, and to acquire 
Bosnia for the Hapsburg Empire. (Weber, vol. 15, part 2, 
p. 1254.) 

This statement of Weber's that even before the 
Russo-Turkish War Austria intended to annex 
Bosnia on the conclusion of peace is entirely and 
coolly admitted by the latest Austrian historians.^ 

At first, indeed, Austrian public opinion did not 
permit Andrassy's policy to be carried through 
openly. Interpellations in Parliament and press 
articles show us that the people, except for a small 
party, was disturbed by a mobilization loan and 
would stand no forcible action. So on the subject 
of his annexation aims Count Andrassy had re- 
course as long as possible to obstinate denial : — 

1 Cf. The Life of Andrassy, by Dr. E. von Wertheimer, A. Four- 
nier's Wie wir zu Bosnien kamen, and Theodor von Sosnosky's, Die 
Balkanpolitik Osterreich-Ungarns sett 1866. These writers see ab- 
solutely nothing immoral in Andrassy's policy. 



How Austria annexed Bosnia 87 

General though the belief in imminent annexation al- 
ready was and, from what happened, was bound to be, 
Count Andrassy thought he must still continue his denials. 
On an interpellation in Parliament by Herr von Grocholsky 
as late as the 14th May the Premier declared that there 
was absolutely no foundation for the stories of imminent 
annexation. It was only on the 31st May that Andrassy 
determined at length to drop the mask he had worn so 
obstinately: he answered the question whether the Mon- 
archy proposed to support its interests by force of arms, if 
the Berlin Congress did not protect them sufficiently, with 
an emphatic Yes. It was the first open word which he had 
spoken on the subject. (Sosnosky, op. cit., p. 178.) 

The cunning Hungarian went further; he tried 
to find sympathetic intermediaries for his plans on 
to whose shoulders, if necessary, some of the moral 
responsibility could have been shifted, Bismarck and 
Disraeli! Then he "cited Russia before an inter- 
national tribunal,*' as Herr von Bethmann would 
put it to-day. Russia consented, but objected to 
Vienna as the meeting-place. The Powers agreed 
upon Berlin, no doubt on Austria's suggestion : — 

Austria proposed the summoning of a European Con- 
gress, to which England declared herself ready to send dele- 
gates, having previously come to an agreement with Russia 
as to the main points at issue. Prince Bismarck invited the 
signatories of the treaties of 1856 and 1871 to send pleni- 
potentiaries to Berlin, where the Congress was opened on 
the 13th June, 1878, in the Chancellor's palace. (Brock- 
haus* "Lexikon.") 

The Congress of Berlin, an assembly of the representa- 
tives of the Great Powers, Germany, Austria, France, 
Great Britain, Italy, Russia, and Turkey, which on the 
suggestion of Austria met in Berlin by invitation of the Ger- 
man Government on the 13th June, 1878, under the presi- 
dency of Prince Bismarck. (Meyer's "Lexikon.") 



88 Germany Her Own Judge 

Greater Bulgaria was severely cut about, and 
Serbia had to put up with a reduction of territory. 
England was to open the most delicate question, 
the annexation of Bosnia. Her Jewish Premier was 
regarded as not pro-Russian, though she had ar- 
ranged the points at issue between herself and Rus- 
sia and stood in correct relations with the Empire 
of the Czar: — 

Andrassy thought it rather unsuitable to propose Aus- 
tria as the Power to take charge of this transaction (the 
introduction of orderly conditions into Bosnia and Herze- 
govina). The suggestion that Austria should take charge 
was to come from a friendly party, and he had decided upon 
England because he wished to avoid any reproach from 
his own countrymen that he had received Bosnia, so to 
speak, from Bismarck's hand — a very clever move. (Sos- 
nosky, op. cit.j vol. i, p. 182.) 

That is written in black and white in one of the 
latest and most detailed German works on Aus- 
trian policy in the Balkans. In earlier years, in- 
deed, the German and Austrian conscience had to be 
soothed by active propaganda, according to which 
Austria received the new territories *'so to speak 
from England *s hand'* — a version which is still 
sometimes brought out by older pro-Germans to 
blacken England.^ 

^ The German-Swiss Professor Hiinerwadel takes the prize 
when he definitely states in his pamphlet "Die geschichtlichen 
Vorbedingungen des europaischen Krieges," p. 9, that "Russia 
requested Bismarck to summon a Congress." The German en- 
cyclopaedias, in spite of their shortness, are more thorough and 
honest about this question. The Blile Professor Bachtold clings 
to the old version that England organized the Congress; this is 
contradicted by the latest and most authentic Austrian sources 



How Austria annexed Bosnia 89 

Nevertheless, England came forward as a gen- 
uine "intermediary," for although she did not flatly 
refuse Austria's pretensions to Bosnia, she yet 
turned "annexation" into "occupation and admin- 
istration" in Serbia's interests. Recently we have 
learnt that Austria felt herself obliged to sign a 
secret protocol with Turkey, according to which 
the "sovereign rights of the Sultan over the prov- 
inces of Bosnia and Herzegovina were in no way 
to be affected by the occupation" and "the occu- 
pation was to be regarded as provisional." (Cf. 
Sosnosky and the Austrian writer A. Fournier.) 

England demanded no quid pro quo from either 
Austria or Turkey for her mediation at the Congress, 
or, rather, she had already received Cyprus by 
treaty from Turkey before the Congress, for her 
active intervention and naval demonstration, which 
had brought the military operations to an end. 
England thought she was acting in her own inter- 
est at the Berlin Congress, when she would not 
allow either the Southern Slavs or Austria to be- 
come too strong in the Balkans at the expense of 
Turkey. 

Germany, who, like Austria, had stood aside from 
all the actual fighting, also demanded no quid pro 
quo for her mediation, which consisted in summon- 
ing the Congress and supporting Austria, and there- 



as to the Balkan policy of that date. It is amusing to play these 
two pro-German savants against one another. In personal opinion 
savants may be allowed tp differ, but they should stick to the truth 
in narrating mere matters of fact, in order not to expose themselves 
to laymen. 



90 Germany Her Own Judge 

fore Bismarck called himself ''an honest broker.*' 
Did he really act disinterestedly? Not at all. We 
know that he bound a heavy weight to Germany's 
leg in 1 87 1 by repeating Louis XIV's mistake and 
by stretching his hand too far in Alsace and Lor- 
raine, annexing in part purely Latin territory. Nat- 
urally France's rapid recovery lay like a nightmare 
on Bismarck. His attempt to strike France again 
in 1875 failed owing to the protest of Russia and 
the Emperor William L So Bismarck had to look for 
an ally who had the greatest fellow feeling for his 
anxieties. What could be more welcome to him than 
Andrassy's policy, which must embitter the rela- 
tions of Austria and Russia for a long time to come, 
and which provided the predominantly pro-Ger- 
man Austria with a similar weight to the one Bis- 
marck had affixed to Germany? A year after the 
Congress the German-Austrian Alliance was signed ; 
the bond of brotherhood between two such con- 
genial races as the world has never before seen. But 
the evil deed — the annexation of Slav territory by 
means of Slav and Latin blood — was bound to 
make enemies for us Germans, and could only bear 
evil fruit. 

The fact that immediately after the Berlin Con- 
gress German Liberal circles in Austria sharply 
condemned Andrassy's policy of annexation is in- 
teresting. A Polish deputy (Hausner), however, 
published the following explanation : — 

This occupation, carried out without conquest, without 
title, without any casus belli, and without provocation, in- 
volves a heavy wrong, a theft of territory of which as an 



How Austria annexed Bosnia 91 

Austrian citizen I should have to disapprove, but which 
as a Pole I abominate. In the same way, without title, 
without casus belli, and without provocation, my own coun- 
try was partitioned and destroyed. . . . (Sosnosky, vol. 2, 
p. 9.) 

4. Serbian Complaints 

To return to Serbia. Quite apart from the ques- 
tion of Bosnia, Serbia rightly regarded herself as 
outrageously treated by the Congress of Berlin. 
Doubtless she received Pirot and Vranja, districts 
which were to have fallen to Bulgaria before.^ But 
the Novibazar was taken from her, which was the 
ancient "Rassia, the origin of the later Serbian 
Empire.'' (Brockhaus, ''Novibazar.") Further, she 
had to give up ''the old historic home of the Serbs, 
theAmselfeld, Prizren,etc." (Brockhaus, "Serbia.") 
Moreover, Bosnia, which Austria was annexing, was 
originally Serbian land, as it belonged to the terri- 
tory which was called the Kingdom of Serbia from 
1377 till its conquest by Mohammed II (Brockhaus, 
"Bosnia"), and lies in the middle of the Serbian- 
Croatian national district (cf. the ethnographical 
map of Austria in Brockhaus. 2) 

^ To-day — such is the irony of fate — Bulgaria has recovered 
these same districts from Serbia by the sword, and that with the 
approval of Austria, who originally took them from Bulgaria and 
allotted them to Serbia. 

^ And yet Professor Schiemann in Ein Verleumder, his answer 
to /'accuse, asserts: "It is well known that Bosnia and Herze- 
govina formed part of Turkey and never belonged to Serbia, still 
less to Russia." (No one ever said they belonged to Russia.) Ger- 
man savants seem to have forgotten that Bosnia was an original 
part of Old Serbia. It is a pity, because German scientific prestige 
is bound to suffer from such open sophistry. 



92 Germany Her Own Judge 

The supervision of this territory by rival Powers, 
as arranged in the Treaty of San Stefano, would nat- 
urally have afforded greater national guarantees than 
its administration by a single foreign State. Austrian 
propaganda emphasizes to-day that the established 
national liberties are untouched in Bosnia, and that 
is undoubtedly true so far as the laws are concerned. 
But we read in Brockhaus under "Bosnia**: — 

An attempt at colonization by Italian Tyrolese in 1885 
was unsuccessful; similar later experiments, however, with 
Wurttemberg and Austrian peasants are prospering ex- 
ceedingly. 

I ask myself as a Swiss what the Italians would 
say if we tried the same experiment with Zurich 
peasants in the Ticino districts. In any case, the ar- 
tificial grafting of a foreign civilization is the best 
way to produce hatred and to stir up the national 
counter-currents to fresh struggles. 

An impartial neutral will realize that the read- 
justment of the situation by the Congress of Ber- 
lin was bound to press hardly on Serbia. Regarded 
from the purely national standpoint, the Tell-like 
spirit of the Serbs inspires us with the same re- 
spect which we pay to it in the unification of Ger- 
many. From the point of view of reason and order, 
however, all Serbian hopes of acquiring Bosnia 
must be condemned; for in 1909 the Serbian Gov- 
ernment, on the advice of Russia, declared itself 
ready to recognize the annexation of Bosnia as 
final. 



CHAPTER VIII 
SERBIA BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 

It is strange that neutrals who came from Serbia 
described the nation as humane and on the whole 
kindly, while we used to believe, on the strength 
of Austrian propaganda, that we must ascribe 
to the Serbs an especially bloodthirsty and grasp- 
ing character. The contradiction can be explained 
by the fact that Serbia — an outpost of Constan- 
tinople — became in a still more vital sense the 
pivot of European politics after the recent open 
fusion of the German Eastern policy (Berlin to 
Bagdad) with the Austrian Balkan policy (Bosnia- 
Sand jak Novibazar-Salonica). 

I. Aggressive Policy of Austria 

The threatening character of Austrian policy 
towards Serbia is clear enough. The Dalmatian 
wedge, which is driven between Serbian territory 
and the Adriatic and cuts off even little Monte- 
negro almost completely from the sea, was broad- 
ened in 1878 by Andrassy's policy, and this policy 
was consolidated in 1908 in spite of what Andrassy 
called a reverse (cf . p. 89) . 

Recently, in 191 2-13, the small agrarian State 
of Serbia, in great difficulties owing to Hungary's 
policy of tariffs, was finally thrust back from the 
sea, as if it was to be forced to join the economic 



94 Germany Her Own Judge 

and political coalition of the ambitious German 
Imperialists. Even a commercial port was refused 
to it. At the same time, according to Serbian ac- 
counts, Austria carried on a subversive propaganda 
in favour of a triple monarchy (Austria, Hungary, 
Greater Serbia). The gains of the Serbian strug- 
gle in the Balkan War were embittered for the vic- 
tor as they had been in 1878 and were eventually 
again reduced. And not content with that, Aus- 
tria tried, as we have said, to set up two friendly 
strongholds in Bulgaria and Albania behind the 
back of her small neighbour. 

Though one of them collapsed, the menacing 
interference of Austria still remained. The extra- 
ordinary mission of Liman von Sanders and the 
milliard war tax increased Serbia's apprehensions, 
especially as her counter-protection, the Balkan 
League, broke up owing to Austrian intervention. 
As the pro-German Giolitti, and Tittoni too, re- 
vealed later, Austria made several efforts from 
19 1 2 onwards to invade Serbia or to crush her in 
other ways. All this was bound to arouse anxiety 
and hatred in her small neighbour. 

2. The Narodna Odbrana 

In view of these circumstances it was impos- 
sible for the Serbian Government entirely to sup- 
press the activity of the patriotic union "Narodna 
Odbrana." Austria's attempt to ascribe to this 
union the intention of separating Serbian terri- 
tories from Austria was a failure. Similarly the 
Austrian "Memorandum on Serbian Propaganda" 



Serbia before the Outbreak of War 95 

lapses into gross misrepresentations. What im- 
partial neutral, for instance, will find fault when 
he reads in the ** Memorandum" that the Narodna 
Odbrana had made military preparations for the 
desired (? !) war against Austria in so far that 
Serbian emissaries or spies were entrusted with the 
destruction of enemy communications, etc., in the 
event of war breaking out? The Central Powers 
also kept such emissaries. One of these gentlemen, 
a German by birth, was arrested in Geneva and 
condemned because, as he lived on the frontier, 
he had undertaken to carry out these functions 
in France on the outbreak of hostilities between 
Germany and France. 

Also the charge in the ''Memorandum" that 
''the Comitadjis were instructed in shooting and 
bombing, in mine-laying and the blowing up of 
railway bridges," etc., has no force, seeing that 
even mighty Germany tried to make the fullest 
use of her national forces by means of the "Ju- 
gendwehr" and similar organizations. All honour 
to the small threatened State, which did not aban- 
don itself like a coward to its powerful neighbour 
under the excuse of its weakness. Certainly vari- 
ous individuals of the Narodna Odbrana went too 
far in their not unreasonable hatred of Austria; 
their action was disapproved of generally, even 
by the Serbian Government. But could that 
Government be expected to stifle every national 
movement among the Serbs, whilst imperialist 
tendencies in Germany were in full blast, and even 
the more moderate amongst the Germans, in view 



96 Germany Her Own Judge 

of the possible blockade of Germany at sea, had 
been glancing covetously towards the East ever 
since the Morocco affair — at a time, too, when 
Austrian policy was openly anti-Serbian and the 
situation in the Balkans was assuming a form 
which was threatening to Serbia? 

3. Austrian Propaganda in Russia 

Austria kept up a subversive propaganda in 
Russia too. For the "Polish Legions" were es- 
tablished before the outbreak of war with an eye 
to its possibility. Again a pro-Austrian Pole pub- 
lished the following admission in a neutral paper 
{Easier Nachrichtenj 191 6, No. 304): — 

Among her schemes of defence against Russia in Eastern 
Galicia, Austria created a centre of Ruthenian Irredenta 
in order if necessary to cause a revolt in the richest Rus- 
sian provinces through the political ideal of a free Ukraine. 
The Ukrainian natives of Galicia were to set fire to Russia's 
granaries, carry the torch of a national movement through 
all Southern Russia, and strike at the Russian Empire at 
its most vulnerable spot, the Black Sea districts. 

The well-known Pan-German publicist Dr. Paul 
Rohrbach also admits the fact of Austrian agi- 
tation before the outbreak of war: ''And the 
Ukraine movement also received increased power 
and stimulus from Austrian Galicia.'* (''Russische 
Selbstzeugnisse," p. 8.) 

We may recognize that this Austrian propa- 
ganda produced no outbreak of violence in Russia, 
as the Serbian propaganda did in Bosnia: but we 
must also bear in mind that Russia never gave Aus- 
tria the slightest excuse for it. Her policy towards 



Serbia before the Outbreak of War 97 

Austria was always one of yielding (the Congress of 
Beriin, 1878; Annexation of Bosnia, 1909; Albania 
with a German Prince, 1913), until in 1914 Aus- 
tria's attempt to crush Serbia filled up the cup. 

4. Serajevo 

We can assume that it was only hatred, and in 
no way the desire to separate Bosnia from Aus- 
tria, that induced some Serbians to support the 
deplorable murder. For no State yields up terri- 
tory on the ground of mere attempts at murder. 
Moreover, the "Memorandum" says that the 
murderers carried cyanide of potassium on them 
to take their own lives after carrying out their 
attack. As the tracks which led back to Serbia 
were to have been obliterated by this means, the 
object of the crime cannot possibly have been 
to throw a spark into the international powder 
barrel and separate Bosnia by the ''desired (!)" 
world war. 

Besides, Serbia was surprised by the war, for 
we read, for instance, on the 26th July, 19 14, in 
the Easier Nachrichten: — 

The Serbian Chief of Staff Putnik, who was on his way 
back from a Styrian cure, was arrested in Hungary.^ 

And later again a student of Serbian affairs 
wrote in a Swiss paper (B.N. 168): — 

^ The Austrian Government subsequently had the wisdom to 
release Putnik. Fortunately! Eor to arrest the enemy's Chief of 
Staff two days before the declaration of war is a breach of inter- 
national law most dishonouring to the nation which is guilty of it. 
Such an action is distressingly like theft. 



98 Germany Her Own Judge 

The medical stores were almost exhausted in the two 
wars in 1 912-19 13, and new stores were just being collected 
when the staff were surprised by the war of 19 14. There 
was great lack of medical stores, etc. 

Many similar statements appeared in the neu- 
tral press. 

Must a political assassination be stamped as 
murder under all circumstances, and can it only 
be atoned for by the crushing of a whole people? 
We will go more fully into the question; here we 
will only note that two attempts were made on the 
life of the Emperor William I and two on Bismarck. 
Though these four cases did not end fatally, the 
intention to kill was there all the same. Are we 
therefore to pass sentence of death on the German 
people? By no means, any more than on the Serbs ! 
For just as political crimes diminished in Germany 
when more orderly times arrived, so also Serbian 
political passions would have quieted down. 

5. Kragujevatz 

At the beginning of the war the private prop- 
aganda of the Central Powers tried very naively 
to incriminate the Serbian Government in the 
Serajevo crime by referring to the use of bombs 
from Kragujevatz. But it is these bombs that 
exonerate the Government. *'The tracks which 
led back to Serbia were to have been obliterated,'* 
as the ''Memorandum" says; and if so, it would 
have been easy for the Serbian Government to 
prepare special bombs differing from the standard 
products of the arsenal. The case is diflferent with 



Serbia before the Outbreak of War 99 

individuals, who, in so far as they had connections 
with a State munition factory, could more easily 
get possession of Government bombs than manu- 
facture their own. 

6. Idea of a Triple Monarchy 

Before I close the Serbian case, I should like 
to mention shortly a remarkable despatch. When 
the Central Powers thought they had won, when 
they were pushing the Russians back after the 
inroad into the Carpathians, and when Bulgaria 
was on the point of attacking Serbia, readers of 
the papers found the following unofficial despatch 
from Sofia (B.N. 454): — 

It is reported from Nish that the Serbian National Party, 
which on the outbreak of war dissolved more or less volun- 
tarily, has reconstituted itself with the old programme, viz., 
the realization of its greater Serbian ideals in the framework 
of a triple monarchy with Austria-Hungary. The party is 
publishing a new organ with the title of "Greater Serbia.*' 

It is quite impossible that the idea of a triple 
monarchy (Austria, Hungary, Serbia), which ac- 
cording to the despatch existed before the war on 
Serbian soil, was really the fruit of Serbian minds. 
We are therefore driven to conjecture that it was 
a case of outside inspiration by Austria in order 
to complete her Eastern policy, which even before 
the war was in active preparation. Such inspira- 
tion might have been logically justified at the time 
of the weak and thoroughly rotten Obrenovitch, 
but not since the patriotic Karageorgevitch dy- 
nasty stood at the head of the modest, but heroic 
and glorious peasant population of Serbia. 



CHAPTER IX 
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 

Part I. The Austro-Serbian Dispute 
I. The Official Documents of the Belligerent Nations 

In various good books — among which I regard 
that of the distinguished American jurist Dr. 
James M. Beck as the best ^ — it has been proved 
in detail, on the strength of the official documents 
published by the various belligerents, that not 
only did Germany and Austria desire and initiate 
the world war in 1 914, but that the Entente Powers 
made the most desperate efforts up to the last 
minute to keep the peace. We are given a detailed 
and unprejudiced picture of how Austria made it 
impossible for the Powers who were interested 
in maintaining the status quo in the Balkans to 
discuss her ultimatum to Serbia, until the time 
limit for Serbia's answer was past. It is further 
shown how afterwards Austria, in union with Ger- 
many, evaded any discussion of the subject until 
Russia mobilized, provoked by the previous Aus- 

1 The Evidence in the Case. An examination into moral respon- 
sibility for the war of 1914 on the basis of the diplomatic docu- 
ments of England, Germany, Russia, France, and Belgium, by 
James M. Beck, Doctor of Laws, formerly Assistant to the Public 
Prosecutor in the United States of America; with an introduc- 
tion by Joseph Choate, formerly American Ambassador to Great 
Britain. The author has German, German-Swiss, and British fore- 
bears, knows Germany well, and greatly admires her. 



The Outbreak of War — I loi 

trian mobilization — not only against Serbia, but 
also against Russia — as well as by the extremely 
intransigent attitude of the Central Powers, which 
threatened vital Russian interests. Thereupon 
Germany declared herself justified in declaring 
war on Russia, and the world was in flames. That, 
in the fewest words, was the beginning of the world 
war, as is already established by the investigation 
of international history. 

It is also shown how Austria, shortly before the 
outbreak of hostilities, lulled Russia and France 
into security by false statements; just as Ger- 
many, half an hour before her violation of Belgian 
neutrality, made the most soothing declarations 
in Brussels by the mouth of her military attache. 
Every one again agrees, on the strength of these 
diplomatic documents, that the representatives 
of Germany repeatedly refused to leave behind 
any copy of the text of certain important notes 
which they had delivered on the instructions of 
their Government — a step which, to say the 
least, does not inspire confidence. 

It is proved that Russia was prepared to offer 
guarantees to Austria for Serbian tranquillity, if 
Austria would renounce military operations against 
Serbia. Unfortunately German and Austrian prop- 
aganda ignores these guarantees. 

It is further shown that Russia bound herself 
to stop her military preparations (without a cor- 
responding assurance from Germany and Austria) 
provided Austria would declare herself ready to 
*'omit those claims in her ultimatum which were 



102 Germany Her Own Judge 

inconsistent with the principle of Serbia's sov- 
ereign rights." This is another guarantee of which 
German and Austrian propaganda apparently 
knows nothing. 

Further, we see how the Entente Powers still 
worked for peace after Austria had already de- 
clared war on Serbia: England proposed that Aus- 
tria should occupy Northern Serbia and Belgrade 
and regard them as a pledge for a favourable issue 
to the negotiations. The Serbian army was to 
retire without fighting, until the Powers had agreed 
as to the guarantees which were necessary to 
satisfy Austria on the one side and Russia and 
Italy on the other. This is another proof of the 
Entente's love of peace about the important de- 
tails of which the German White Book is entirely 
silent. 

In the matter of Belgium we are shown the 
absurd inconsistency of Germany. In 191 1, at 
the time of the Morocco crisis, she refused to give 
a public declaration of neutrality on the ground 
that such a declaration would in case of war divert 
the French troops from the Belgian frontier and 
concentrate them on the German front. Three 
years later she made use of this very diffusion of 
the French armies on the Belgian frontier, which 
she had desired, to excuse her crimJnal violation 
of Belgian neutrality. How is one to satisfy such 
an evil neighbour? 

Much more of the greatest historical impor- 
tance is proved on the strength of these diplo- 
matic documents. In no previous war were the 



The Outbreak of War — / 103 

official data, on which history must be based, pub- 
lished so quickly or in such quantity. The proof 
of guilt has long been sufficiently established, 
firmly and incontestably. 

Nevertheless it is not yet universally acknowl- 
edged even now; the evidence is drawn from the 
documents of a// the nations, and in the opinion 
of narrow Pan-Germans most of these lack the 
quickening spirit — German truth. 

In what follows, therefore, we shall rely wholly 
on German documents and show shortly that Ger- 
man propaganda leads us to the same result as 
the writer of "J 'accuse" and other authors who 
base their reasoning on the documents of all the 
belligerents. 

2. The Austrian Ultimatum 

Although Austria knew that "military action 
against Serbia might bring Russia on to the scene*' 
(White Book), she sent an ultimatum to Serbia 
which was equivalent to a declaration of war as 
regards the notorious points 4, 5, and 6. The ac- 
ceptance of these three points would have laid 
Serbia defenceless at the feet of Austria. Serbia 
answered in the humblest way, but permitted her- 
self certain reservations in those three demands. 

We may show the outrageous character of the 
three points shortly as follows : — 

Point 4. The ultimatum : — 

The Serbian Government shall undertake to eliminate 
from the military service, and from the administration in 
general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda 



104 Germany Her Own Judge 

against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, whose names 
and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserve to 
themselves the right of communicating to the Royal Gov- 
ment. 

Serbia's answer : — 

The Royal Government is ready to dismiss those officers 
and officials from the military and civil services in regard 
to whom it has been proved by judicial investigation that 
they have been guilty of actions against the territorial in- 
tegrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; it expects that 
the Imperial and Royal Government will communicate to 
it for the purpose of starting the investigation the names of 
these officers and officials and the acts with which they have 
been charged. 

Austrian conclusion : — 

By promising the dismissal from the military and civil 
services of those officers and officials who are found guilty 
by judicial procedure, the Serbian Government limits its 
assent to those cases in which these persons have been 
charged with a crime according to the statutory code. As, 
however, we demand the removal of such officers and offi- 
cials as indulge in a propaganda hostile to the Monarchy, 
which is generally not punishable in Serbia, our demands 
have not been fulfilled in this point. 

Here the Austrian Government is practising a 
deception, as it wilfully ignores Serbia's willing- 
ness, expressed elsewhere, to undertake a revision 
of the Press laws, whereby ^'the incitement to 
hatred of, and contempt for, the Monarchy is to 
be most severely punished, as well as every publi- 
cation whose general tendency is directed against 
the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary.'* 
(White Book, Annex i.) 

Serbia even bound herself, according to the 



The Outbreak of War — / 105 

White Book, without any demand from Austria, 
to carry out a corresponding revision of the Con- 
stitution and declared herself ready to enter into 
further negotiations. Where a State shows so 
openly its readiness to amend its Constitution and 
laws, its neighbour has no right to put forward 
gaps in the laws, which may possibly remain, as 
a reason for immediate action. By her proposed 
medieval procedure Austria would have been in 
a position to substitute a more pliable individual 
for every patriotic official who might have op- 
posed her Eastern policy. Serbia would have had 
to accept, without question or criticism, the evi- 
dence furnished by Austria and the guilt of the 
accused. Verily a black reactionary demand which 
shows unmistakably what Austria was aiming at. 

Point 5. The ultimatum demanded that the 
Serbian Government should bind itself **to accept 
the cooperation in Serbia of officials of the Austro- 
Hungarian Government for the suppression of the 
subversive movement directed against the terri- 
torial integrity of the Monarchy." 

Serbia answered that she was willing to accept 
every cooperation of officials of the Austrian Gov- 
ernment on Serbian territory "which is consistent 
with international law and criminal law, as well 
as with friendly and neighbourly relations.'' 

Austria concluded: " International law and crim- 
inal law have nothing to do with the question ; it 
is purely a question of the supervision of political 
offences within the state {'rein staatspolizeilicher 



io6 Germany Her Own Judge 

Natur')y to be solved by way of a special agree- 
ment.'* 

Whilst Austria here admitted that her note 
needed further negotiations on this point at least, 
she at the same time made them impossible by 
breaking off diplomatic relations without explana- 
tion and by declaring war immediately afterwards, 
although Serbia declared herself ready for any 
and every form of further negotiation. (White 
Book.) An ultimatum which must be accepted 
without reservation, to which, however, after ac- 
ceptance, special agreements are to be attached, is 
like the proverbial pig in a poke. It is equivalent 
to a declaration of war. 

Point 6. The ultimatum demanded that the 
Serbian Government should bind itself ^*to take 
judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot 
of the 28th June who are on Serbian territory. 
Delegates of the Austrian Government will take 
part in the investigation relating thereto." 

Serbia "cannot accept, as this is a violation of 
the Constitution and of the law of criminal pro- 
cedure." 

Austria concluded: "It did not occur to us to 
demand that Austrian officials should participate 
in the procedure of the Serbian courts: they were 
to cooperate only in the preliminary investiga- 
tions by the Serbian police." She then points to 
the difference between "recherches" and "enquete 
judiciaire." 

Here again, therefore, Austria had expressed her- 



The Outbreak of War — / 107 

self too shortly and inexactly for so serious a dS- 
marche; this demand could not be answered by a 
simple Yes or No, and was not, therefore, compat- 
ible with the form of an ultimatum. Serbia ac- 
cepted all the other points — correctly, even hum- 
bly! Austria cannot deny that, from the first, the 
real object of her ultimatum was to produce war 
with Serbia. For she sent a note which could not 
possibly be accepted without further negotiations, but 
precluded negotiations by breaking off diplomatic 
relations and declaring war. Count Tisza prepared 
the mass of the people for the rigour of coming 
events; for even before the Serbian answer ar- 
rived, he declared that there was only one alterna- 
tive between Serbia and Austria; further nego- 
tiations were out of the question. (B.N., 25th July, 
1 9 14.) The ^'either" was the complete and abso- 
lute crushing of Serbia (that can be seen from the 
contents of the note and Austria's efforts to avoid 
a conference); this was the keystone of German 
Eastern policy. And the ''or" was war — that 
is to say, the same thing. 

That this ''short shrift to Serbia" was the Aus- 
trian plan, is confirmed by the German White 
Book: "Serbia," it explains, "though complying 
in some points with the conditions of Austria- 
Hungary, yet showed in all essentials an unmis- 
takable endeavour to evade the just demands of 
the Monarchy by procrastination and by suggest- 
ing fresh negotiations." 

It establishes, too, with approval that Austria, 
after receipt of the answer, immediately broke 



io8 Germany Her Own Judge 

off diplomatic relations with Serbia. And then, 
obviously embarrassed, after some loose talk, it 
curtly describes the giant's declaration of war on 
the dwarf as di fait accompli: "From this moment 
[the breaking-off of diplomatic relations] Austria 
was in fact in a state of war v/ith Serbia, which it 
proclaimed officially on the 28th July by declaring 
war." 

How the absolute crushing of Serbia, which 
necessarily involved a menace to the Powers in- 
terested in maintaining the status quo in the Bal- 
kans, can be described as a "just demand,'' re- 
mains unintelligible to neutrals — all the more as 
Austria was not without responsibility for Ser- 
bian hatred of her. 

3. Refusal of a Conference 

Serbia, as we read in the White Book, offered 
to submit to the decisions of the Peace Conference 
at The Hague — a proposal which met with assent 
from all the Powers except Germany and Austria. 
Russia especially supported the idea.^ 

England, too, repeatedly supported the idea of 
international mediation. Germany and Austria, 
however, declared the Austro-Serbian quarrel to 
be local, in spite of its exceptional and interna- 
tional character, and regarded it as beneath the 
dignity of Austria to admit any intervention by a 
third party. 

^ The Czar's telegram on this subject is missing in the White 
Book, but Herr von Bethmann felt compelled afterwards to admit 
its existence. 



The Outbreak of War — / 109 

''From the very beginning of the conflict we 
took up the attitude that it was a question for 
Austria, who would have to settle the matter with 
Serbia alone. We used every effort, therefore, to 
localize the war. . . . [Observe: to "localize," not 
to "avoid."] We emphatically took the posi- 
tion that no civilized country possessed the right to 
stay the arm of Austria in this struggle with bar- 
barism and political crime, and to shield the Ser- 
bians [i.e., the whole nation!] against their just 
punishment. ..." Germany would have done bet- 
ter to take the position that a great Power — 
Austria — should refrain from a policy of sup- 
pression towards a small neighbour, since a policy 
based on hostility is bound to produce resentment 
and disagreeable incidents, which in a small State 
are the more likely to degenerate into assassina- 
tion, as weakness causes fury. 

"In answer to our declaration that the German 
Government desired and aimed at a localization 
of the conflict ..." That is, with a view to the 
achievement of the Berlin-Bagdad scheme, of 
which German Imperialists were dreaming even 
before the outbreak of war. Austria's plan after 
1913 — not 1914 — for a friendly Greater Bul- 
garia as an adjunct to a friendly Turkey presup- 
poses that the autonomy of the intervening Ser- 
bian territory should sooner or later be outraged. 
That this was so, is confirmed by the behaviour 
of the Central Powers in 19 14, when they avoided 
all open expression of their intentions. 

"Meanwhile we had endeavoured to localize 



1 10 Germany Her Own Judge 

the conflict by the most emphatic steps . . . *' in- 
stead of allaying the uneasiness of the neighbour- 
ing States Russia and Italy by an explanation 
of the pressing question to what extent and for 
what period Austria intended to occupy Serbia. 
The explanation was absolutely necessary in con- 
sequence of the menace to the status quo. 

''Austria-Hungary having promised to consider 
the Russian interests by disclaiming any terri- 
torial aspirations — a great concession on the part 
of a State engaged in war — should therefore be 
permitted to settle its affairs with Serbia alone.*' 
The German Government knew perfectly well 
that independence was not guaranteed by the 
assurance of territorial integrity, for in the case 
of Belgium she definitely guaranteed ''territorial 
integrity and independence." (Cf. the Chancellor's 
speech of the 4th August.) The independence 
of Serbia was as important for Russia and Italy 
as her territorial integrity. 

"We could not, however, in view of the vital 
interests which were at stake, advise Austria- 
Hungary to take up a yielding attitude not com- 
patible with her dignity nor deny her our assis- 
tance in this serious crisis." Austria's interests 
were vital and legitimate — Russia and Italy ad- 
mitted that; but the route on which the Central 
States embarked was definitely imperialistic and 
therefore reprehensible. It is incomprehensible how 
German propaganda can declare that a yielding 
attitude on the part of Austria in the interests of 
European peace would have been incompatible 



The Outbreak of War — I ii i 

with Austrian dignity. One would suppose it to 
be far more undignified to embark upon so adven- 
turous a course. 

''We declared in regard to this proposal that 
we could not, however much we approved the 
idea, participate in such a conference, as we could 
not call Austria in her dispute with Serbia before 
a European tribunal. '* Again this false Austro- 
Prussian idea of the dignity of a great Power, or 
rather the concealment of imperialist aims under 
an untenable idea. 

Only absolute confidence in a quick and deci- 
sive victory and in the speedy attainment of world- 
dominion — the confidence which manifested it- 
self at the outbreak of war in the leading German 
papers and in the innumerable lucubrations of 
divers German pompous nonentities — could start 
a world conflagration and then defend it by such 
feeble catchwords as "Austrian dignity" and 
''localization of the conflict." The well-known 
pretence of foreign aggression served at first to 
force the natural opposition to the war into the 
background: and later on, it was confidently an- 
ticipated, the intoxication of victory and the 
achievement of world-dominion would conceal the 
lack of reasons for war. 

What is meant by ''localization"? 

Did England and Belgium describe their Congo 
Agreement of 1894 as "local," when Germany and 
France intervened? Not at all; they gave way; 
and yet the Agreement was a private deal. Did 
Russia describe the apportionment of the fruits 



112 Germany Her Own Judge 

of her victory over Turkey in 1878 as of only 
^' local import/* when Austria called Russia before 
the Berlin Tribunal? Certainly not! And, what 
is more, the victor did not think it incompatible 
with his dignity to appear before the Congress, 
although the Powers had, from the first, refused 
to participate in liberating the Balkan peoples 
from the Turkish yoke, and had watched the Rus- 
sian sacrifices with folded arms. Russia would 
have been far better justified in refusing the Con- 
ference in 1878, on the strength of those burdens 
which she had borne alone, than Austria was in 
1 9 14. Correctly and impartially speaking, every 
conflict between two States loses its local charac- 
ter as soon as the neighbours, especially if they 
are great Powers, announce their interest in the 
issue. If, nevertheless, one of the disputants for- 
bids the interference of a third party, he clearly 
shows a presumptuous and bellicose spirit. It is 
especially so if, as in the case of the Central Powers 
in this incident, no relevant evidence can be pro- 
duced of the evil intentions of their neighbours 
(cf. pp. 43-64), while they on their part manifest 
an extreme imperialism (cf. pp. 12-23). 

What is meant by *' dignity"? 

Was it ''dignified'* for Austria-Hungary to let 
the Russians, Serbs, and Roumanians defeat the 
Turks in 1877, and then to snatch Bosnia and 
Herzegovina from the weakened conquerors — that 
is to say, to frustrate the most essential purpose 
of the war, which was the liberation of those ter- 
ritories? Again, where is the dignity of a civil- 



The Outbreak of War — I 113 

ized great Power, when it dare not summon its 
Parliament at a critical time owing to its aggres- 
sive policy, when it sees itself obliged in a time 
of crisis to condemn a considerable number of its 
members of Parliament to the gallows, as Austria 
has executed Czech, Bosnian, and Italian patriots 
and representatives of the people? Again, is it 
'Signified,*' when the plenipotentiary of a great 
Power in a neutral country tries by bribery to 
produce acts of violence and is turned out by his 
hosts, as Dr. Dumba was? And finally was it 
compatible with Austrian dignity to make even 
neutrals suffer under the burden of a world war, 
when she could have hoped, with far greater 
confidence, to realize legitimate aims through the 
Conference? The justice of these aims was uni- 
versally recognized. The Red Book has to admit 
that Sazonov stated: "Austria's object is an en- 
tirely legitimate one, but the method, by appeal 
to arms, is not the surest way of attaining it." 

As no State had taken preparatory steps for 
mobilization at that time, it would have been 
possible quietly to carry on negotiations. The 
Powers which felt themselves threatened by 
Austria's action would have learnt at the Con- 
ference how far Austria would go, and Germany's 
signature — the essential point of the whole busi- 
ness — would have given them a guarantee that 
the military pressure on Serbia, in so far as it had 
to be applied at all, would be limited in point of 
time. If Serbia had on the present occasion es- 
caped the threatened ''criminal trial" owing to 



114 Germany Her Own Judge 

the Conference, the Serbian Government, in its 
own interest, would have done its utmost to con- 
vert Austria*s hostihty into friendship, in order 
to avoid the possibility of a later military attack. 
For the Powers would have fixed the conditions 
and the date on which, if necessary, such an attack 
might take place. 

On the other hand, the Austrian Government 
could scarcely seriously assume that its murder- 
ous ** punitive expedition," the indefinite charac- 
ter of which was bound inevitably to increase Ser- 
bian hatred, would improve the situation. It knew 
that its plan for the indiscriminate punishment 
of a whole nation for the crime of individuals 
would meet with the disapproval of neutrals, and 
must rouse the Serbs to blind fury. A virile race, 
whose temper has been roused by two wars and 
the menacing policy of a powerful neighbour, may 
show heroism under such gross injustice, but cer- 
tainly not calm reason. For the thirst for revenge 
is added as a fresh incentive to increased political 
hatred: when a man knows that his nearest and 
dearest have been miserably lost or killed in what 
was obviously a war of conquest, he will readily 
find weapons to avenge them on the guilty au- 
thors of their misery. Every war has been fol- 
lowed by attempts at assassination; why should 
the Austro-Serbian War have the opposite effect? 

A conference, therefore, would have been far 
more likely to bring Austria peace and quiet than 
an appeal to arms. 

But Austria clearly did not want peace and 



The Outbreak of War — / 115 

quiet, but increased power — the realization of her 
Eastern poHcy. 

4. The First Falsification of History 

The German White Book showed some embar- 
rassment in reproducing the Austrian declaration 
of war on Serbia. Austria herself went further: 
she actually thought it necessary to misrepresent 
the facts, as if the declaration of war had only 
occurred after Serbia had begun hostilities. When 
England made an attempt at mediation, the Ger- 
man Ambassador in Vienna replied to the Chan- 
cellor: — 

Count Berchtold requests me to express to Your Excel- 
lency his thanks for the communication of the English medi- 
ation proposal. He states, however, that after the opening 
of hostilities by Serbia and the subsequent declaration of 
war, England's step appears belated. 

Count Berchtold did not dare to refuse the 
English proposal point blank without putting the 
responsibility on Serbia.^ He obviously hoped to 
keep England neutral by arousing feeling against 
Serbia; similarly he wanted to reconcile peace- 
loving circles in Austria to the declaration of war 
on Serbia. But as a matter of fact the opening of 
hostilities proceeded from Austria herself, as we 
discovered from the neutral press at the time : — 

* The reasons given by Austria for the opening of hostilities 
were inadequate. For Austria had not submitted the incriminating 
documents either to the Serbian or to a neutral Government; the 
documents incriminated Serbian individuals, but not the Govern- 
ment, and Austria's attempt to prove that these individuals were 
aiming at the separation of Bosnia was unsuccessful. 



Il6 Germany Her Own Judge 

Hostilities on the Austro-Serbian frontier have been 
opened by Austrian troops invading Serbia at Mitrovitz 
on the Save. The Serbians are retreating. (B.N. of the 
28th July, 1914.) 

The analogous Austrian assertion that Serbia 
had already ordered mobilization before deliver- 
ing the answer to the Austrian ultimatum has 
never been proved either. According to the neu- 
tral press, Austrian as well as Serbian mobiliza- 
tion took place after the rupture of relations: no 
doubt, it is nevertheless possible that preparations 
were made on both sides after the delivery of the 
Austrian note.^ 

This assertion on the part of Austria, too, must 
be regarded as a misrepresentation, for Austria gave 
as her reason for breaking off diplomatic relations 
not the supposed mobilization, but merely the ** pro- 
crastinating " answer of the Serbian Government. 
The question of premature mobilization is in any case 
unimportant (especially as it was a case of the gnat, 
in fear of the coming blow, turning its sting against 
the elephant's hide), for mobilization does not mean 
a state of war, as Austria herself declared later in 
the announcement of her general mobilization. 

^ The Berlin Lokal-Anzeiger at the outbreak of the war reported 
the arrival of Austrian and German men of military age from 
America, who reached Germany before the closing of the harbours. 
"Among the arrivals are merchants who have given up good posi- 
tions. . . . Many of them, who have their own establishments 
across the Atlantic, have left wife and children." It is obvious that 
these men of military age would not have determined on this step 
without definite direction from the Consuls, whence we see that 
the Central Powers had made all necessary preparations before- 
hand. 



The Outbreak of War — / 117 

5. Further Misrepresentations 

We know from the press, and from individual ex- 
pressions of opinion, that by far the greater part 
of the population of German territories struggled to 
prevent Austro-Serbian hostilities developing into 
a world war before they became acute. Intelligent 
members of the public foresaw that Austria's open 
attempt to crush Serbia, and so break up the status 
quo in the Balkans must inevitably lead to protest 
from the other Powers, especially from Russia. Even 
the White Book admits that the Governments of 
the Central Powers had looked for Russian inter- 
vention : — 

We were well aware that a possible warlike attitude of 
Austria-Hungary against Serbia might bring Russia upon 
the field and that it might therefore involve us in war in 
accordance with our duty as allies. 

It was to the interest of the Central Powers to 
represent the Russian protest as unjustified, and so 
it was necessary to represent Russian opinion as iso- 
lated. Accordingly Herr von Bethmann declared 
in his speech of the 4th August : — 

From the first moment of the Austro-Serbian conflict 
we declared that this question must be limited to Austria- 
Hungary and Serbia and we worked with this end in view. 
All Governments, especially that of Great Britain, took the 
same attitude. Russia alone asserted that she had a right 
to be heard in the settlement of the matter. 

But in fact Herr von Bethmann deviated from 
the truth ; for the protest of Russia, who was most 
directly threatened (in the Dardanelles) by the 



Ii8 Germany Her Own Judge 

realization of German Eastern policy, was sup- 
ported by France, as she too objected to any further 
strengthening of the Central Powers at the expense 
of the East. 

, Even on the 25th July, 1914, we read in the 
neutral press : — 

Viviani and Sazonov publish a communique which con- 
firms the complete agreement of their political views on the 
subject of the European balance of power and Eastern 
questions. (B.N.) 

Moreover, Italy protested simultaneously with 
Russia. The Chancellor and his organs concealed 
this fact most carefully, for Italy was certainly not 
pro-Serbian, and so her condemnation of Austria^s 
action must have carried special weight. 

It was not till the Austrian Red Book appeared 
six months after the outbreak of war that the fact 
had to be stated in consequence of Italian revela- 
tions: — 

As early as the 25th July the Duke of Avarna (the Ital- 
ian Ambassador in Vienna) explained that the Italian Gov- 
ernment reserved the right to claim compensation on the 
ground of their treaty of alliance, and demanded that Aus- 
tria-Hungary should come to an agreement with them be- 
fore occupying Serbian territory. (Summary of the new 
Red Book, N.Z.Z., 966.) 

From the same source we learn further: — 

There follows the first concession by the Austro-Hun- 
garian Government. On the ist August Count Berchtold, 
on the suggestion of the German Government, declares 
himself ready to negotiate about concessions to Italy — 
of course such concessions are not to be made out of the 
possessions of Austria-Hungary. 



The Outbreak of War — / 119 

So we find that Herr von Bethmann's statement 
that ^'only Russia asserted that she had a right to 
be heard in the settlement of the matter** was 
utterly false. But why did the Chancellor conceal 
the truth? 

The answer is that it would look bad if Germany 
herself, on the very first day of war, began the bar- 
tering of foreign territory of which it might even- 
tually wish to accuse the enemy. 

Subsequently, the Entente, and especially the 
English "nation of shopkeepers," was freely 
charged with such bartering by the German Press, 
and also, unfortunately, by a part of the Swiss Press. 
They did not know that Germany had been the 
first to recommend this contemptible "shopkeeper 
policy*' to her ally, just before she began the war 
by the bombardment of Libau! 

Moreover, Russia's standpoint appears justifiable 
as soon as Serbia's antagonist Italy — for whom 
an advance of Slav power in the Balkans might be 
as dangerous as for Austria — associated herself, 
in her judgment of the ultimatum, with Russian 
distrust of Austria. 



CHAPTER X 
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 

Part H. The Russo-German Dispute 
I. Questionable Mediation 
'*No State could have made more honest and ener- 
getic efforts to preserve the peace of the world than 
Germany/' 

If these words of the Chancellor are true, Ger- 
many must have undertaken some kind of pacific 
action. This could only have been a mediating ac- 
tivity between Austria, who was aiming at Serbia's 
destruction, and Russia, who was openly oppos- 
ing it. German propaganda, therefore, repeatedly 
asserts that mediation was initiated by Germany 
for the preservation of peace, and especially that 
the Emperor undertook the part of mediator. 

About the same time and before receipt of this telegram, 
the Czar asked the Emperor to come to his aid and to 
induce Vienna to moderate her demands. The Emperor 
accepted the r61e of mediator. . . . 

In spite of this we continued our task of mediation in 
Vienna and carried it to the utmost point which was com- 
patible with our position as ally. . . . 

While we were mediating in Vienna in compliance with 
Russia's request . . . (Chancellor's Speech of the 4th Au- 
gust, 1914.) 

The Austro-Hungarian Government remarked that it 
fully appreciated our mediating activity, but that the pro- 
posal had come too late, hostilities having already been 
opened. In spite of this we continued to make all possible 



The Outbreak of War — // 121 

efforts at mediation, and we advised Vienna to adopt a con- 
ciliatory attitude, wherever it was compatible with the 
dignity of the Monarchy. . . . 

Shoulder to shoulder with England we laboured inces- 
santly at mediation, and supported every proposal in 
Vienna which seemed to us to promise a peaceful solution 
of the conflict . . . Whilst these endeavours of ours for 
mediation were being continued from July 29th to 31st 
with increasing energy, supported by English diplomacy, 
etc. (White Book.) 

Similar references to Germany*s serious efforts at 
mediation are frequent in the White Book; impar- 
tial readers, however, are struck by the fact that 
there is no single document which might give an 
insight into the method of mediation. In other 
words, the German despatches to the Austrian Gov- 
ernment on the subject, which would be of such 
immense importance, are not in the White Book. 
Their absence is extraordinarily suspicious. 

The request for mediation came from Russia, 
as we learn from the telegrams from the Czar to 
the Emperor: — 

To prevent such a calamity as a European war would 
be, I urge you in the name of our old friendship to do all 
in your power to restrain your ally from going too far. 
(White Book, Exhibit 21.) 

We need your strong pressure upon Austria, to induce 
her to come to an understanding with us. (White Book, 
Exhibit 23a.) 

The Emperor undertook the mediation, but car- 
ried it out in a way which does not justify the 
word ^'mediation*' at all. The Czar wished to have 
guarantees that Serbia should not be crushed, and 
Russia should not be threatened by an alteration 



122 Germany Her Own Judge 

of the status quo; but the Emperor took up the 
Austrian point of view entirely, and pretended to 
mediate while in fact he only acted as transmitter. 
The following passage in the White Book shows 
clearly that the Central Powers thought they might 
regard transmission as mediation : — 

We further declared ourselves ready, after failure of the 
conference idea, to transmit a second proposal of Sir Ed- 
ward Grey's to Vienna, in which he suggested that Austria- 
Hungary should decide either to regard the Serbian reply 
as sufficient or to use it as a basis for further negotiations. 
The Austro-Hungarian Government remarked that it fully 
appreciated our mediating action, but that the proposal 
had come too late, hostilities having already been opened. 

When a person only transmits, he has no right 
to claim the role of mediator. A famous German 
author calls this sort of service *' postman service.*' 

All the Great Powers were convinced that Austria 
could protect her vital interests against Serbian 
aggression without endangering outsiders by al- 
terations of the status quo; Germany, however, 
shared the Austrian view that it was urgently neces- 
sary to crush Serbia. Here is the evidence from 
the White Book: — 

We found ourselves in the most hearty agreement with 
our ally's estimate of the situation, and were able to assure 
him that any action which he considered necessary to end 
the movement in Serbia directed against the conservation 
of the monarchy would meet with our approval. . . , 

We, therefore, permitted Austria a completely free hand 
in her action against Serbia. 

Those are certainly not the words of a mediator. 
On the contrary, these sentences in the White Book 



The Outbreak of War — II 123 

agree absolutely with the definition of Germany's 
attitude which was published before the war, e.g., 
in the Vienna Neue Freie Presse (No. 17932): — 

Bedin, 27th July. As to the attitude of the German 
Government to efforts at mediation, your correspondent 
is told by an authoritative source that efforts at mediation 
are not, of course, absolutely precluded, but the decisive 
questions for the German Government are: Does Austria 
desire mediation? And if so, to what extent? The German 
Government would only participate in mediation if it knew 
that it was desired in Vienna. Germany decisively repu- 
diates participation in any mediation that is unwelcome in 
Vienna, as such participation would be equivalent to bring- 
ing pressure to bear on an ally. 

As your correspondent learns further, the diplomatic 
action which various Powers are planning is directed in the 
first instance to mediation between Austria and Russia, but 
it is to take the form of mitigating the harshness of some 
of the Austrian claims against Serbia. \: 

As we discover from the official propaganda of the 
Central Powers, Austria did not desire this "miti- 
gation"; on the contrary, this propaganda describes 
the steps taken by Austria as merely "defensive 
measures against Serbian agitation," explains "that 
Austria-Hungary must of necessity demand guar- 
antees for the friendly behaviour of Serbia in the 
future" (White Book), and does not go into the 
question of the possibility of other methods.^ As 
Austria did not wish for mitigation, she could not 
welcome any mediating action; and that again, ac- 
cording to "the authoritative source," obliged Ger- 
many to stand aloof from genuine and effective 

^ For a detailed elucidation of why Austria's way was wrong, 
see pp. 93-115. 



124 Germany Her Own Judge 

mediation. If German propaganda nevertheless is 
at such great pains to speak of mediation, it cer- 
tainly confirms the view that the assassination of 
Serajevo cannot seriously be regarded as a sufficiently 
convincing excuse for the war; but it does not prove 
that Germany made energetic and honest efforts 
at mediation. The Emperor's Speech from the 
Throne in August speaks for the opposite view: — 

The Russian Empire has crossed the path of Austria- 
Hungary whilst the latter was pursuing her legitimate 
interests. Not only our duty as ally calls us to Austria's 
side; we are faced with the Herculean task of protecting 
our own position with the help of the ancient common civili- 
zation of the two Empires against the assault of hostile 
forces. 

When a speaker, a few days after assuming the 
r&le of mediator, asserts so decidedly the absolute 
right of one of the parties and even adds that he is 
called to the side of that party by his own inter- 
ests, he admits that he never could have been 
reckoned as a mediator at all. 

Germany's efforts at mediation are best summa- 
rized as follows: **You, Russia, will gain nothing 
from me, Germany; but I will gladly look on while 
you negotiate with my friend Austria, because your 
chances in that quarter are even smaller.*' 

We can learn from the White Book that, accord- 
ing to the German point of view, Russia was to get 
nothing out of Austria. A despatch of the 28th 
July, 1 9 14, from the German Chancellor to the 
German Ambassador in Petrograd shows beyond 
dispute that Germany consented to induce Austria 



The Outbreak of War — II 125 

to enter upon explanations which should satisfy 
Russia, but not to think of negotiations, moderation 
of her claims, the acceptance of Russian or inter- 
State guarantees of future peace for Austria, or the 
abandonment of the crushing of Serbia, and, least 
of all, of Germany's Eastern policy. Austria's ini- 
quitous and high-handed policy was to be pursued 
without let or hindrance. 

We do not relax our efforts to induce Vienna to give con- 
vincing explanations at Petrograd, which we trust will be 
satisfactory to Russia, with regard to the object and scope 
of Austrian action in Serbia. The declaration of war (against 
Serbia) which has meanwhile ensued alters nothing in this 
matter. (White Book, Exhibit 14.) 

There was no need of German interference for 
these ** convincing explanations," for the explana- 
tion of external actions is a most elementary neces- 
sity as soon as a neighbouring State intervenes. To 
withhold it is equivalent to a gross insult — even 
to a declaration of war. The preservation of peace 
did not demand "explanations," but a discussion 
between the two parties (Austria on one side and 
Russia and Italy on the other) of the most suitable 
method for dealing with the common menace. 
Consequently the German assertion of her at- 
tempts at mediation is a pure invention. 

2. Austria provokes the Russian Mobilization 
Austria mobilized directly after breaking off re- 
lations with Serbia, i.e., on the 26th July; accord- 
ing to the White IBook, against Serbia, but, as 
Herr von Bethmann has to admit, she also mobil- 



126 Germany Her Own Judge 

ized two army corps in Bohemia, ttet is to say 
against Russia (Poland). Russia answered this 
partial mobilization at first merely by preparatory 
steps : — 

On July 27th the Russian Secretary of War, M. Su- 
khomlinov, gave the German military attach6 his word of 
honour that no order to mobilize had been issued; prepara- 
tory measures only were being taken, but not a horse had 
been mustered nor reserves called up. (White Book.) 

On the same date (27th July) Russia issued the 
following warning : — 

If Austria-Hungary crosses the Serbian frontier, the mili- 
tary districts ^directed towards Austria, i.e., Kiev, Odessa, 
Moscow, Kazan, will be mobilized. (White Book.) 

We learnt through the neutral press on the fol- 
lowing day that, in spite of this warning, hostili- 
ties had been begun by the invasion of Serbia by 
Austria. 

The logical consequence was the Russian decision 
of the 29th July to mobilize partially, which was 
published in an official communique on the 30th 
July at 4 A.M. (according to a letter of the Belgian 
Ambassador in Petrograd, which was seized in 
Germany). The decision was communicated to the 
German Government on the 29th July (White Book) , 
after the Chief of the Russian General Staff, Janush- 
kevitch, had offered the German military attach6 
at 3 P.M. on the same day his word of honour in 
writing, according to which no mobilization had 
taken place at that time. On his word as an officer 
he declared that all news to the contrary was false, 
though here and there there might have been a 



The Outbreak of War — II 127 

false alarm. ^ (White Book, and Wolff's reports on 
Sukhomlinov's trial.) 

All the reports of the White Book which put the 
Russian mobilization on the 26th and 27th July are 
to be rejected as untrue, for the Chief of the General 
Staff could never have given his word of honour in 
writingy unless he had known that no witness would 
appear against him later. Again, there is not a single 
neutral in Russia who doubted his word of honour.^ 

Thus it is established that Russia only proceeded 
to mobilize three to four days later than Austria, This 
fact proves beyond dispute how much Russia desired 
peace. On the other hand, it is obvious that, in 
view of the slowness of her mobilization, she was 
bound to take preparatory steps; even Germany, 
which in Moltke's words can be regarded as "per- 
manently mobilized,** did not omit preparatory 
measures. We need only point out here that the 

^ Any one who knows Russia will regard it as very possible that 
the (admitted) preparatory steps on the Russian side may have 
caused false alarms. A rumour of mobilization was current in Riga 
— merely on the strength of the recall of officers on leave in the 
neighbouring health resort, Majorenhof; nothing was known of 
the rumour in Riga itself. Mobilization was not so drilled into 
the people in Russia as in Germany, and so in a crisis the smallest 
preparatory measures might give rise to false rumours. 

^ German propaganda has recently tried to represent the word 
of honour of the Chief of the General Staff as a "deception" on the 
strength of Sukhomlinov's trial, because the former declared that 
he "still" (or as the Germans say "already") had the ukase in his 
pocket. This is a question of malicious misrepresentation, for the 
Chief of Staff expressly added that he could give no assurance for 
the future. Similarly the Russian Government informed the Ger- 
man Government en regie on the same day of their partial mobili- 
zation. The action of Janushkeviteh was merely intended to cor- 
rect the false German accusations. 



128 Germany Her Own Judge 

German proclamation of ''imminent danger of 
war'* involves a concentration of forces, i.e., 
mobilization. (Cf. the note, p.ii6.) 

Our insight into the development of mobiliza- 
tion after the 29th July is less clear. The White 
Book utterly ignores the Austrian general mobiliza- 
tion and merely states that Russia interrupted the 
strenuous efforts of Germany for peace by her gen- 
eral mobilization on the morning of the 31st July. 

Before this telegram (of 2. p.m. on the 31st July) reached 
its destination, the mobilization of all the Russian forces, 
obviously directed against us and already ordered during 
the morning of that day, was in full swing. 

Two years later Herr von Bethmann gave the 
same morning (July 31) as the date of the Aus- 
trian general mobilization, while he assigned the 
Russian mobilization to the night of the 30th- 
31st. These extremely inaccurate, unsubstan- 
tiated, and self-contradictory statements are not 
cleared up by the recent revelations in the Vos- 
sische Zeitung about Sukhomlinov's trial; these 
latest unofficial reports are even more confused and 
self-contradictory than anything hitherto published. 

On the other hand, two documents which went 
the round of the press in August, 19 14, are clear 
enough to give the student an idea of the course 
of events: — 

I. Vienna^ the ist August (Official): — 

The official papers in Vienna and Buda-Pesth make the 
following announcement to-day: "According to an official 
communication of the 31st July the Emperor has ordered 
the general mobilization of the army and navy and of both 



The Outbreak of War — // 129 

classes of the Landwehr, as well as the summoning and en- 
rolment of the Landsturm. This step is due to the mobiliza- 
tion ordered by Russia. The measure ordered by the Em- 
peror has no aggressive aim of any sort, but it is merely a 
question of precautionary measures for the necessary de- 
fence of the monarchy. {Berliner Tagehlatt, No. 386.) 

The wording of this Austrian communique is 
extraordinarily suggestive and is therefore of his- 
torical importance. We see, above all, that Austria 
knew nothing of a Russian general mobilization when 
she promulgated her own; for it would be an unpar- 
donable sin of omission to know of the Russian 
general mobilization and not base her own action on 
it. The Central Powers knew no more than the rest 
of the world — namely, merely that on the 29th July 
Russia had decided on partial mobilization and 
published her decision on the 30th July. Therefore, 
the White Book, too, is silent, as we have shown, 
about the Austrian general mobilization and fixes 
the Russian on the 31st July, i.e., on the same day 
on which the Austrian was proclaimed very early in 
the morning. The Emperor, too, telegraphed at 
2 p M. on that day, that is to say, long after the 
proclamation of Austrian general mobilization, to 
the Czar: ''Now I receive reliable news that serious 
preparations for war are going on on my Eastern 
frontier also." That means that the news before 
was not reliable and that the Russian preparations 
were not serious, although France had already raised 
a protest two days before against infringements of 
her frontier by German patrols. A splendid tes- 
timony to Russian forbearance! 



130 Germany Her Own Judge 

Similarly the same Austrian document expressly 
draws attention to the fact that her general mobili- 
zation had no aggressive aim, an assurance which 
Germany recognizes as accurate in Austria's case, 
but which later she strangely refuses to accept 
in the case of her Russian neighbour. 
■ 11. In the middle of August the German press 
felt called upon to publish an exchange of tele- 
grams between King George and the Czar, which 
had previously filtered into Germany through the 
Dutch press. The genuineness of the telegrams was 
not doubted. The Czar*s communication throws 
light on the Russian view of the mobilization : — 

The object of Austria^s action was to crush Serbia and 
make her a vassal of Austria. The effect of this would have 
been to upset the balance of power in the Balkans, which 
is of such vital interest to my Empire. Every proposal, 
including that of your Government, was rejected by Ger- 
many and Austria. . . . Austria's declaration of war on 
Serbia forced me to order a partial mobilization, though, 
in view of the threatening situation, my miHtary advisers 
strongly advised a general mobilization owing to the quick- 
ness with which Germany can mobilize in comparison with 
Russia. I was eventually compelled to take this course in 
consequence of the complete Austrian mobilization,^ of the 
bombardment of Belgrade, of the concentration of Austrian 

^ It is well known that Austria is accused by Russia of having 
overstepped the limits of partial mobilization as early as the 28th 
July, and no clear Austrian dementi has appeared against this 
assertion. It is true that the promulgation of the Austrian general 
mobilization only took place on the 31st July at about i a.m., i.e., 
in the very early morning; still it must be taken as obvious that 
the order for it was signed by the aged Emperor at the latest on 
the previous day. On the other hand, it may be assumed on the 
strength of Sukhomlinov's trial that the corresponding Russian 
ukase was also signed on the evening of the 30th July. 



The Outbreak of War — // 131 

troops in Galicia, and of secret military preparations being 
made in Germany. . . . 

Here we see, in contradiction to the statement 
in the Austrian document, that the Russian gen- 
eral mobilization was based on the Austrian. This 
evidence, drawn from the Czar's telegram, retains 
its force so long as German propaganda leaves us 
in the dark about the progress of the Austrian 
mobilization. But the document cites even more 
cogent reasons for quickening the mobilization. 
The Czar says quite truly that the maintenance 
of the balance of power in the Balkans is a vital 
interest for his Empire ; he speaks further of threat- 
ening military measures undertaken by the Cen- 
tral Powers. These phrases indicate the real rea- 
sons which forced the slowly mobilizing Russians 
to defensive measures. These were absolutely 
inevitable, after Count Pourtales had threatened 
war on the 29th July on the mere hypothesis that 
Russia was mobilizing also against Germany, ^ 
and when no answer was returned to Sazonov's 
proposal on the 30th July, according to which 
Russia bound herself to stop her military prepara- 
tions provided Austria would mitigate the notori- 
ously harsh points in her ultimatum. ^ After these 
occurrences war seemed inevitable and it was only 
a question of keeping the precautionary measures 

^ This event, reported in the Russian Orange Book, was only 
recently confirmed in a German interview and was therefore not 
mentioned in our first edition. 

2 The corresponding document is missing in the original German 
propaganda. On the other hand, it is confirmed in the German 
Rainbow Book, p. 262, and so can be referred to here. 



132 Germany Her Own Judge 

secret as long as possible in order not to make the 
situation still more acute. 

Austria, by the intransigent attitude of her 
diplomacy and by her premature mobilization 
against Russia, set the military machine in mo- 
tion. Europe experienced one of its most tense 
political moments. The obvious intention of crush- 
ing Serbia appeared as the natural consequence 
of the previous Balkan policy of the Germanic 
Powers. *' Berlin-Bagdad '' was not only demanded 
by the Pan-Germans, but in the last few years 
had been the aim of both Imperial Governments. 
The championing of a Greater Bulgaria, the un- 
friendly policy of Austria towards Serbia, the 
mission of Liman von Sanders, the milliard-mark 
loan ... 

A Russian capitulation was impossible on this 
occasion, for in 191 8 even *' completed prepara- 
tions'' would be no match for ''the completed coali- 
tion.'* Of two evils Russia chose the lesser, and 
this time did not reject the sword in spite of the 
wavering and the humane disposition of her ruler. 

The ominous course of events, we may add, was 
known in Berlin. The Wilhelmstrasse prophesied 
to the Belgian representative, Baron Beyens: — 

Austria will reply to Russian partial mobilization by a 
general mobilization. It is to be feared that Russia too 
will thereupon mobilize her full forces, which would cause 
Germany to do the same. ("L'AUemagne avant la guerre," 
p. 299.) 

This prophecy is confirmed in the Red Book, 
No. 48, where Austria openly declares that she will 



The Outbreak of War —II 133 

reply to Russian partial mobilization by her own 
general mobilization. 

3. Setting the Stage for the World War 
The Central Powers could not permanently 
avoid the conference which all peace-loving circles 
demanded. So they finally resolved to agree to a 
sham conference; the necessary instructions, how- 
ever, were not sent to M. Sazonov until the Cen- 
tral Powers had previously, as we have shown, pro- 
voked Russia to a general mobilization. This was 
apparently taken hy Germany as a reason for her 
own mobilization, but was actually used as a cause 
of war. Thus the consent even to a sham conference 
was illusory and war was made inevitable by the 
German intervention. 

The White Book tried to remove the extremely 
painful and incriminating impression which the 
belated consent of Austria to the sham conference 
was bound to produce, by announcing and ante- 
dating the "readiness to enter upon conversa- 
tions.'' For it gives the date as the 29th July: — 

In reply to the various enquiries concerning reasons for 
its threatening attitude, the Russian Government repeat- 
edly pointed out that Austria-Hungary had commenced no 
conversation in Petrograd. The Austro-Hungarian Am- 
bassador was therefore instructed on July 29th, at our sug- 
gestion, to enter into such conversation with Sazonov. 

In contradiction to this we quote from the Chan- 
cellor's Speech of the 9th November, 191 6, to 
show that this suggestion was not made in Vienna 
till the 30th July: — 



134 Germany Her Own Judge 

You all know the instructions which I sent to Vienna 
on the 30th July. In them I suggested to the Austro- 
Hungarian Government an immediate understanding with 
Russia. 

Similarly the Red Book, No. .49, shows that the 
instructions in question were only communicated 
to the Austrian Ambassador in Petrograd on the 
30th July. No. 56 of the Red Book even proves 
that it was not till two days later, on the 1st Au- 
gust, that the Austrian Ambassador carried out 
his instructions. Moreover, the character of this 
''sham conference" manoeuvre is clearly revealed 
by the documents in the Red Book; for the dis- 
cussion of the notorious points in the Austrian 
ultimatum which Russia desired is again watered 
down to a mere ^'explanation'^ ■ — a term the sig- 
nificance of which is sufficiently familiar to the 
reader (No. 49). No. 50 of the Red Book defines 
the instruction: — 

In any case this could only take the form of subsequent 
explanations, as it was never our intention to allow our- 
selves to be induced by negotiation to depart in any way 
from the points contained in the note. 

Thus the responsibility of Austria for the world 
war is incontrovertihly established: Austria rejected 
up to the last minute every proposal for coming to an 
agreement with regard to her procedure against Ser- 
bia. All Austrian attempts to prove her desire 
for peace sound sophistical in view of this fact. 
Even the White Book recognizes indirectly that 
Austria's action was objectionable; for it no longer 
speaks of an ''explanation," but of a "conversa- 



The Outbreak of War — // 135 

tion** desired and agreed to. And Herr von Beth- 
mann actually refers to his instructions for an 
immediate ''understanding," while Austria as a 
matter of fact did not depart one step from her 
original position. 

Nevertheless, Germany's responsibility is not 
less than Austria's. For Germany, who had recog- 
nized the Austrian mobilization as defensive, who 
herself had undertaken defensive military action 
and in so doing had permitted herself certain in- 
fringements of the French frontier by patrols, sent 
the following ultimatum to Russia — even before 
the Austrian Ambassador produced his instruc- 
tions for a sham conference : — 

In spite of negotiations still pending and although we 
have up to this hour made no preparations for mobiliza- 
tion, Russia has mobilized her entire army and navy — 
against us, therefore, as well as against Austria. By these 
Russian measures we have been forced, for the safety of the 
country, to proclaim "the imminent danger of war," which 
does not yet imply mobihzation. Mobilization is, however, 
bound to follow, unless Russia stops every measure of war 
against us and against Austria-Hungary within twelve hours 
and notifies us definitely to this effect. (White Book.) 

The impropriety of this demand is obvious: 
Russia was to demobilize completely ("against 
us and against Austria-Hungary") while Austria 
remained mobilized. Russia could give no un- 
qualified assent to such a challenge in spite of 
factors which made the conduct of war difficult, 
such as insufficient material preparation, drought, 
etc. The ultimatum will stand alone in the history 
of the world, not only for the insulting demand 



136 Germany Her Own Judge 

which it makes, but also for its perfidious charac- 
ter; while it says, put shortly, ''Either you de- 
mobilize or I mobilize too,'' the real underlying idea 
is, "or I declare war." It is true that the Ger- 
man Ambassador in Petrograd stated on the 26th 
July: "Preparatory military measures by Russia 
will force us to counter-measures which must con- 
sist in mobilizing the army. But mobilization 
means war.'* Doubtless a similar statement may 
also have been made incidentally in later conver- 
sations. But Austria issued meanwhile, on the 
occasion of the proclamation of her general mobi- 
lization, a contrary assurance which neutralized 
the effect of the German threat — more especially 
since the earlier German point of view found no 
expression, either in the ultimatum itself or in a 
personal communication, at the time when the 
ultimatum was delivered. How should the just- 
minded Germany approve of the defensive mobi- 
lization of her ally and refuse the like rights to 
her neighbour? As a matter of fact, when the 
German Ambassador delivered his ultimatum and 
Sazonov asked whether the German mobilization 
meant war, he answered in the negative. His 
comment, "We should be very near war'' (Rain- 
bow Book, p. 314), was natural in view of the cir- 
cumstances and does not cancel the negative. In 
any case, the denial was false, though of this the 
Count was perhaps unconscious; for the German 
Government notified its Ambassador in Paris, on 
the 31st July, that it had delivered an ultimatum 
to the Russian Government, and that a rejection 



The Outbreak of War — // 137 

of it would inevitably mean war. (White Book, 
Exhibit 25.) This declaration was concealed from 
the Russians till the time limit had expired. 
(White Book, Exhibits 24 and 25.) Why did 
"peace-loving'* Germany not send Russia a more 
honest ultimatum, though with a shorter time 
limit, or give her Ambassador instructions to tell 
the Czar the plain truth shortly before the end 
of the time limit? Germany was more especially 
bound to correct the false impression, inasmuch 
as the Emperor, in reply to the Russian general 
mobilization, sent the Czar the following telegram 
on the 31st July: "Responsibility for the safety 
of my Empire forces me to measures of defence.** 
(White Book.) The phrase "measures of defence*' 
does not lead one to expect a declaration of war. 
The result was that, instead of the Russian Gov- 
ernment answering the ultimatum, the Czar sent 
the following answer — or rather, further question 
— to the Emperor: — 

I have received Your telegram. I comprehend that You 
are forced to mobilize, but I should like to have from You 
the same guarantee which I have given You, viz., that these 
measures do not mean war and that we shall continue to 
negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the uni- 
versal peace which is so dear to our hearts. With the aid 
of God it must be possible for our long-tried friendship to 
prevent the shedding of blood. With full confidence I ur- 
gently beg for Your reply. (White Book.) 

A more favourable reply from Russia to the 
ultimatum was not expected in Berlin, for we 
read in the Berliner Tageblatt on the 1st August 
1914: — 



138 Germany Her Own Judge 

That the Russian answer will be favourable, is not be- 
lieved even by certain high personalities of the Foreign 
Diplomatic Corps in Berlin who have hitherto preserved 
a certain optimism. At least, no one at this hour dares to 
express such a hope. The best that any one dares to regard 
as possible is that the answer might not absolutely reject 
the demand. 

Germany could not expect any further answer, 
seeing that her declaration of war had crossed the 
Czar's question, and she had therefore herself 
broken off relations. 

The whole method of procedure of German di- 
plomacy reminds one of the schoolboy game of 
"tripping up.*' 

4. The Pretended Attack 

In order to increase the indignation of her own 
people and to win the sympathy of neutrals, Ger- 
man propaganda represented the course of events 
as if Russia had fallen upon Germany without giv- 
ing an answer to the ultimatum, and as if France 
also had joined in the attack, in equal disregard of 
international law. Evidence : — 

We still do not know what Russia's answer to our demand 
was. (Chancellor's Speech of the 4th August.) 

Russia began the war. (Big-type headline in the Berliner 
Tagehlatt of the 3d August, 1914.) 

Before a declaration of war was made or a breach of dip- 
lomatic relations had arisen, Russian troops invaded Ger- 
man territory and so began war against the German people. 
{Lokal-Anzeiger of the 3d August.) 

The action (the Russian occupation of Eydkuhnen on 
the 2d August) is only important in so far as it is a fresh 
proof that Russia attacked German territory and so began 
the war. {Lokal-Anzeiger of the 3d August.) 



The Outbreak of War —II 139 

We have long known that the brutal attack on Germany 
which is now being carried out was being plotted in cold 
blood by England and her fellow conspirators of the En- 
tente. {Lokal-Anzeiger of the 14th August.) 

The French and the Russians, who fell upon us without 
a declaration of war, and in breach of their pledged word, are 
worthy of one another. {Lokal-Anzeiger of the 4th August.) 

God permitted the enemy to compel us to spend Christ- 
mas here. We were attacked! (William II.) 

We shall carry on this war until we have secured our 
Empire from a fresh attack and insured for all time a free 
field for the peaceful operation of the German spirit and of 
German hands. (William II.) 

We shall not sheathe the sword till we have security that 
our neighbours will not fall upon us again. (President of 
the Herrenhaus.) 

A few months later Russia, England, and France fell upon 
us together, in order to destroy us. A peaceful people has never 
been so shamefully attacked. (Finance Minister Lentze.) 

Half the world has risen up to destroy us. {Norddeutsche 
AUgemeine Zeitung.) 

It is officially reported from Berlin, the 6th August, that 
the Austrian Government informed the German Govern- 
ment that their Ambassador in Petrograd, Count Szapary, 
had been instructed to notify to the Russian Government 
that Austria-Hungary — in view of the threatening atti- 
tude of Russia on the Serbian question, and also in view 
of the state of war which exists, in consequence of the 
Russian attack on Germany, between these two Powers — 
regards herself as in a state of war with Russia. (Berliner 
Tageblattj 395.) 

It IS not surprising that not only the whole Ger- 
man people, but neutrals also, were deceived by 
these positive assertions. And yet the German 
theory of a hostile attack is a distortion of the 
facts. It was not Russia that began the war by 
violating the frontier in the night between the ist 



140 Germany Her Own Judge 

and 2d of August, but Germany by the bombard- 
ment of Libau, soon after her delivery of the dec- 
laration of war. This fact was immediately re- 
ported by wireless to the German Admiralty, but 
delayed in publication and issued to the public 
under a wrong date. 

It was bound to strike any impartial and atten- 
tive reader of the Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger of the 
3d August {Der Montag, No. 388) that all the 
Russian and French hostile acts on the frontiers 
were dated, and that only the German bombard- 
ment of Libau (the announcement of which was 
put first in the paper) was undated. The reader 
could see clearly that the enemies' actions had 
taken place on the 2d August or at earliest in the 
night between the 1st and 2d of August. About 
German action there was only the following re- 
port (put first, it is true) : — 

Official Report ; The Commander of the small cruiser Augs- 
burg, Captain Andreas Fischer, reports at 9 p.m. by wire- 
less: "I am bombarding the naval harbour of Libau and 
am in action with an enemy cruiser. I have laid mines. The 
harbour of Libau is on fire. 

As the report was published in the press on the 
3d August, the public was sure to assume that the 
German bombardment had taken place the pre- 
vious evening, i.e., after the beginning of hostili- 
ties by Russia. Other papers gave the wrong 
date, but put the report in unofficial form: — 

The small cruiser Augsburg reported yesterday at 9 p.m 
by wireless: "Bombarding naval harbour Libau, am in 
action with enemy cruiser, have laid mines. Harbour Libau 
on fire. {Berliner Tagehlatt of the 3d August.) 



The Outbreak of War — II 141 

The real state of the case was manifest to every 
impartial reader. For the semi-official Lokal-An- 
zeiger gave the report in official form, but un- 
dated ; the Berliner TageblaU, writing for a critical 
public, did not dare do that, but gave the pre- 
sumptive date and published the report in unoffi- 
cial form. Hence, it was evident that the bombard- 
ment took place on Saturday, the ist August, 
and not on Sunday, the 2d. 

Later the Leipziger TageblaU had the misfor- 
tune to confirm this fact involuntarily. On the 
2 1st August it published a letter from a sailor on 
the Augsburg to his parents, in which we read: 
*'0n Saturday at about 8 o'clock we arrived before 
Libau, after successfully passing the mines the 
Russians had laid . . ."; and there follows a de- 
scription of the bombardment, etc. 

The whole fiction of a ''foreign assault*' would 
have been rejected at once, as it deserved to be, 
by the German people as well as by neutrals; but 
the former were bewildered and confused, whilst 
the racial sympathies of the latter had been excited 
to fever-heat.-^ 

German propaganda tried to ascribe to the enemy 

^ How credulously neutrals with Pan-German sympathies 
swallowed the German bait is shown by a pamphlet of our Federal 
judge, Professor Leo Weber, of Berne. In his Gedanken eines 
schweizerischen Neutralen uher das Buch J 'accuse, p. 17, we read: 
"The ultimatum to Russia was simply left unanswered. Hostili- 
ties began at three places on the Prussian frontier on the night 
between the ist and 2d of August. That is a fact which is proved 
by documents." Our thorough investigator ignores the fact that 
Germany before that wantonly bombarded Libau, because her 
documents do not report it! 



142 Germany Her Own Judge 

the opening of hostilities on the Western front, as 
on the Russian front. For this purpose it relied 
on worthless rumours which were in the air and 
were spread, I am sorry to say, officially. We can 
see from the following despatch how utterly worth- 
less these official reports were : ■ — 

It is officially reported that on the night of the 1st August 
an enemy airship was observed flying from Kersprich to 
Andernach. On the same night an hotel-keeper at Kochem 
and his son made an attempt to blow up the tunnel at 
Kochem. The attempt failed. Both were shot. Enemy 
flying machines were observed between Diiren and Cologne. 
A French aeroplane was shot down near Wesel. 

A fortnight later the following notice appeared 
in small print on a back page of the Berliner LokaU 
Anzeiger: — 

The attempt on the railway tunnel at Kochem on the 
Moselle, which was reported at the beginning of our mobili- 
zation, came before the military court of the fortress Cob- 
lence-Ehrenbreitstein yesterday, as we hear from Coblence. 
The accused hotel-keeper, Nikolai of Kochem, who was 
reported to have been already shot, was found not guilty 
and set free. Compensation was allowed him. 

Sunday, 2.45 p.m. Official: A military communique has 
just arrived to the effect that this morning French aviators 
dropped bombs in the neighbourhood of Nuremberg. As 
there has not yet been any declaration of war between 
France and Germany, this constitutes a breach of inter- 
national law. (Berliner Tagehlatt of Monday, the 3d August.) 

We happen to know the facts about this mili- 
tary report, which was spread officially, from the 
Friedenswarte (19 16, No. 7), a German paper which 
endeavours to restore the very doubtful reputa- 
tion of German honesty: — 



The Outbreak of War — // 143 

The news of the dropping of bombs on Nuremberg by 
French aviators before the beginning of the present war 
was regarded as a fact. It is still accepted as true by many 
people. The statement occurred in an article in the Ger- 
man Medical Weekly: "After a French aviator had dropped 
bombs even before the French declaration of war," etc. 
This caused the Medical Officer of Health, Professor J. 
Schwalbe, to investigate the incident. As a result, he wrote 
to the paper on the i8th May, 191 6: "It appears from a 
correspondence between Geheimrat Riedel and the Mayor 
of Nuremberg that this statement, which has never been 
confirmed, but yet is generally accepted throughout Ger- 
many as a proof of a breach of international law by French 
aviators, is as a matter of fact unfounded. The Mayor of 
Nuremberg wrote on the 3d April, 1916: *To the acting 
O.C. the 3d Bavarian Army Corps: Nothing is known here 
of any dropping of bombs by enemy aviators on the rail- 
way line Nuremberg-Kissingen and Nuremberg-Ansbach 
either before or after the outbreak of war. All statements 
and newspaper articles to this effect have turned out false.' " 

It is extremely damaging to German prestige 
that all these false reports were sent out to the 
world as official; also that the Chancellor brought 
them into his speech of the 4th August ; and most 
damaging of all that the ''Libau'* case clearly 
shows that the deception was intentional and de- 
liberate. 

5. Conclusion 

The above narrative, which is based on German 
and Austrian propaganda, may be shortly sum- 
marized as follows : — 

Austria delivered an ultimatum to Serbia which 
could not possibly be accepted without further nego- 
tiations; yet she precluded all possibility of negotiations 



144 Germany Her Own Judge 

by her declaration of war against Serbia. At the 
same time she refused to allow other Great Powers, 
which were interested in the status quo in the Balkans, 
to intervene in this preeminently international affair, 
on the pretext that the affair was purely local. The 
origin and progress of Serbian hatred were repre- 
sented in a one-sided and inaccurate way, and the 
possibility of reconciling Serbia and Austria by a 
conference of the Powers was peremptorily denied. 
Nevertheless, Austria failed to give sufficient guaran- 
tees for the preservation of the status quo in the Bal- 
kans and confined herself to an assurance that she 
would respect the territorial integrity of Serbia. As, 
however, the Central Powers could not permanently 
evade the conference, they finally expressed their 
consent to a sham conference, but only after Austria 
by her general mobilization had made Russian gen- 
eral mobilization absolutely inevitable and so had 
given her German ally a pretext for a declaration of 
war. The German theory that she is waging a ''de- 
fensive war'^ falls, therefore, to the ground. 

Similarly the Central Powers have failed to 
prove that an aggressive coalition directed against 
them existed before the outbreak of war. The fact 
remains that the Anglo-French friendship had not 
even the character of a defensive alliance adequate 
to maintain the European balance of power. 

It is equally well established that the formation 
of a defensive Triple Alliance was not even in 
prospect, owing to opposition on many sides, and 
especially in England. And finally, general Euro- 
pean politics in the last few years can be shown to 



The Outbreak of War — // 145 

have taken an exceedingly favourable turn for 
Germany and Austria. Hence the idea that this 
is a "preventive war'* on Germany's part must 
also be definitely rejected. 

It is not likely that any of these conclusions 
will need to be revised, for they are based, not on 
foreign, but on Germany's own evidence. 

It is to be hoped that in later and quieter times 
the German people will realize its own errors, for 
only so would it be in a position to help effectively 
in preventing similar catastrophes in the future. 
To-day Germany stands alone in her opinion, and 
the longer the war lasts, the clearer will her isola- 
tion appear. 

As the conclusion of our argument we may quote 
the words of the famous American jurist Dr. J. M. 
Beck which are to be found in his book "The 
Evidence in the Case" and are unfortunately only 
too true : — 

Germany's chief weakness to-day consists in her moral 
isolation. She stands condemned by the whole civilized 
world. No physical force which she is in a position to exer- 
cise can compensate for this loss of moral weight. Even 
success would be too dearly bought at such a price. There 
are things which are more successful than success. One of 
them is — the truth. 



THE END 



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